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This thesis examines the impact of colonial legal institutions planted by the British 
administration upon the working of local indigenous practices in Bengal from 1860 
to 1914. The aim of the thesis is two-fold. Firstly, the aim is to highlight the 
constraints and limitations faced by institutions that were reorganised following the 
assumption of Crown control in 1858. Secondly, the purpose is to illustrate the ways 
in which these limitations allowed the native population to mould, and manipulate, 
state institutions according to local needs and expectations.  
By examining these issues the aim is to highlight the tenuous relationship 
between western methods and indigenous practices, at times complementing each 
other and at other times proving to be incompatible. Through an examination of the 
system of criminal administration, the thesis seeks to highlight the complexities of 
the interaction between the local populace and colonial law. Rather than representing 
rigid categories which highlighted the difference between coloniser and colonised, 
the system of criminal administration was often the site where boundaries would 
often become blurred. As the thesis will aim to demonstrate through specific 
scenarios and cases described both in private memoirs and official records, it was a 
site which would be shaped by a number of influences- from clashing interests and 
changing alliances amongst local groups to the conflicting objectives of the colonial 
rulers themselves. In the process individual agencies were asserted that confound 
simplistic characterisations of the impact of colonialism in this important region 







CPC............................Criminal Code of Procedure 
IOR.............................India Office Records 
IPC..............................Indian Penal Code 
L/PJ/5.........................Public and Judicial Records (Acts Passed) 
L/PJ/6.........................Public and Judicial Records (1880-1914) 



















Glossary of Terms 
 
amlah     head Indian officers of
    a judicial or revenue 
    court 
 
bhadralok     educated, middle class
    Bengali society 
 
chotolok     lower orders 
 
chowkidar       village watchman 
darogah       sub inspector 
elaka        area 
lathials groups of armed men 
employed by zamindars 
ma-bap mother-father   
mofussil interior districts 
panchayat village council 
panha        ransom 
patwari       village accountant 
pugree        turban 
tehsildar revenue administrative 
officer 
thana        police jurisdiction 
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Chapter One: Introduction- Subalterns, Sovereigns and  
     Networks of Control 
    
The Government are very keen on amassing statistics- they 
   collect them, add them, raise them to the nth power, take  
   the cube root and prepare wonderful diagrams. But what  
   you must never forget is that every one of those figures comes  
   in the first instance from the chowkidar, who just puts in what   




What the judge was keen to emphasise in his conversation with politician Harold 
Cox was that the rhetoric of empire was far removed from the reality of running a 
colonial administration in British India. Although the judge did not specifically refer 
to the system of criminal administration in India, the above assertion can equally be 
applied to any examination of the colonial framework of policing and control. Within 
this framework, the chowkidar would form an integral part, commonly referred to as 
the first link in the chain of criminal administration. The colonial police and the 
criminal courts of law would form the second and third links in the chain and would 
be equally responsible in the distortion of the information-gathering process that is 
alluded to in the above statement. Together, these three key agencies would maintain 
a colonial structure of control which would have to be continuously moulded to meet 
the demands of the state and at the same time address the more local concerns held 
by the Indian subjects over whom the British ruled. It would be a chain that would 
prove to be fragile throughout the colonial period, most visibly so during periods 
when British rule in India was being challenged. 
A closer examination of the influences upon the chowkidar, the pressures 
which he faced at both state and local level, as well as the demands which other links 
in the chain of criminal administration endured alongside him, are points of enquiry 
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that can highlight the ways in which the network of control, designed to provide the 
necessary facts and figures, could instead reflect a number of conflicting dilemmas 
and concerns. 
The main purpose of this study is to explore the ambiguous relationship 
between the colonial administration and Indian society through an examination of 
archival material relating to law and policing in the province of Bengal. To be clear, 
the aim of the study is to examine the impact of colonial legal institutions planted by 
the British administration upon indigenous practices of control and punishment in 
Bengal from the mid-nineteenth century to the onset of the First World War in 1914. 
The purpose of the study is twofold: firstly, to highlight the constraints and 
limitations faced by colonial institutions that were reorganised following the 
assumption of Crown control in 1858; secondly, to illustrate the ways in which the 
limitations of the system allowed the local native population to mould and 
manipulate these institutions according to local needs and expectations. By 
examining these issues the aim is to examine the tenuous relationship between 
western methods and indigenous practices, at times complementing each other and at 
other times proving to be incompatible. An analysis of the ways in which the chain 
of criminal administration was distorted will also highlight the complexities of the 
interaction between the state and local groups, complexities which undermine 
simplistic notions of the impact of colonialism.  
In the report of the Indian Police Commission of 1902-03, which considered 
the various defects within the Indian police force, the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal 
commented upon the peculiar circumstances of the province under his control. What 
separated Bengal from other Indian provinces, he argued, was the problem of village 
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government, which differed ‘materially from other parts of India.’2 It was at the 
village level where the chain of criminal administration began, the point where 
information of a criminal nature was gathered and passed onto the official 
institutions of the state. Collaboration between the colonial authorities and leading 
indigenous agencies was a key aspect of this system. In provinces such as Punjab and 
the United Provinces there were a number of agencies, such as the patwaris and 
tehsildars, whose work was constantly inspected by district sub divisional officers. 
Due to the existence of numerous local agencies available to assist the government, 
and the higher level of control possessed by district magistrates in these provinces, 
the colonial authorities, thus, could still penetrate the interior districts of these 
provinces and gain access to various kinds of information.3  
In Bengal, on the other hand, it was believed that the revenue system 
introduced following the Permanent Settlement of 1793 had led to the weakening of 
traditional village agencies, leaving only the all-powerful landlord and the chowkidar 
as agents upon whom the colonial government depended for the transferral of 
information relating to criminal cases.4 The lack of alternative agencies, and the 
decisive influence of the zamindar in determining what type of information was 
passed onto legal institutions, ensured that the colonial authorities experienced 
                                                          
2
 See Indian Police Commission 1902-03 – Bengal Papers, volume 1, p. 85  
3
 Whilst in Bombay it was the village patel who was responsible for revenue and criminal matters, in 
Madras the Police Act XXIV of 1855 applied to both village and regular police. Elsewhere, in the 
North Western Provinces and Punjab, the district magistrate had tight control over the system of 
village watch. See Council Proceedings for the Amendment of the Chowkidari Act (V1) of 1870 
L/PJ/6/335, File  2148 (1892), p. 99 
4
 The Permanent Settlement essentially set the land revenue in perpetuity, permanently fixing the 
amount of rent to be paid by individuals declared as landlords, who by the terms of the settlement 
were declared official owners of the land. Furthermore, whilst in pre-colonial society village agents 
were given lands as gifts, various lands were resumed following the settlement, thus altering the 
nature of the relationship between traditional agencies and the zamindari class. 
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greater difficulties in trying to establish a link with village communities in the 
interior districts of Bengal.   
What followed during the period under review in this thesis was the attempt 
to ‘readjust’ traditional village agencies to meet state requirements. Chowkidari 
panchayats, designed by the colonial government to gain information of a criminal 
nature, were one example of a system completely alien in other provinces.5 The 
creation of village panchayats formed specifically to aid and assist police work in 
this particular province would in turn elicit very specific types of responses from 
rural communities. As this thesis will demonstrate, readjusting agencies at the village 
level, in a manner that was alien to the local population, would ultimately determine 
how the chain of criminal administration operated.  
The process of readjusting agencies at the village level also required the 
colonial authorities to justify such attempts. The concept of local self governance and 
the idea that reorganising village government would create responsible, legal citizens 
was thus heavily relied upon. But recreating agencies, of essentially introducing a 
system at odds with local custom, ensured that the differences between British and 
Indian conceptions of governance, law and justice would be brought into sharper 
focus in Bengal. Moreover, as this thesis will show, when the system was further 
readjusted by Indians themselves, and new identities formed as a result, the tensions 
and complexities of colonial rule were made further visible. It was in the province of 
Bengal where these complexities would become visible through the legal network of 
control. A network acknowledged by colonial authorities as differing from other 
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parts of British India, thus, suggests that it is the chain of criminal administration in 
the province of Bengal in particular that requires further examination. 6 
Local self governance became an increasingly prominent feature in the 
second decade of the twentieth century. The year 1914, at which point this study 
ends, marked the beginning of the First World War which resulted in a number of 
profound changes on a political, social and economic level. These changes placed 
different sorts of pressures upon the legal institutions of the colonial state. It was 
after the war that mass nationalism emerged, connecting elite politics with politics at 
the grass roots level.7 Rural concerns increasingly formed a key part of the nationalist 
campaign, thus connecting rural and urban society more effectively than in the period 
before the war. Furthermore, it was after 1914 that the colonial government devolved 
more powers to the provincial governments. In effect, what this meant was that 
panchayats which had previously supplemented the official legal institutions of the 
state were now granted an increasingly official, ‘legitimate’ status to deal with cases 
of a criminal nature. This study ends at this point because the dynamics of the 
relationship between indigenous groups and legal institutions changed. After 1914 
the acceleration of mass nationalism and the devolution of power, which granted 
rural powers a certain level of control over the legal apparatus of the state, were 
issues which altered the network of control. The complexities of such a shift require 
a separate, independent inquiry which falls outside the scope of this study. 
This study will make use of a wide range of both official and non official 
sources to critically analyse the manner in which the agencies of the colonial state 
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that it was wise ‘other Indian provinces did not follow the step taken by Bengal to entrust village 
police functions to the villagers themselves.’ See Council Proceedings for the Amendment of the 
Chowkidari Act (V1) of 1870 L/PJ/6/335, File  2148 (1892), p. 99 
7
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operated. The material includes in particular the police administration reports, which 
provide a detailed account of the ways in which crime was perceived, reported and 
handled by the agencies associated with the criminal justice system. Other sources 
include the memoirs of retired police officials as well as judicial reports focusing on 
key issues and events that would impact upon the working of the system of criminal 
administration. A constant theme that runs throughout these sources is the view that 
despite the existence of a colonial network of policing and control, many crimes 
were still unrecorded. The inspector general of police for the Lower Provinces in 
Bengal argued that he had insufficient manpower to control a huge rural province.8 
This, and the ‘general apathy’ of the rural population, ensured that ‘of crimes 
detected by the Police, and found to be true, less than one third are solved.’9  
The figures quoted in police reports suggest that the agencies of the state 
were ineffective and in a sense rejected by the local populace. However, the archival 
material also suggests that these agencies were not in actual fact absent, instead 
being worked in ways which would always undermine crime reporting methods. 
Indeed, as a whole, the archival material charts the dilemmas which arose from the 
moment that a crime was committed to the point at which it came to the attention of 
the chowkidar. The chowkidar was the first link in the system of criminal 
administration and a key agent in deciding whether the case should be passed on to 
the other institutions of the state. How and under what circumstances criminal cases 
made their way through the criminal justice system, the manner in which they were 
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 Only 20000 police officers, the inspector general argued, were entrusted with the duty of protecting 
the lives and property of more than forty million people living in scattered hamlets and homesteads 
spread over an area of 73000 square miles. See Police Administration Report for the Lower Provinces 
of Bengal for the Year 1914 
9
 It was also stated that only one in 700 persons was reported to have suffered an offence against their 
property.  One in 7000 was reported to have suffered an offence against their person in the Lower 
Provinces of Bengal. See Ibid. 
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handled, and the contradictions and conflicting demands that bore heavily on the 
police and the courts of law in that process, are all issues that are visible within these 
various sources.   
The following chapter will examine the differences between British and 
Indian perceptions of crime, law and policing, perceptions which would have a direct 
impact upon how the legal institutions of the state were viewed and employed by the 
indigenous population. Chapter three will focus upon the first link in the chain of 
criminal administration, the chowkidar. He was not in fact an agent of the official 
network of the state. Yet the state would make concerted efforts from the mid-
nineteenth century onwards to try and ensure that he resembled an official agent, 
doing the official work of the government without removing him from the local 
environment. The conflict which this would create between the state and the local 
agencies that fell outside the official network of the state, local agencies that heavily 
influenced the actions of the chowkidar, forms the focus of chapter three. Chapter 
four focuses upon the constraints and dilemmas faced by the police, having to serve 
their colonial masters whilst adjusting to the requirements of the local population 
whom they were supposed to protect. Chapter five focuses upon the final link in the 
chain, the British court, addressing why, and exactly when, the local population 
made use of this institution. The study will conclude by stressing the flexibility of the 
colonial network, which would allow various groups, including agents of the state, to 
subvert broader imperial agendas and adapt colonial legal institutions to the 
circumstances of the locality. This study will, however, first of all, begin by 
examining the existing historiography concerning law and policing in British India, 
which will be discussed in the remainder of this chapter. 
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1.1 Law, Policing and the Metropole 
Policing, and the establishment of a network of surveillance and control, was a 
crucial component of the colonial administration and central to the expansion of the 
British Empire. It was a system of control which developed according to the needs of 
the colonial rulers and reflected ambitions that differed markedly from indigenous 
systems in pre-colonial India. It was also influenced by changes within the metropole 
itself and this is a topic which has been researched extensively. 
 The development of crime in English society, the changing attitudes towards 
it and the institutions created to contain it, have been examined by various scholars 
from different disciplines. Whilst sociologists such as Robert Nye and David Garland 
have argued that it is not crime itself but how crime is perceived which ultimately 
influences institutional and public responses to it,10 various historians have 
considered the shifts in thoughts and perceptions of what crime was seen to be since 
the eighteenth century. Many have critically examined the transformation of the legal 
system amidst the huge political, social and economic changes that resulted from 
industrialisation in the nineteenth century.  
David Taylor, in his examination of the growth of the criminal justice system 
in England, has noted that eighteenth-century English society was one in which 
‘courts operated in a highly personalised manner...crime as an abstract concept was 
rarely discussed and the criminal, though a problem, was seen as a sinful figure but 
not a major threat to the stability of society.’11 From the middle of the eighteenth 
century, urbanisation and commercialisation profoundly changed the economic, 
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 See Robert Nye, ‘Crime in Modern Societies: Some Research Strategies for Historians’ in Journal 
of Social History, volume II (1978) and David Garland, Punishment and Modern Society: A Study in 
Social Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990) 
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 David Taylor, Crime, Policing and Punishment in England 1750-1914 (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1998), p. 2 
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social and political landscape of England and, argues Taylor, ‘a distinctive 
disciplinary state would develop...the growth and evolution of the criminal justice 
system was a central aspect of state formation.’12 In particular the emergence of a 
‘criminal class’, composed largely of those belonging to the indigent sections of 
society, has been extensively examined.13 What these studies emphasise is that the 
construction of the ‘criminal’ was very much dependent upon the moral and social 
panics which defined Victorian society and, indeed, upon the varying definitions of 
crime and criminals which existed between different social classes. Indian society 
was itself subjected to profound changes during the colonial period, and the 
following section will discuss the change from pre-colonial society to British 
governance.  
 
1.2 Indigenous Practices and British Sovereignty  
Systems of governance in pre-colonial India have been subjected to much scholarly 
analysis. In pre-colonial village society, Basudeb Chattopadhyah has noted that the 
‘maintenance of law and order and the administration of justice were the 
responsibility of the zamindars.’14 In a similar vein, Sandra Freitag has argued that 
perceptions of authority in pre-colonial India centred around a hierarchical system in 
which ‘each social unit had its locus of moral authority. Whilst they owed symbolic 
obedience to outside power holders, they wanted their own interests to be protected 
and no interference in their value system, a demand that power holders accepted as 
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 Ibid, p. 1. See also Clive Emsley, Policing and its context 1750-1870 (London: Macmillan, 1983) 
13
 See J.J. Tobias, Crime and Industrial Society in the Nineteenth Century (London: B.T. Batsford, 
1967), Douglas Hay, ‘Crime and Justice in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century England’ in Crime and 
Justice, volume II, (1980), pp. 45-84 and David Taylor, Crime, Policing and Punishment in England 
1750-1914  
14
 Basudeb Chattopadhyay, Crime and Control in Early Colonial Bengal: 1770-1860 (Calcutta: K.P. 
Bagchi & Co, 2000), p.19 
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long as their own demands were met.’15  Martine Van Woerkens has further stated 
that according to ancient Indian literature, kings and thieves were similar in the sense 
that they ‘used and misused power. There was no difference between the army of a 
prince and the gang of a robber as they were driving the imperial trade and the work 
of the emperor.’16 Jacques Pouchepadass has also noted that Indian society had an 
‘inclusive, holistic character which absorbed the norms of these deviant groups and 
gave them a place albeit one at the bottom of the social hierarchy.’17  
The changes within the criminal justice system in the metropole had a 
profound impact upon how the British viewed the Indian colony. The organisation of 
a fluid indigenous hierarchy in pre-colonial India was at odds with British visions of 
how law and order should be established in the colony. It was a vision influenced by 
a number of interests. Ranjan Chakrabarti and Basudeb Chattopadhyay have noted in 
their respective studies that the capitalist ambitions at the end of the eighteenth 
century required a new form of policing.18 This would ensure the security of revenue, 
which, as a result, in 1793 led to zamindars being stripped of their policing powers 
and a separate police force being created under the control of local magistrates. The 
subsequent division of each district into police jurisdictions, each under the control of 
a darogah and the establishment of police officers paid by the government, would 
coincide with the desire to establish a new form of colonial authority. Power was 
regarded as an exclusive right belonging to the state including, argues Ranjan 
Chakrabarti, the right to hold a monopoly over the instruments of coercion, which 
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 Sandra Freitag, ‘Collective Crime and Authority in North India’ in Anand Yang (ed.), Crime and 
Criminality in British India (Arizona: The University of Arizona Press, 1985), p. 142 
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 Martine Van Woerkens, The Strangled Traveller: Colonial Imaginings on the Thugs of India 
(Chicago: University of Chicago, 2002), p. 18 
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 Ibid, p. 20 
18
 See Basudeb Chattopadhyah, Crime and Control in Early Colonial Bengal 1770-1860 and Ranjan 
Chakrabarti, Authority and Violence in Colonial Bengal: 1800-1860 (Calcutta: Bookland, 1997) 
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would meet the ‘political and ideological need for the British to settle the population, 
to hold and discipline Indian subjects within a defined space with definite categories 
and roles.’19  
Finally, law and order was a central feature of a broader civilising mission 
which, Chakrabarti continues, portrayed India as a land devoid of any rule of law, 
with utilitarians arguing that the law would act as a tool which would ‘civilise’ the 
indigenous population and improve the morality of a backward Indian society.20 In a 
similar vein, John Marriott and Bhaskar Mukhopadhyay have argued that whilst pre-
colonial regimes were defined by the will of the sovereign, the British introduced a 
centralised, record- based form of governance which centred on, not the will of the 
sovereign, but the impersonal reason of the state.21 It was, as Partha Chatterjee 
continues, a form of governance in which the extraction of surplus was not enough. 
What the British wanted was to justify their presence in India and the benefits their 
governance would bring to the colonised subjects. This led, Chatterjee continues, to a 
colonial project in which both direct and indirect methods, from the collection of 
‘facts’ to law and medicine, were employed to validate colonial rule in India.22 
The vision of an exclusive authority and broader economic interests, which 
crystallised at the end of the eighteenth century, led to the creation of a network of 
policing and control which was designed to penetrate rural society more vigorously 
than before. Yet, as has been noted by a number of scholars, the main aim was to 
control and contain those elements which threatened the exclusive authority of the 
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 Ranjan Chakrabarti, Terror, Crime and Punishment: Order and Disorder in Early Colonial Bengal 
1800-1860, (Kolkata: Readers Service, 2009), p. 268 
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 Ranjan Chakrabarti, Authority and Violence in Colonial Bengal, 1800-1860, p. 9 
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 John Marriott, and Bhaskar Mukhopadhyay (eds.), Britain in India 1765-1905 (London: Pickering 
& Chatto, 2006), p. i 
22
 Ibid, p. xxvi 
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colonial state. In other words, it was the ‘criminal communities’, the wandering bands 
and freelance soldiers created by the economic and political dislocation of the early 
nineteenth century, who could, as Freitag has noted, ‘form as a band to attack other 
parties of recruits or travellers.’23 Collective criminality, Freitag argues, adhered to 
multiple indigenous systems of authority. The danger that this alternative indigenous 
system posed to the colonial network led to the creation of a detailed organisational 
structure, the aim of which was to emphasise the supremacy of British power over 
other local systems.24 It was an infrastructure which enabled the government to 
introduce special laws and legal shortcuts to deal specifically with groups.  The most 
famous example of this campaign against groups were the thugs of the early 
nineteenth century, whose ‘extermination’ depended upon carefully constructed 
stereotypes of native criminality, which, once verified as ‘fact’ through empirical 
investigation, could be dealt with using extralegal measures designed specifically to 
deal with the phenomenon of thagi. It paved the way for a whole host of groups to be 
dealt with in a similar manner throughout the colonial period. 
 The special attention given to cases of potentially threatening groups, and the 
special provisions put in place to control and contain these groups, meant that 
‘individual criminality’ was often a secondary concern, to be controlled by the new 
rural police created in 1793. Indeed, whilst William Sleeman proudly exclaimed that 
thagi had almost been ‘wiped out’ between the years 1831 and 1843, at around the 
same time, in 1838, a report concluded that there were serious defects in the ordinary 
system of law.25 This system of control has been the subject of several key studies. 
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 The defects in the Mofussil Police, concluded the Bird Committee Report of 1838, ‘pervade every 
grade of the Establishment...magistrates are overwhelmed, darogas and the subordinates corrupt...and 
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Ranjan Chakrabarti has emphasised the negative impact of the Raj upon the 
traditional social and political order in rural society which he states broke down due 
to the ‘forceful impact of the Raj.’26 Chakrabarti has argued that state institutions in 
the form of the police and the courts of law were not embraced by the rural 
population of Bengal because it was far removed from the local zamindari justice to 
which they were accustomed.27 Basudeb Chattopadhyay, however, has stated that 
colonial power was not all-encompassing in rural society. Chattopadhyay argues that 
far from their power being destroyed, local leaders could adapt to and indeed 
manipulate the new system.28 In other words, the zamindars may have been stripped 
of their policing powers but government officers were still dependent upon them to 
assist in the apprehension of criminals. Crucially, the zamindars still had the power to 
nominate and remove village chowkidars, thus ensuring that the East India Company 
was dependent upon them for local information. The policeman may have been the 
visible link between the rulers and local society, but it was the chowkidar who was 
the real link to information regarding criminal matters and he was largely under the 
influence of the zamindar. Added to this, Chattopadhyay continues, the police were 
themselves more amenable to local forces as opposed to the colonial rulers.  Thus, the 
colonial authorities may have ensured that the thana, in form at least, represented the 
single, exclusive authority of the colonial state. However, in the everyday running of 
the system of criminal administration, there was in existence what Chittabrata Palit 
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has termed a ‘parallel government’, the purpose of which was to ‘keep landlord 
power at a minimum yet responsibility at a maximum.’29 
 What these various studies stress is the variety of conflicting interests which 
would often collide. The protection of investment, the desire to maintain the ‘levers 
of social control’ at minimum cost and the expectation that local elites would assist 
the government despite stripping them of their traditional powers, together led to a 
precarious relationship between local society and the colonial government. This, in 
turn, would have an impact upon the way in which the system of criminal 
administration would operate. The uneasy coexistence between the civilising mission 
and the practicalities of empire would become even more visible and fragile 
following the assumption of Crown control in 1858.  
The process of trying to tighten the administration and create a more efficient 
system had begun long before the Mutiny of 1857. Indeed, Thomas Macaulay had 
arrived in 1834 to draft the Indian Penal Code as a single system of law; one that 
would be marked by its unity and simplicity – like the English system but without the 
cumbersome technicalities. A spate of legislation in the years after 1857 reflected this 
in the form of the Police Act V of 1861, the Criminal Code of Procedure of 1862 and 
the Indian Evidence Act of 1872. Each act in principle clearly defined the role, 
responsibility and procedure to be followed by the agencies of the state – including 
the role of the rural community, which was to ‘assist’ in the information-gathering 
process. 
James Fitzjames Stephen may have triumphantly declared the success of the 
codification of law in India, but in fact it made the difficulties of applying theory to 
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practice more visible. A number of scholars have critically examined how agencies 
within the system of criminal administration operated. Indeed, the archival material, 
which will be consulted throughout this study, has formed a part of their analysis. 
The colonial police in particular have been the subject of considerable scholarly 
attention because, as historians David Anderson and David Killingray have pointed 
out, they ‘played a vital role in the construction of the colonial social order. It lay 
very much at the centre of the ideologies of imperial rule that informed social 
construction as well as political domination.’30 Moreover, as the ‘most visible public 
symbol of colonial rule, in daily contact with the population and enforcing the codes 
of law that upheld colonial authority, the colonial policeman stood at the cutting edge 
of colonial rule.’31 He was also the symbol of colonial power. David Arnold has 
written extensively on the role of the police as servants of the state rather than the 
people.32 Anandswarup Gupta has similarly noted the focus of the police upon crimes 
that were a direct threat to the colonial state.33 Arvind Verma has also pointed out in 
his examination of police registers that the appearance of a strong government was 
often of greater importance than dealing with the underlying causes of crime.34 Arun 
Mukherjee, whilst mainly focusing on a quantitative analysis of the levels of crime in 
colonial Bengal, nonetheless points out that the Indian Penal Code labelled a whole 
host of native practices as ‘criminal’. Thus the sudden ‘rise’ in certain types of 
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criminal activity reflected government attempts to categorise activities which were 
not traditionally considered to be deviant.35  
An insight into the limitations of the colonial administration can be gleaned 
from these studies, which highlight the inequalities which were embedded within the 
institutions of the state. Thus, the broader restrictions of colonial policy and ideology 
are continuously emphasised. This is a theme, which will also be apparent 
throughout this study, but much more can be said about the working of the various 
agencies – chowkidar, police and courts – at the local level. The ways in which these 
key agencies interacted with each other, were caught between different demands, and 
the dilemmas and tensions that were subsequently exposed, can thus be further 
explored.  
The work of Christopher Bayly is an important point of reference in such an 
examination. Bayly asserts that the intelligence gathering system established by the 
British, rather than reflecting a confidence in their understanding of native society, 
instead revealed British anxieties and uncertainties over their lack of knowledge 
about their colonised subjects. It was, argues Bayly, an information network ridden 
with ‘information panics...a product of the weakness and blindness of the state, rather 
than a set of governing assumptions.’36 Of particular relevance to this thesis, is 
Bayly’s assertion that despite the creation of information gathering agencies, 
networks of information ‘beneath the level of the district office remained tenuous.’37 
One can also apply these observations to the system of criminal administration, the 
fragility of which, as this study will aim to demonstrate, was evident from lower 
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level agencies such as the chowkidar to the courts of law. How information about 
crime would be handled and distorted as it made its way along from one link in the 
chain of criminal administration to another will thus be a focal point of examination 
in this study.  
 An analysis of the chain of criminal administration in this way will also help 
to emphasise the importance of local agency within the colonial network of control 
and indeed the ways in which the ideology of empire itself would be complicit in 
creating a legal framework ridden with contradictions, a site within which British 
power was fractured and contested. These issues require further examination because 
the power of colonial ideology and hegemony tends to be overemphasised by some 
scholars. Nicholas Dirks has focused on the power of colonial discourse in 
subjugating Indian agency
38
. Dirks argues that colonial power was coercive enough 
to create and re-create colonised society, effectively silencing, and marginalising, 
Indian agency throughout the colonial period. 
 As influential as Dirks’ observations are, one notes that Indian agency is 
missing from his work. That is, by assuming that colonial discourse is powerful 
enough to silence the colonised subject, he does not probe further how Indian agency 
could respond to imperial agendas. Furthermore, he has undermined colonial 
constructions on the basis that they were part of a wider hegemonic project in which 
the British alone could ‘define what is acceptable and what is not and what is 
civilised and what is not.’39 However, it is important not to condemn completely the 
role of colonial constructions. For, as this study hopes to demonstrate, once the 
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constructions in colonial sources are, in a sense, peeled away, one can still observe 
the ‘everyday realities’ of Indian agency, the problems they experienced and how, if 
they chose to employ the institutions of the state, they could do so on their own 
terms. Ranajit Guha and a range of scholars, in the influential Subaltern Studies 
series, have sought to undermine colonial discourse by pointing to the ways in which 
the subaltern could offer resistance.40  Rosalind O’Hanlon, has also added that agents 
are not helpless victims nor do they necessarily have to engage in overt, physical 
resistance which results in some form of submission. Rather, she stresses that one 
should also focus upon the subtle, ‘everyday forms’ of resistance which people can 
employ, forms that are more influenced by the politics of family life and personal 
relationships rather than any adherence to politics on a national level.41  
The inconsistencies of colonial policy also shaped local responses to the 
criminal justice system. Whilst Dirks emphasises the power of British rule, this study 
hopes to point to those areas where British power was almost fighting with itself. As 
well as Indian agency remoulding the institutions of the state to suit their own needs, 
the agents of the state would themselves contest imperial agendas, which were often 
unworkable in a local environment. The fractures in imperial policy would mean that 
the chain of criminal administration was a site where a number of issues would be 
contested, and not just between coloniser and colonised.  
The influence of these factors- from fractured colonial policy to the personal 
agendas of local groups themselves- upon the chain of criminal administration forms 
the main body of this study. An analysis of the system will begin with Chapter three, 
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which will focus on the first link in the chain of criminal administration, the 
chowkidar. Giriraj Shah, in his critical examination of the Police Act V of 1861, has 
argued that the Commission of 1860, despite being established with the specific aim 
of creating a centralised structure, did not actually ‘make any special 
recommendations for the rural police structure.’42 He further adds that although 
attempts were made to extend the regular system of policing to rural areas, ‘police 
stations were so sparsely distributed in rural areas that the bulk of police resources 
were reserved for urban areas.’43 The scarcity of, particularly financial, resources 
meant that the chowkidar, poorly paid and poorly regarded, often belonged to the 
criminal sections of society.44 He was nonetheless a key agent in rural society. He 
was integral to the policing network yet he was not a fully fledged member of the 
colonial police force because the colonial government still wanted to retain a link to 
local society. The problem was that the inability to remove him fully from that 
society meant that he was subject to a number of influences. How the colonial 
government tried to bring the chowkidar under state control without removing him 
from these local influences will be examined in the third chapter. By analysing these 
attempts made by the state to control the chowkidar, the intention is not only to 
emphasise the conflict in interests, as well as different perceptions of authority 
between state and local elites, but also to highlight the ways in which the colonial 
authorities were themselves complicit in maintaining informal networks of control 
that would often be at odds with the law of the state.  
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 The presence of the policeman within this informal network, and the manner 
in which he interacted with the chowkidar and the locality, suggests that his role as a 
‘corrupt, vicious’ officer of the state needs to be more closely examined. The 
reluctance of the local community to confide in the darogah did not mean that he was 
completely removed from the affairs of society. That he could be violent and 
oppressive was a fact. But it was also the case, as various memoirs and police reports 
suggest, that he could not afford to alienate the local community unreservedly. 
Indeed, the native policeman could often demonstrate a frustration with official 
procedures, especially those that complicated matters and, in his eyes, hindered the 
process of capturing criminals and ‘giving out’ justice. The different pressures that 
the darogah faced from the state on the one hand and the local community on the 
other, and how he adjusted official procedures according to the needs of the local 
population at different times will be examined in the fourth chapter of this study.  
 The fifth chapter of this study will focus on the courts of law, which were the 
third link in the chain of criminal administration. The British court was the symbol of 
colonial rule, a key legitimising tool that would signify the supremacy of the foreign 
rulers and their form of law, order and justice. But it was often at odds with more 
local forms of dispute resolution and one focus of this chapter will be to examine the 
disparity between local justice and colonial law. What is also noticeable within the 
archival reports, particularly in the appeals of magistrates dismissed from their posts 
for deviating from procedure, is the uneasy tension that existed between magistrates 
at the lower level courts and the upper echelons of colonial government. The other 
aim of this chapter is to consider the nature of the hostilities within the network of 
control, and the extent to which the colonial government was willing to tolerate 
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procedure being set aside by subordinate officials. Tensions in colonial policy would 
also be revealed through the system of jury trial in India, and the chapter will 
consider the dilemmas that the system would pose for the authorities. 
 By examining the ways in which both rural actors and the agencies of the 
colonial state chose to interact with each other, this study will reconsider the 
‘democratic deficit’ which is said to exist in post-colonial India. The machinery of 
control implemented during the colonial period has been inherited by the modern 
Indian state.45 As a result, scholars such as Kalpana Kannabiran and Upendra Baxi 
have pointed out that the network of control has remained in the hands of a powerful 
few and that the Indian state can itself be complicit in crimes, dealing primarily with 
specific threats whilst overlooking more ordinary forms of crime.46 By focusing on 
particular types of threat and labelling whole communities as criminal, it is argued 
that the Indian Constitution and human rights are undermined. And as scholars such 
as Meena Radhakrishna have noted, it is those formerly known as ‘criminal tribes’ 
that feel the full force of the law in this respect.47 
 This study does not intend to dispute these findings. Rather, the purpose is to 
try and emphasise the flexibility of the system of criminal administration in British 
India, which, whilst it could be seen as the machinery of oppression, was at the same 
time sufficiently flexible to act as a site within which various actors could protest, 
bargain and manipulate the various agencies of the state. By emphasising the flexible 
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nature of the system, the intention is to undermine simplistic binaries of power in 
which one group or institution is pitted against another and instead highlight the 
complex nature of their interaction which can evoke a number of different responses. 
The manner in which the system of criminal administration would be 
operated by officials, and employed by local society, was dependent upon various 
perceptions of crime and criminality. The differing perceptions of crime – of both the 
colonial rulers and native society – form one focus of the second chapter of this 
study. The other focus is upon the contradictions within colonial policy regarding the 
perception and treatment of crime. On the one hand, the British held very specific 
ideas about crime within native society. It was a colonial stereotype of rural society – 
religious, subservient, childlike, yet prone to sudden outbursts of extreme violence – 
which would serve a number of purposes. The British could emphasise their 
civilising mission to improve the moral nature of native society. What would often 
challenge the stereotype, as the second chapter will aim to demonstrate, was not so 
much the differing perceptions of local society but the inconsistencies inherent 
within colonial policy itself. It was a policy which would make visible a dilemma in 
which the desire to avoid intervention in the private domestic sphere of the native 
undermined both law and the idea of an improved morality – the pillars of the 
civilising mission. By examining the differences in perception between local society 
and the state, as well as the contradictions which shaped state policy, the intention is 
to show that challenges to the system of criminal administration were made not only 





Chapter Two: Crime, Locality and Empire 
 
The line which divides punishable wrongdoing from some forms  
of legal commercial enterprise is a very narrow one... a man is not  





This was the view expressed by crime writer and journalist Hargrave Lee Adam in 
his critique of the criminal justice system in England at the turn of the twentieth 
century. Keeping in line with a theory of crime, which stressed the adverse effects of 
an urban environment upon the physical and moral health of an individual, Adam 
was keen to point out the various flaws of the legal system which exacerbated the 
crime problem. Above all, he emphasised the inability of the law to influence the 
moral behaviour of individuals, the failure of which, he argued, led to the prevalence 
of crime amongst those at the bottom of the social scale. For Adam, social reform 
and the improvement of the moral character was the key to a healthy society. 
Without moral elevation to ensure that one could distinguish between ‘right’ and 
‘wrong’, alienation and disrespect for the law amongst vulnerable sections of society 
would be the only result. But the reluctance of the legal authorities to enter the 
private domain of the individual and set a positive moral tone ensured the 
continuation of a system in which English judges were blindly subservient to 
‘illogical, oppressive and biased’ laws.2 The tense relationship between concepts of 
law and morality became even more problematic in British India, where they were 
widely considered to be the pillars of the colonial ‘civilising mission’.  
 The main intention of this chapter is to examine how the clash between issues 
of law and morality played out in colonial Bengal. Section one examines local 
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perceptions about crime and ‘moral behaviour’, which were at odds with those held 
by the colonial rulers. This clash was further compounded by the contradictions 
inherent within colonial policy itself, within which broader imperial interests 
undermined other concerns. Section two, then, examines these contradictions, within 
which the law and ideas of morality coexisted uneasily.  
Crime, and the reformation of the criminal, was a central feature of the 
‘civilising mission’ in India. Ideas of moral progress, order and responsibility, which 
were closely associated with this process of reformation, proved to be powerful 
legitimising tools. A key feature of the archival material, ranging from administration 
reports to personal memoirs, is the carefully constructed image of crime in India. It is 
one in which land, women and religion are the main causes behind crime in India.3 
The native community is subservient yet passionate; docile yet prone to sudden 
bursts of violence. Indeed, it is the ability of the village to transform into a mindless 
mob, giving out its own rough justice, which forms the focus of many administration 
reports. A land dispute elicits a mob-like response with opponents torn ‘limb by 
limb’; an act of adultery leads to murder; a child-wife is ‘ravished’; crime is 
committed in the name of religion. Members of the village are engaged in a ‘cover-
up’ operation, making it difficult for the authorities to detect the crime. The colonial 
stereotype, then, resurfaces continuously, one in which crime is attributed to the 
lawless and immoral nature of the rural community, incapable of telling the truth. 
Docile or violent, what was certain amongst official circles was the absolute 
necessity of British presence to, firstly, protect the law-abiding who were ‘incapable 
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of self rule’ and, secondly, to control the lawbreaking groups in Indian society, both 
of which would require good laws and moral progress.  
The construction of the criminal and criminality within a colonial context has 
received much scholarly attention. Nicholas Dirks has argued that colonialism played 
a key role in the Enlightenment project, acting as a ‘blank canvas’ upon which the 
British, through scientific techniques, could ‘know’, ‘create’ and ‘control’ their 
colonial subjects.4 Christopher Bayly, whilst not denying the significance of colonial 
constructions, calls into question the power of colonial discourse, arguing that, far 
from being a consistent tool by which the British could confidently govern and 
control the colony, it ‘remained self-contradictory, fractured and contested.’5 The 
‘creation’ of Indian society, and the criminal within it, has led to a vast amount of 
literature examining not only the political agendas behind the construction of a 
particular social order but also a critical analysis of the colonial discourse which 
produced the Indian criminal. Race, anthropometry and other surveillance techniques 
have all been critically analysed by scholars eager to ‘deconstruct’ the Indian 
criminal and consider the wider historical forces at play.6  
What is stressed in these studies is the idea that colonial anxieties were 
central to the construction of the criminal. What they also emphasise is that such 
anxieties did not end once the colonial gaze had created the Indian criminal, 
knowable and organised into various categories. These categories emphasised not the 
individuality of the criminal, but the idea of criminal groups. The emphasis upon 
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criminal groups of course made it easier for the colonial authorities to control them 
through special legislation, such as the Criminal Tribes Act of 1871, which has been 
extensively examined by scholars such as Meena Radhakrishna and Sanjay Nigam.7  
That the construction of the Indian criminal was influenced by a number of 
broader imperial projects and concerns, then, is a theme that runs strong in a number 
of studies. The criminal group was the key focus of colonial surveillance, whilst rural 
incidents that were reported were dismissed as crimes arising from immorality; 
crimes that would never abate until there was an improvement in native morality. 
This construction was ultimately reflective of colonial anxieties about the 
‘knowledge gap’ between the state and its subjects. Lack of knowledge remained a 
source of anxiety for the authorities, which in turn would strengthen stereotypes 
about Indian society. Yet, as will be argued in this chapter, beneath the layers of 
construction, one can still observe the everyday realities and concerns of local 
society. In this process, one can also observe the differences in local perceptions 
about criminal behaviour and morality.  
It is important to consider these variances in perceptions because it is not 
enough for an act to be labelled as ‘criminal’ by the law; how it is perceived by the 
wider community is also crucial. Debkamal Ganguly, has argued that in the colonial 
context, an act can be positioned as a ‘crime’ only if we have a ‘picture of centralised 
authority in the mind – the definition of ‘crime’ changes if the authority, and the 
penetration of that authority, changes.’8 In a similar vein, scholar Hans Boutellier has 
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noted that a criminal act not only ‘reveals something about the morality of the 
perpetrator but also about the morality of the culture that disapproves of the act in 
question.’9 For Boutellier, it is crucial that criminal law represents a wider public 
morality. Bearing this in mind, the first section of this chapter will examine Indian 
perceptions of crime which would ultimately determine what use Indians made of the 
legal institutions of the state.  
The construction, and subsequent stereotype, of the Indian criminal once 
stripped away also reveals a number of anxieties relating to the imperial agenda 
itself. Crime and religion were inextricably linked in colonial accounts yet at the 
same time, whilst crime could fall within the public legal sphere, the issue of religion 
was considered to be a moral one – one that fell within the private domain of the 
Indians and one with which their colonial rulers were reluctant to interfere. Whilst 
specific ‘religious crimes’ such as thagi and sati in the early days of colonial rule had 
been carefully clothed with a criminal aspect to justify state intervention using 
special legal measures, dealing with crimes using the ordinary machinery of law was 
much more problematic.  
With this in mind, the second section of this chapter considers the types of 
dilemmas, both involving crimes relating to the private domain as well as those 
within the public sphere, which were faced by the state. One such crime was that of 
poisoning. Whilst William Sleeman had been given free rein to exterminate the 
thugs, suggestions to do the same with cases of poisoning met with a more muted 
response from local governments in the period following the Mutiny of 1857. Thus, 
even though poisoning fell within the strictly public ‘legal’ sphere, it still 
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undermined the ability of the colonial state to suppress it effectively. Why the 
construction of the poisoner as a thug-like threat was so difficult to achieve will be 
considered further in this chapter. Another dilemma faced by the authorities was 
dealing with crimes which were associated with questions of morality. Both law and 
the idea of improving native morals were crucial to the justification of British 
presence in India. But, as the examination of specific moral cases in the second 
section will demonstrate, the pillars of the civilising mission – legality and morality – 
actually undermined each other. There was a conscious effort made by the British to 
avoid their moral mission in India through their own laws. Thus,  not only did these 
‘moral crimes’ undermine the law but they exposed the fissures in colonial policy in 
India – a policy within which the rule of law coexisted uneasily with the policy of 
non-interference, particularly in matters concerning the private sphere of their 
colonised subjects. 
 
2.1 Law, Morality and the Criminal 
The fragile relationship between law and morality has been a contentious issue in the 
fields of legal philosophy and criminology over the years. M. J. Sethna has pointed to 
the uneasy coexistence that exists between the two concepts, stating that ‘morality is 
internal and involves the freedom of choice...but the law is external and will always 
have the force of coercion behind it.’10 In a similar vein, legal theorist Joseph Raz has 
also considered the paradoxical nature of the relationship between the concepts of 
authority and autonomy and the ways in which the disparity between the two can 
highlight a conflict between different moral standards.11 In particular, the debate 
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between legal positivists and those in support of a natural theory of law has been the 
subject of much attention. Neither group doubts that moral values form the base of 
legal systems. But whilst Lon Fuller has emphasised the ‘inner morality of law’, 
stating that if the law does not represent certain principles then it cannot be deemed 
to be law at all,12 legal positivists, following in the footsteps of HLA Hart, have 
argued that ‘whether a society has a legal system depends on the presence of certain 
structures of governance, not on the extent to which it satisfies ideals of justice, 
democracy, or the rule of law.’13  
 The precarious relationship between law and morality has also been 
examined by legal theorist Ferdinand Schoeman, who has focused upon the 
differences between the public domain and the distinctly private realm, of which 
morality is a crucial feature.14 Greater discretion is granted in the private than in the 
public domain because ‘private life is the sphere in which individuals relate as 
individuals and because maintaining relationships between individuals as individuals 
is more demanding than maintaining relationships between individuals as generic 
role players.’15 Non-interference is an integral part of this process and even when 
outside intervention is deemed a necessity, the domain is still recognised as private 
because a personal relationship is at issue. As one governmental committee, set up to 
consider whether homosexuality in 1950s Britain should be decriminalised, 
concluded, the ‘function of the criminal law is to preserve public order and decency, 
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and also to protect citizens from offensive and injurious elements. Beyond this, 
unless society wants to equate crime with sin there must remain a realm of private 
morality, which is not the law’s business.’16  
In theory, non-interference in issues of morality is ideal but in practice, the 
line dividing the law from questions of morality has proved to be a blurry one. In his 
influential study of village culture in early modern Germany, David Warren Sabean 
has argued that the state ‘attempted to elicit obedience directly via religious 
institutions.’17 The ways in which quarrels within the local community were made 
visible through these religious institutions, and the important role of the court in 
resolving disputes and conflicts, forms a central part of his study. In a similar vein, 
Ishita Bannerjee-Dube, in her examination of the relationship between law and 
religion in India, has argued that the machineries of law play a crucial role in the 
creation of ‘ordered religion’.  Modern law, she has argued, with its authoritative 
texts and the ‘facts’ and evidence which they provide, allows a movement to 
transform itself from a fluid, flexible religious group into a fixed, ordered religion. It 
is within the law court that everyday disputes between rival factions are played out 
and ‘facts’ accordingly modified.18  
 Whilst the issue of religion has traditionally been associated with morality, 
violence, so often seen as an act which falls squarely within the state controlled 
public sphere, has also been subjected to critical examination by a number of 
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scholars. Historian Katherine Watson has argued that throughout the nineteenth 
century violence in western societies was a ‘shifting category depending on who 
defined it.’19 In a similar vein, Efi Avdela in an examination of Greek society, long 
considered the ‘Other’ of Western Europe, has stated that ‘violence attributed to 
other states, locations or people has historically been a means of underpinning 
western claims to civilisation.’20 For Nandini Sundar, the law and media themselves 
have been crucial in shaping and reshaping public morality in such a way that state-
sanctioned violence is legitimised. By doing so, she has argued that modern states 
can highlight the ‘culpability for violence’ of the groups they regard as a threat, 
whilst concealing their own culpability in the process.21  
The uneasy coexistence between law and morality within a system of 
governance, then, is central to the various debates amongst scholars. These dilemmas 
are particularly marked when placed within a colonial context, where law and 
morality were closely entwined. ‘Good laws and moral progress’ were what defined 
British rule in India. Orientalist empiricism, with the emphasis upon scientific 
techniques and categorisation, enabled the British to construct their own truth about 
crime and the criminal in India. It was, as historians such as Sandra Freitag have 
shown, a process that allowed the British to construct a social order within which 
concepts of the criminal group, caste and religion were emphasised.22  
                                                          
19
 Katherine Watson, Assaulting The Past: Violence and Civilisation in Historical Context 
(Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2007), p.5 
20
 Efi Avdela,  ‘Introduction: de-centering violence history’ in Efi Avdela, Shani D’Cruz and Judith 
Rowbotham (eds.),  Problems of Crime and Violence in Europe 1780-2000: Essays in Criminal 
Justice (New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 2010), p. 20 
21
 Nandini Sundar, ‘Toward an Anthropology of Culpability’ in American Ethnologist, Volume 31, 
Number 2, May 2004 
22
 Sandra Freitag, ‘Crime in the Social Order of Colonial North India’ in Modern South Asian Studies, 
Volume 25, Number 2, (1991), pp. 227-261 
32 
 
In the early days of colonial rule, it was a programme of construction which 
was powerful enough to emphasise the ‘immoral’ nature of practices such as thagi 
and sati as well as the duty of the British in exterminating them and establishing law 
in a previously lawless society. In the late nineteenth century, the extermination of 
‘special threats’ was replaced by the idea of the control and containment of those 
labelled ‘criminal’ under special legislation. Concerns raised by authorities over the 
threats posed to the liberty of the subject were considered secondary to the 
‘protection of society as a whole.’23 The purpose of special legislative measures, 
beginning with the Criminal Tribes Act of 1871, was to simultaneously remove 
certain groups from their ‘private space’ and place them squarely within the public 
sphere. Within this public sphere, the colonial state alone had the exclusive authority 
to contain and control groups which it regarded as a threat to the colonial order. 
The labelling of such groups as ‘criminal’, and their subsequent placement 
within a controllable public sphere, also provided the authorities with the opportunity 
to continuously emphasise the ‘immoral’ nature of these groups. Crime was their 
profession into which they had been born, ensuring, what one account described as, a 
‘pride in their criminality.’24 Another stressed the ‘lack of moral guilt on account of 
what they regard as their proper business.’25 Thus, magistrate Arthur Dash, recalling 
his time touring the interior districts of Bengal, described the tribes providing his 
camp with evening entertainment as ‘social pests...none of the women would marry a 
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young man unless he had committed a serious crime, preferably murder and none of 
the men would give a glance at any girl who had not combined prostitution with 
some spectacular theft or violent assault.’26 Their placement under the Criminal 
Tribes Act allowed the police to ‘move them on whenever they had made things too 
hot in any campsite they occupied.’27 The threats posed by such groups, and their 
supposed immorality, justified their placement under special legislation and under 
the complete control of the colonial state which would transform them into law 
abiding citizens. In later years, it was the gangs of Bengal which were placed under 
the Criminal Tribes Act, with an emphasis remaining on ‘systematic addiction’ of 
members ‘addicted to the commission of non-bailable offences against property.’28 
There was, then, a continuous preoccupation with the criminal groups of India and 
the ties that united these people which, as one deputy superintendent of police noted, 
were not only ‘criminal, but also to a great extent, religious, ethnological and 
geographical.’29  
The emphasis upon particular threats had an impact upon how ordinary crime 
was viewed and treated by the colonial authorities.30 The criminal tribe, it was 
believed, would always need to be placed under surveillance because crime was their 
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‘profession’. Ordinary crime would not elicit the same type of response. One 
prominent official, when making a passing observation on crime in rural society, 
stressed the importance of the link between criminal groups and rural India, where 
groups could easily make themselves invisible amongst a vast rural population. Their 
control under criminal legislation was thus a necessity. But the habitual criminal was 
a distinctly ‘town manufacture. In villages, where everybody knows everybody else, 
and where the advent of every stranger forms a subject for general remark, the 
professional thief finds no scope for his abilities. Only the town could provide the 
thief with the adventure and material gain that the village sorely lacked.’31  
The image of Indian rural society as unchanging, with its concerns focusing 
solely around the preservation of caste and religious faith, concerns that posed no 
threat to the authority of the state, is a predominant one in colonial accounts of 
Indian society. The  simplicity of the Indian character was emphasised by Hargrave 
Lee Adam, who went onto conclude that the ‘Indian criminal is a much better man 
than the criminal in the West...the natives of India are neither intemperate nor violent 
when their caste prejudices are not interfered with.’32 The authorities were 
particularly anxious to stress the temporary nature of crime arising out of religious 
fervour.33 Thus, rural society was portrayed as largely controllable, only prone to acts 
of ‘violence’ periodically.  Significantly, these acts are devoid of any political 
ambitions, being purely of a religious, personal nature which poses no real threat to 
the authority of the state.  
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The stress placed by the colonial state upon the link between religion and 
Indian society has been the subject of much scholarly attention. What these studies 
have aimed to do is to undermine ideas about the ‘timeless religion’ of India which 
appears repeatedly in colonial accounts. Instead, they have emphasised the complex 
role that Indian religion plays in articulating various concerns within communities. 
Heinrich von Stietencron has argued that continuity and innovation are a central 
aspect of Indian religions, which allow people to make sense of, and respond to, 
changing experiences and challenges with which they are faced in everyday life.34 
David Hardiman, in his influential study of adivasi assertion, has argued that the act 
of spiritual possession, far from being ‘chaotic hysteria’, is actually a means by 
which they can air their grievances about specific hardships with which they are 
faced in this life.35  
Thus, if one looks beyond constructions, and the resulting stereotypes, one 
can still view a process whereby groups try to address a range of concerns through 
their faith, ranging from the spiritual to the everyday realities of the world in which 
they live. It can be a process where they can assert their authority through a number 
of means. Nandini Sundar, for example, has examined local methods of handling 
deviance. Sundar, in her study of the state and witchcraft in modern day Bastar, has 
cited the weak relationship between the state and the local community as a cause of 
the accusations of ‘occult malpractice’ that exist in the region. Faced with 
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unexplained illness and death, a non-existent health system, the weakening power of 
traditional healers and a state reluctant to deal with such issues, the local community 
has a unique response to the problem to deviance. By ensuring that those ‘accused 
are beaten up or forced to give their land away to the whole village, local agents 
possess a degree of power, something which eludes beyond village life.’36  
One can certainly apply this argument to local responses to cattle poisoning 
in the late nineteenth century. The crime of poisoning cattle, committed by those 
belonging to the chamar caste for the sake of obtaining the hide, was an act which 
received considerable government attention. Difficulty in regulating the use of 
poison, and the inability of the government to act decisively, not least because they 
had wider imperial interests to consider, ensured that the numbers of such cases 
continued to trouble a largely agricultural community, for whom cattle were crucial 
to the running of the rural economy and a means of subsistence. Cattle deaths 
resulting from disease were a huge cause for concern for village communities and 
their response to the problem could vary, changing from one invoking ritual to 
decisive physical violence.  In 1903, in the district of Jessore, a mochi, engaged in 
skinning a cow, was attacked by a number of villagers who beat him so severely that 
he died. The villagers believed that if a mocha could be made to weep whilst 
skinning a cow, cattle disease would disappear from the village.37 In 1873, to offer 
another example, the officiating commissioner of the Benares division noted that 
villagers believed that the deaths were the result of an evil spirit and  
offered pig’s flesh and shurab to the ghosts of deceased chamars. When this failed to satisfy 
the villagers, they collectively proceeded to loot chamar villages, swinging up chamar wives 
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naked from the boughs of trees, after which, the villagers once again sought refuge in the 




By emphasising the resumption of this ritual, the commissioner turned the villagers 
from a threat, as seen in their sporadic act of violence, back into the non-threatening 
group concerned solely with issues of spirituality and the afterlife. Yet one cannot 
fail to notice that their response, whether expressed through faith or evil spirits or 
physical violence, was a result of very worldly and practical concerns. The colonial 
authorities would base their constructions of criminality around notions of violence 
and irrationality but one can note from the above example that beneath the 
construction, villagers were reacting in a situation where rural economy, and the 
livelihood of the village, was under threat. 
Religion can play a crucial role in helping communities make sense of the 
challenges that they face in their everyday lives but the role of religion is not simply 
confined to dealing with grievances. It can also be used as a form of social control, 
particularly in questions relating to female conduct. In 1881, when the question of 
widow remarriage in India was discussed by social reformers, conservative sections 
of the Hindu community claimed that such an act would be ‘immoral’ according to 
their religious scriptures. One priest argued that widowhood ‘was a practice of self-
control, of renouncement of passion, worldly goods. The preservation of these led to 
gains in the next spiritual life and damnation if they were not followed. Remarriage 
and subsequently lying in the bed of another man was immoral and against 
humanity.’39  
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Sin and repercussions for family members in the afterlife were some of the 
consequences believed to result if women acted in opposition to their ‘moral duty’. 
The role of these religious rituals and practices was solely to preserve a patriarchal 
social order in society.  When this patriarchy was threatened by controversies, 
particularly by the Age of Consent debate in 1891,40 orthodox members reiterated the 
religious obligations of women to ensure the well-being of their husbands in their 
next life. By doing so, orthodox members ensured that the patriarchal order was 
maintained and any attempts by social reformers to implement their own ideas of 
moral improvement via legal means would be constantly undermined. 
 Social control in a patriarchal community also reflects other concerns, which 
are rooted in questions of honour, reputation and the maintenance of a ‘moral 
economy’. In an excellent analysis of the strong association between the concept of 
‘honour’ and interpersonal violence, Efi Avdela has undermined the idea of 
‘senseless violence’. Honour is:  
a fundamental social value binding members of a hierarchical family unit in a 
hostile, antagonistic world of equals, and prescribing specific gendered conduct 
namely female modesty and agonistic masculinity. So violent behaviour is a 
definitional ingredient of masculinity expressed via challenge (in honour crimes). 





The concept of honour, and the shame which results from dishonour, then, can act as 
a powerful mechanism of social control and regulation outside the state.42 Thus, in 
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1886 Officiating Inspector General J.C. Veasey rather frustratingly noted that for 
every ‘one disgraceful intrigue we hear there must be hundreds which never come to 
light.’43 Where, he continued, ‘jealousy and immorality is the cause and a woman the 
victim, it is plain that public opinion exercises no restraint.’44 For Inspector General 
Veasey it was the lack of moral virtues within rural society which was of concern. 
But it can be alternatively argued that such acts of violence are, as Thomas Gallant 
has suggested in his examination of Greek rural society, ‘manifestations of self help 
justice...a sort of ritualised violence underlined by a common theme, that of honour 
and reputation.’45 
Themes of honour and reputation are also visible in the police reports of 
Bengal. The reports are filled with an array of cases in which adultery, rape and 
intrigue are the prelude to a criminal act. Violence in defence of honour is 
particularly apparent in one case which occurred in the Dacca division in 1887. 
Madhu, following an ‘intrigue’ with the sister-in-law of a fellow villager, found his 
own wife becoming the victim of outrage. The outrage was committed by the brother 
of the aforementioned villager. He had wished to avenge his brother’s honour.46 In 
other cases, violence was not an act of vengeance but a refusal by the offending party 
to quietly resolve the matter. In the 24 Parganahs of the Presidency Division, for 
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instance, a man killed his cousin, his wife’s paramour, with a blow on the head, not 
for taking the woman away but because she was not allowed to come back to him.47 
At the same time, violent means could also be replaced by legal methods. In 
1873, lack of regulation concerning Mohammedan marriages and divorces was, it 
was argued, leading to instances whereby a false case was made up by an aggrieved 
husband whose wife had eloped with ‘her paramour’ – the case only being dropped 
once he had his wife returned back to him.48 Indeed, cases instituted in court reflected 
a range of domestic concerns. In 1899, a special report was produced relating to the 
increased numbers of outrages on young women by low class Mohammedans in the 
district of Mymensingh. It was argued that cases of outrage or kidnap were not quite 
what they seemed, with local newspapers such as the Charu Mihir displaying a 
‘tendency to exaggerate’. In actual fact, argued the Magistrate of Mymensingh, many 
of these women were not ‘unwilling agents’, many deciding to elope with their 
paramour.  The unfortunate husband met this challenge to his masculinity through 
violent means, employing the assistance of his relatives and friends to ‘crush his 
opponent’ when discovered.  
Honour could be preserved in other ways too. The magistrate noted that there 
were cases in which the husband, in order to save his own honour as far as possible, 
alleged that his wife was ‘taken away because the house was attacked in force and 
she and he were powerless to resist.’49 To support this statement, the husband would 
go on to name as the paramour’s accomplices all those against whom he had enmity. 
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In such cases although outright violence was not resorted to, the injured party could  
preserve his honour on the one hand, whilst on the other, he could strike a blow to his 
wrongdoer by employing the law as his weapon of attack, which in many cases 
proved to be an effective move.50 The response of the authorities to this state of 
affairs would be to argue that immorality, particularly of the Mohammedan woman,51 
was the cause behind the ill use of legal institutions introduced by the colonial state. 
Attacks upon the honour of an individual can also be regarded as an attack 
upon patriarchal authority. As well as the portrayal of the Indian woman as cunning 
and devious, the colonial authorities would also place emphasis upon her rather 
wretched plight within the domestic sphere. 52 The widow, noted one social reformer, 
‘if she be virtuous would earn her livelihood by begging or becoming a menial 
servant. If not virtuous, she would commit adultery and kill any illegitimate 
offspring.’53 Thus, a wife is strangled by her husband for refusing to ‘lie with him’, 
another has her eye gouged out as a ‘fitting punishment for her infidelity’54 whilst yet 
another is ‘kicked in the stomach for bad cooking.’55 The response of the female to 
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ill-treatment could manifest itself in verbal abuse,56 yet there were other forms of 
retaliation, of which poisoning was one.57 For instance, to the authorities the act of 
abortion was a crime committed to conceal immorality prevalent in a country, within 
which female behaviour was heavily regulated.58  But, as Ranajit Guha has argued, 
the act can also be interpreted as a subtle form of resistance to the patriarchal social 
order. Rather than being considered simply as an act of helplessness by women, 
abortion was an act which allowed women to ‘stop the engine of male authority from 
uprooting a woman from her place in local society.’59 It was an act, Guha notes, 
which had a double purpose. On the one hand, it provided women with an option, a 
sense of control, in a society which closely regulated female behaviour. On the other, 
it saved them from complete social exclusion and shame. 
One can also apply this argument to cases of reported infanticide. One 
observer noted that in the United Provinces, within a ten-year period, the average 
annual number of such cases was forty one. In Bengal, similar cases appeared 
consistently within police reports. In 1887, a woman in Mymensingh, after a quarrel 
with her husband and mother-in–law, jumped into the river at night with her three-
month-old infant child.60 In the Burdwan division in 1886, a woman cut her child’s 
throat after a quarrel with her husband.61 She was acquitted on the ground of insanity. 
In the same district, a woman jumped into a well with her eighteen-month-old child 
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as a result of a dispute with her father-in–law.62 By endangering the lives of their 
children, particularly infant sons, and employing them as their weapon, women, 
although not able to undermine it, could still strike a blow to patriarchal authority. In 
a society within which the behaviour of women was closely regulated, and one which 
placed an emphasis upon the chief role of female as mother, women could use this 
role to upset conditions within the domestic household. 
Honour and reputation also defined cattle theft, a ‘crime’ that appears 
continuously in police reports. Police authorities ruefully noted that owners preferred 
to pay panha and recover their cattle. To the authorities it was often described as a 
‘system of blackmail’, a crime that was notoriously difficult to put down because it 
was spearheaded by influential, wealthy members of the community and victims 
were reluctant to inform the authorities for fear of being mistreated by ‘ruffians’ and, 
most importantly, lose any chance of recovering their stolen cattle.63 Whilst these 
explanations were of importance at the same time, one can also suggest other 
explanations for the reluctance to report cattle theft. Firstly, the authorities 
themselves admitted that cattle theft was regarded as a prosperous trade by the native 
community rather than a criminal offence.64 Secondly, as anthropologist Urania 
Astrinaki, in her study of animal theft in western Crete has suggested, such practices 
can be viewed as a ‘test’ to prove one’s masculinity.  Rather than a criminal act, the 
practice can be viewed as ‘a serious challenge by which one achieves the qualities of 
“manhood”, necessary for the recognition of a respectable personal and social 
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identity group.’65 For the ‘victim’ to report his loss would be to acknowledge his 
failure as a man. In the context of colonial India, it was indeed acknowledged by 
authorities that tribes ‘do not think that a youth is fully grown until he has stolen his 
first head, he is not permitted to wear a turban until he has done so.’66  
There were also other ways for victims to respond to the practice. As one 
colonial official found in his study of the village community in Bengal, as long as the 
demands made by robber guards were within reason, then they were willing to 
uphold the system.67 Only when thieves made unreasonable demands relating to the 
payment of ransom did villagers react collectively – through taking oaths, forming 
funds to compensate for lost cattle or setting alight the homes of the thieves. Once 
the matter was resolved, then the practice would resume. Thus, cattle theft was an act 
much more complex than a ‘criminal loss’ as defined by colonial law. It was an act 
which could elicit a number of responses. For some, it was a legitimate profession; 
for others it was a ‘game’ in which honour and reputation were put to the test. And 
for those for whom it was simply a case of theft, robbers could be made to act within 
a strict code of conduct. Thus, even robbers themselves were aware that for their 
trade to survive, it was important to preserve the moral economy of the village. 
Excessive demands would only lead to the disruption of their trade. 
 Thomas Gallant has argued that ‘unwritten social codes of behaviour’ were 
crucial features of rural response to, and treatment of, various local grievances and 
were a way of handling disputes in instances where the state ‘lacked legitimacy or 
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state views were at odds with local norms and customs.’68 But it is also important to 
note the involvement of the state in preserving local customs. Certainly, in the case 
of cattle theft in British India, what is interesting to note is the complicity of the 
colonial state itself in maintaining the practice. David Gilmartin has argued that the 
state and the local community had to negotiate with each other on a number of levels. 
It was a relationship within which broader concerns, centring around ideas about 
property, would ensure that the state would always have to enter a bargaining process 
with local groups.69 Indeed, broader imperial concerns ensured that limited resources 
were always directed towards acts which were a direct threat to the authority of the 
state. This would have a direct impact upon attitudes towards ordinary forms of 
crime, particularly those of a moral nature. For instance, in 1890, an article 
considered the problems experienced by the colonial authorities when dealing with 
cases where young children were murdered for their ornaments.70 Indeed, the police 
administration reports frequently mention instances where children were often lured 
to a secret location by a ‘trusted relative or family friend’ before being slain. 
Introducing laws prohibiting the wearing of ornaments, the author argued, would be 
ineffective because ‘making crime a vanity is a difficult problem to solve.’71 
Furthermore, the author continued, whilst the colonial state was efficient in ‘warding 
off aggression and keeping the peace’ in ‘social questions the natives are giants and 
we infants.’ What was needed, he concluded, was not a law to put an end to such a 
crime but education, through which local custom could be altered and native morality 
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improved. It was only when educated members of the Indian community taught their 
illiterate peasants of such dangers that these crimes would cease.72  
Whilst both the law and the idea of an improved morality would be central 
features in official attempts to control groups, in the case of ordinary crimes one can 
observe a conscious effort by the colonial state to avoid dealing with crimes of a 
social nature. Indeed, as the next section shall aim to demonstrate, the British would 
use their own laws to avoid dealing with such crimes, which contradicted the 
civilising mission in India. The aim of the next section is to consider these dilemmas 
and contradictions of colonial policy. 
 
2.2 The Civilising Mission: Rhetoric versus Reality 
The arrival of the British in India, and their quest to establish an exclusive authority 
by which they had a monopoly of the crime control apparatus has been emphasised 
by a number of scholars. Whilst Radhika Singha has described the process as a 
‘despotism of law’, Mukul Kumar has pointed out that exclusive authority was 
established either through ‘brute force or moral influence.’73 It was an exclusive 
authority which rested on a paradox. As both Sandra Freitag and Meena 
Radhakrishna have pointed out in their respective studies, the process involved 
targeting any groups on the margins of society and labelling them as wandering or 
itinerant; yet it was the ruthless revenue policy pursued by the British which had an 
adverse effect upon the employment opportunities of certain communities. Forced 
into redundancy by the revenue policy, these communities would become the 
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‘wandering tribes’ that the British aimed to settle and control.74 Nor has the fragile 
nature of carefully constructed colonial knowledge been ignored. Freitag has 
recognised that whilst this knowledge strengthened the cultural prejudices held by 
the British and justified the extraordinary measures they took against groups which 
they regarded as criminal, it was a knowledge that was ‘inherited from indigenous 
informants and then legitimised as scholarship in reference volumes.’75  
Mark Brown, in his analysis of the Criminal Tribes Act of 1871, has 
suggested that tribes were targeted by colonial legislation because in the post-1857 
period, the British did not wish to upset the landlord classes who had traditionally 
protected these tribes. The answer was to keep landlord and tribe separate through 
legislation specifically aimed at controlling the latter group.76 Brown, elsewhere, has 
also sought to undermine scholarship that engages in what he considers to be a 
simplistic totalising Orientalist discourse about the colonial response to criminal 
tribes.77 Rather, measures like the criminal tribes legislation, he has argued, ‘reflected 
a highly contested vision of the way in which India ought to be ruled. Such 
legislation was perhaps indicative of tensions within British political thought and 
strategies of government in India.’78 
 Disagreements over issues of governance, and the lack of coherence and 
predictability in colonial policy that would result from these, did not disguise the fact 
that the colonial response to specific problems of law and order were shaped by 
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anxieties about the British role in India. Sati, infanticide and thagi, the crimes that 
had been so publicly exterminated by a campaign driven by ideas of improved 
morality and law and order, reflected British anxieties and paranoia about their lack 
of knowledge about native society. A sense of control was gained only when these 
concerns were transformed from mere stereotype into fact and evidence through 
various empirical investigations. The knowledge that was generated through this 
transformation had the double purpose of both organising Indian society into 
controllable groups whilst emphasising the moral duty of the new rulers to impose a 
new set of standards upon these groups. Most importantly, the facts that were 
produced through these investigations were crucial in transforming ‘concerns’ into 
‘definite crimes’ which posed a threat to the exclusive authority sought by the new 
rulers. These facts produced the necessary statistics that would act as evidence and 
subsequently justify state intervention via legislation. But the role of empiricism was 
a multifaceted one in the colonial context, particularly in the post-1857 period, when 
the idea of moral improvement met with a much more muted response whilst the 
control and containment of groups remained a key priority. On the one hand, 
empirical methods provided justification for state intervention in matters concerning 
specific threats to the authority of the colonial state. On the other hand, the facts 
produced through empiricism could also be used as justification for state non-
intervention in matters involving the domestic sphere of the native community. 
Poisoning was one such crime which would visibly highlight this delicate 
balance between intervention via regulation and the policy of non-interference which 
resulted from a need to protect wider economic interests. Poisoning cases in the 
colony were a subject much referred to in official colonial accounts. In India there 
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were two particular types of poisons which were a cause for concern. Dhatura was 
one described by some as an organised system of roadside poisoning, often referred 
as ‘Dhatura thugee’.  Those who engaged in this particular form were described as 
direct descendants of the infamous thugs exterminated by William Sleeman in his 
celebrated campaign in the early nineteenth century. Indeed, a number of ‘official’ 
accounts of crime in India referred time and again to the expert ability of the 
professional poisoner to conceal himself in various guises, most notably in the form 
of a wandering fakir, and strike unsuspecting travellers. His ability to evade detection 
from the police further strengthened the belief that the Dhatura thug was an invisible 
yet ever present threat. The use of poison, easily and widely grown within the 
colony, as a method by which to target his victim further contributed to official 
anxiety over ‘Dhatura thugee’.  
Arsenic was the other deadly poison which, in the words of one official, was 
most frequently used for homicidal purposes and was procurable in unlimited 
quantities in India because there was no act regulating the poison. Many accounts 
would refer to this poison as a ‘weapon of the weak’ in the domestic sphere where 
‘women murder their husbands mainly by poison to continue affairs with their 
lovers.’79 Indeed, whilst Dhatura led to the creation of the stereotype of the ‘Dhatura 
thug’, arsenic also played a key role in the cultivation of a gender-specific stereotype. 
Arsenic, both in the colony and the metropole, emphasised the secretive and cunning 
image of the woman, who employed the discreet method of poisoning her victim, in 
stark contrast to the hot-headed and spontaneous male, whose anger always 
manifested itself through physical violence.  
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What one notices about cases of poisoning within memoirs is the recurring 
stereotype of the poisoner, whether domestic or the Dhatura thug. The regular 
appearance of the poisoner in various accounts written over the colonial period, 
demonstrates the power of the stereotype in the British imagination. Yet, it was a 
construction which disguised a number of very real divisions within official circles 
over the prevalence of the crime and the deeply divisive question of whether or not to 
regulate the sales of poisons. That question in turn was tied to wider imperial 
interests.  
Whilst poisoning was a crime which could be placed firmly within the legal 
public sphere of the court and punishable by the laws of the colonial state, a number 
of other concerns would ensure that the response of the government to it would be far 
from a simple case of conviction and subsequent punishment. Indeed, low conviction 
rates would play an important role in the reluctance of the government to introduce 
special regulation. Indeed, whilst the poisoner was a constant presence in memoirs 
and official accounts of crime in India, he or she was a notably absent figure from the 
criminal returns. The courts of Bengal, argued the inspector general of police in 
1891, were unwilling to deal with drugging cases under new rules which had been 
issued by the Executive Government.80 This tussle between the law courts and 
Executive Government did not help conviction rates. Thus, in 1890 only seven out of 
                                                          
80
 The Government of India in a Resolution of 20 February 1880 had expressed the opinion that these 
cases should be tried under section 394 of the Indian Penal Code rather than under section 328 of the 
same Code, as was the usual procedure. This was because the punishment provided by section 328 (10 
years imprisonment) was not considered to act as a sufficient deterrent and also previous convictions 
could not be proved under Chapter XVI, of which section 328 was a part. Section 394 was considered 
to be more suitable because previous convictions could be proved in a case tried under Chapter XVII, 
which included that particular section. See Police Administration Report for the Lower Provinces of 
Bengal for the Year 1891 
51 
 
fourteen cases were convicted. There was no improvement a year on, with eight out 
of thirty cases ending in conviction.81  
The preoccupation of the colonial state in gaining high conviction rates also 
undermined attempts made to tackle the crime under special legislation. General 
Charles Hervey had, over the years, pointed to the ineffectiveness of the ordinary 
system of law in dealing with the crime, and argued that ‘Dhatura thuggee’ should 
be dealt with using the special legislation used to exterminate the original thugs in 
the early nineteenth century. Hervey and his supporters insisted that there was a 
direct link between those engaging in crimes of robbery and the original thugs 
targeted in the early nineteenth century.82 The solution, he continued, was to extend 
the approver system of the Thugee and Dacoitie Department to the crime of 
professional poisoning. By doing so, cases of poisoning could be treated as a group 
offence rather than being labelled as individual crimes. The response of the 
Government of India centred around the fact that there had not been a single 
conviction of a ‘thug’ poisoner. Indeed, the law itself made conviction difficult, 
undermining Hervey’s claims of ‘intent to kill’. Section 300 of Act XLV stated that 
an accused could only be termed a thug and, hence an approver, if the person 
committing the act knew that death would ensue.83 The purpose of the thug, argued 
the opponents of Hervey, was to kill. Intoxication, rather than death, was the purpose 
of the poisoners. Without successful convictions it would be impossible to apply the 
approver system to cases of robbery by poisoning. The strength of the approver 
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system lay in the fact that the original thugs were ‘a large and united nationwide 
gang and only required a few of the accomplices for the detection and prosecution of 
the whole body.’84   
Robbery by poisoning, in contrast to the cult of the thugs, local governments 
stated, was ‘of infrequent occurrence’. As one official pointed out, the approver 
system was significant because it was a ‘readier and least expensive method of 
suppressing a large body of men by the evidence of the smallest number of 
accomplices.’85 Gangs of poisoners were so small in number and rarely associated 
with each other, that to use the approver system would be pointless. As one official, 
though not disputing Hervey’s claims of an organised gang, pointed out ‘without an 
approver we cannot establish a system...there are hints of an organised gang but there 
is no proof or certainty, the facts being too stubborn to be got over.’86  
 The need to present poisoning as an ‘organised crime’ that would force the 
government to take action can also be seen in the debates over the control of certain 
poisons. Throughout the colonial period, the colonial authorities had discussed the 
issue of regulating the sales of poisons, thereby correcting the anomaly which had 
troubled the authorities over the years.87 It was an issue for which there was no easy 
resolution, tied as it was to broader economic interests. A special investigation was 
conducted in 1879 by R. D. Spedding, the magistrate of Goruckpur, who stressed the 
urgent need to regulate white arsenic in particular, a poison used in most domestic 
disputes and also in cases of cattle poisoning. He, as others had before him, argued 
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that lack of regulation had created a drug trafficking system spreading from the 
North-Western Provinces to Calcutta and that tracking down criminals was 
impossible without any regulation. In particular, the enquiry made references to the 
caste of chamars, claiming that it was this group that was largely responsible for 
using the poison for illegitimate purposes, primarily cattle poisoning. The officiating 
collector of Patna stated that if a search was to be made, ‘we would scarcely find a 
chamar’s house without a certain amount of arsenic in it...it is secretly given out to 
fellow chamars in different parts of Patna and other districts for the destruction of 
cattle.’88 The officiating magistrate of Azimgarh, described the ‘extensive system’ of 
cattle poisoning in more detail, a ‘vast conspiracy involving leather merchants, 
buniahs, poison-distributors and the village chamars who administered the drug to 
the cattle...the chowkidars of villages are the ringleaders.’89 Spedding, thus urged the 
Government of India to introduce legislation that would clamp down on the sale of 
the poison as well as the native agents engaged in supplying it for illegitimate 
purposes. 
 His request was not granted. The government of India of course pointed to 
the impracticalities of regulating a drug easily grown and available in a vast colony. 
As in the case of Dhatura thugee, the government undermined Spedding’s claim of 
the existence of an ‘organised system of poisoning’, arguing that no regulation was 
necessary if such a system did not exist.90 Furthermore, the use of arsenic by native 
practitioners, who pointed to the beneficial effects of the poison, was also discussed 
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in detail.91 But most importantly, the decision would reflect trade interests. Spedding, 
in his enquiry, had consistently referred to the role of the chamars in using the 
poison to destroy cattle. But introducing regulation and controlling their movements 
would be detrimental to the interests of a number of groups. As Horace Cockerell, 
the Secretary to the Government of Bengal pointed out, the people who used the 
poison for the purpose of destroying cattle belonged to the same class and caste as 
those who required the poison for the legitimate purposes of their trade.92 Chamars 
could use arsenic to poison cattle but they also required arsenic to continue their 
legitimate trade. Arsenic was used in the Lower Provinces of Bengal to cure hides 
and the hide trade in Bengal was a profitable one, for both native merchants and 
European firms.93 Any proposal that would interfere with or tend to check such an 
enormous trade, argued Cockerell, should be carefully considered.94 To regulate the 
poison would not only harm trade interests but it would also harm the livelihood of 
chamars who used the poison for legitimate purposes. To regulate, and to raise the 
price of arsenic in the process, would place them at such an economic disadvantage 
that oppression, particularly from the police, would be the only result. 
 Arsenic would eventually be regulated under the Poisons Act of 1904 but 
even that Act was framed with trade interests in mind. Following the introduction of 
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the Act, a licence was required for the sale of poisons. It was a widely criticised 
piece of legislation.95 This was primarily because it exempted the very group which 
engaged in the illegitimate use of the poison from holding a licence whilst the term 
‘medical practitioner’, also exempt, was dangerously wide in the native 
environment.96  Furthermore, the act only dealt with poisons that were for sale, whilst 
the possession of poisons not for sale was not interfered with. Significantly, too, the 
Act only extended to the rural areas in cases where arsenic was sold. If poisons other 
than arsenic were concerned, then the Act was not applicable in rural areas, special 
permission being required from the Governor General. It was, as one official noted, 
‘a disastrous rule...rural areas must be included because that is where the abuse 
prevails.’97 Amidst such outcry, the framers of the Act would point out that it was 
always regarded as an experiment and was intentionally limited in scope.98 Such a 
‘general and flexible’ Act, was the only option because the colonial authorities were 
anxious to avoid unnecessary intervention in legitimate industries, including both 
indigenous medicine and trade. Due to this, it was important to ensure that the Act 
was as flexible as possible and ‘local courts be given the power to change the rules 
and adapt according to individual circumstances.’99 It was eventually repealed and 
replaced by the Act XII of 1919, an Act designed to rectify the many limitations of 
the original legislation. 
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 The crime of poisoning fell strictly within the public legal sphere, to be 
punished by the colonial state. The cautious approach adopted by the state 
demonstrates the powerful influence of broader imperial interests. Such an approach 
was also adopted when crimes associated with questions of religion and morality, 
and those that fell within the private sphere, were brought to the attention of the 
authorities. Indeed, it would be these types of cases which visibly exposed the 
dilemmas faced by a colonial government aware that they had to publicly support the 
idea of a civilising mission in India, designed to improve the ‘depraved morality’ of 
their native subjects. For the British, however, the policy of non-interference would 
always be of utmost importance and the civilising mission would in comparison 
remain a secondary concern.  
Problems occurred when crimes committed within the domestic sphere found 
their way into the colonial court of law. Publicly, the Indian Penal Code was 
designed to deal with all forms of crime, whether in the private or the public sphere. 
But concerns arose when officials shied away from dealing with domestic crimes, 
and used colonial law itself to avoid doing so. That the idea of an improved morality 
would always be secondary to the policy of non-interference was one thing. But for 
crimes to occur and for colonial law itself to be seen as contributing  to the ‘depraved 
morality’ of the native subjects was quite another. It was too visible a reminder of the 
tenuous position that the British held in India – one that was ultimately dependent 
upon maintaining a policy of non–interference and hence protecting broader imperial 
interests such as trade. However, it was also equally reliant on the civilising mission, 




 The attempt to keep a distance from the private sphere was beset with 
problems. This was demonstrated by the agitation over the Muhammadan Marriages 
and Divorces Act I of 1876. The aim of this legislation had been to provide a definite 
form of registration, a lack of which had meant that it was difficult for a court of law 
to successfully resolve a dispute without proof of documentation. This state of affairs 
had meant that Muhammadan couples had used the courts of law for their own 
personal agendas. It was due to the improper use of the court by the native 
community that the authorities decided to introduce the Act of 1876. 
  The Act of 1876 was designed to alleviate the difficulties faced by officials 
within the British court. It was a concern related to the public legal sphere but the 
Act by its very nature involved intervention within the private sphere. What the Act 
had implied was that unregistered marriages would not be valid in the British court 
of law. But, as pointed out by one Muhammedan official, ‘making unregistered 
marriages and divorces invalid in the British courts of law does not make them 
invalid under Muhammedan law.’100 Thus, on the one hand, Muhammedan clerics 
protested that their religion was being interfered with. On the other, there were 
claims that the Act had a negative impact in that ‘individuals knowing that only 
registered marriages counted in the British court, could easily leave earlier 
unregistered marriages, which would not stand in a court of law without proof.’101 
The Act had been introduced purely to ease the practical difficulties faced by 
authorities in the British court in dealing with unregistered cases. Discussions 
surrounding the Act would focus on the depraved morality of the Muhammedan 
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character. But it was also implied that the colonial policy of registering marriages, by 
making it easier to dispose of unregistered marriages, was itself implicated in 
exacerbating the depraved morality existing amongst the Muhammadan community. 
There were also other instances where it was difficult for the authorities to 
keep the moral and legal spheres separate. This was most visibly apparent in the case 
of infant marriages. Infant marriage and widow remarriage were particularly 
prevalent amongst Hindu communities and social reformers had over the years 
emphasised the need to improve native morality through education. B.M. Malabari, a 
Parsee social reformer, had in 1884 emphasised the dangers of infant marriage and 
the ‘sickly, degenerate population’ that would be the product of early consummation. 
The emphasis was clearly upon improving the moral nature of the native population, 
Malabari arguing that ‘if not legal intervention, then the government should at least 
apply moral pressure upon native community.’102 The government of India would 
ultimately reject the suggestions put forward by Malabari on the grounds that if 
‘native practices are not in accordance with the Shastras then public opinion  needs 
to be corrected which is not the business of Government...a foreign government 
cannot interfere in the domestic economy of our domestic institutions.’103  
Clearly, there was a concerted effort by the colonial authorities to preserve 
the policy of non-interference in domestic personal matters. As the Officiating 
Secretary to the Government of India would point out, the state used a ‘common 
sense test’ when faced with social or religious questions. The test, he argued, is ‘Can 
the State give effect to its commands by the ordinary machinery at its disposal? If 
not’, he continued, ‘it is desirable that the State should abstain from making a rule 
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which it cannot enforce without a departure from its usual practice or procedure.’104 
The problem, however, was that the ordinary machinery of law would itself ensure 
that colonial policy itself was implicated in social questions and indeed allowed the 
continuation of immoral behaviour. In a clear reference to the isolation of widows, 
under the Indian Penal Code, sections 341-344 and 346 stated that enforcing 
seclusion upon any person was an offence. To provide another example, it was 
pointed out that the Widows Remarriages Act XV indirectly promoted immoral 
behaviour. A widow would lose possession of her deceased husband’s property upon 
remarriage. Reasons of unchastity or immoral conduct, however, did not disqualify 
her from possession. Adultery and unchastity, acts of an extremely immoral nature 
were, it was argued, indirectly promoted by a colonial law, suggesting that it was 
better for a widow to be unchaste rather than remarry. The law again was implicated 
in promoting immoral behaviour and this was, it was argued, an anomaly that ‘must 
be removed.’105 Thus, as much as the government tried to maintain a distance from 
questions of morality, it was faced with a situation where not only did colonial law 
visibly undermine the civilising mission but it was indirectly responsible for the 
‘depraved morality’ exhibited by the native community. 
 This was also evident in what came to be known as the case of Luchmin. This 
was a case in which the colonial law and the civilising mission most visibly clashed. 
Luchmin was a fourteen–year-old girl who, in her own words, was a widow who had 
been sold by her immoral mother to a man by the name of Radha Kissen.  Having 
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escaped to the Christian mission house, and having converted to Christianity, her 
case would rest on three points. As a widow she could not remarry; that as she was 
over the age of fourteen, she was her own mistress; finally, her mother had sold her 
for immoral purposes and Kissen was keeping her as ‘his prostitute’. Radha Kissen 
issued court proceedings at the local police station accusing a member of the Mission 
House for illegally detaining ‘his wife Luchmin’ for the purpose of converting her to 
another faith. Magistrate Quinn, subsequently, ordered that Miss Abraham, who took 
in Luchmin at the Mission House, be arrested under section 155 and Luchmin be 
returned to her husband. 
 The case of Luchmin is interesting in that it demonstrates the extent to which 
the authorities were prepared to go to avoid handling matters of a domestic nature. 
Magistrate Quinn, it was found, had completely reinterpreted section 155 so that the 
case came within his jurisdiction. As a result, Miss Abraham argued in her defence, 
that Magistrate Quinn, through this reinterpretation of section 155, had ‘completely 
reclassified my Zennana mission as a house of ill-fame and disrepute!’106 The case 
received much public attention, even being the subject of debate in the House of 
Lords. Supporters of Christian reform repeatedly referred to the ‘sacrifice of a 
Christian maiden by an official acting in the name of a Christian Queen’ and the law 
as an ‘infernal machinery of oppression.’107 This passionate plea had been in response 
to Miss Abraham taking her case to the High Court, only to be told by Justices Mitter 
and Macpherson that the ‘wrong interpretation of section 155 was a slight error on 
the part of Quinn...to forcibly take a child from her legal guardian can only be 
justified if it could be proved that the guardians were immoral which in this case 
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cannot be established.’108 Whilst Justices Mitter and Macpherson based their 
explanation on legal technicalities, the debate in the House of Lords interpreted the 
case in more blunt terms. It was stated that the House must remember that ‘Indian 
Magistrates are bound to administer the law as it is, and the Government of her 
Majesty is under the most solemn obligations to respect religious and social customs 
of the Hindoos and all other classes of Her Majesty’s subjects in India.’109  
What the case of Luchmin, and indeed the arguments suggested by B.M. 
Malabari, demonstrates is the careful reinterpretation of events to meet need and 
circumstance. Malabari’s recommendations for intervention were countered by 
claims that Hindu ideas of moral and immoral behaviour differed from the colonial 
rulers, and as a result, non-intervention in the domestic sphere was the desired course 
of action. 
  The Age of Consent controversy led, to an extent, to a reversal of this 
argument.110 This particular event is often regarded as a defining point in the 
development of nationalism in the nineteenth century, and indeed, has received much 
scholarly attention. As a number of scholars have convincingly noted, it was not the 
seriousness of a crime resulting in the death of a child that was the focal point of 
discussion in this particular controversy. Rather a number of interests were at stake. 
For the Hindus, as Tanika Sarkar has pointed out, the death of Phulmoni was a 
defining point, when the protection of the personal domestic sphere, and of the 
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female within it, became a focal point in the development of nationalist politics.111 It 
was a form of nationalism which, as Mrinilini Sinha has argued, for the Hindu male 
served as a platform upon which the notion of masculinity was rigidly defined.112 For 
the British, it was, as Himani Bannerjee has noted, ‘not a question of consent but of 
control of the female body, of determining when her body would be ready to meet 
the needs of her husband.’113 Furthermore, Bannerjee continues, ‘the death of 
Phulmoni, produced legally through marital rape, became an occasion for 
legitimation, that is, expansion of hegemony.’114  
One can also place emphasis upon the ease with which law and ideas about 
religion could be carefully reinterpreted to accommodate changing circumstance.  
Although, in effect, the bill as passed was a dead letter, emphasising the desire to 
maintain a distance from the domestic sphere, what is interesting to note is the way 
in which religion was now used to justify their initial intervention.115 The colonial 
authorities would attempt to explain the necessity of intervention via the bill. The 
Proclamation of 1858, so often relied on as the Act that enabled the colonial 
authorities to evade handling cases of a domestic sphere, was in the case of 
Phulmoni, undermined, with one magistrate arguing that the ‘Government of India 
has at all times manifested a just attention to the religious opinions and customs of 
the Natives, so far as is compatible with the paramount claims of humanity and 
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 Intervention had led to an outcry from orthodox sections of the Hindu community who claimed that 
the proposal threatened their religious ceremony of Garbhadhan, according to which a marriage had to 
be consummated following the first menses. 
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justice...respect for religion will always be observed where religious doctrines do not 
compel criminal results.’116  
The Age of Consent debate was an event that brought various concerns and 
anxieties of the colonial government to the fore. Chief amongst these was the fear 
that the colonial law, in the form of section 375, suggested that a husband could 
demand his marital rights from his wife.117 The colonial authorities, argued the 
Governor General, were faced with the dilemma ‘of either protecting these little girls 
or disregarding the religious argument.’118 The religious argument was not 
completely disregarded but what the authorities did do was to depend on 
interpretations which undermined the religious argument put forward by the 
opponents of the bill. Thus, argued one native social reformer, the religious texts of 
the Hindus stated that consummation could not occur before puberty was reached, 
which according to the texts occurred at the age of twelve. The low limit sanctioned 
by the Indian Penal Code, he continued, ‘has actually sanctioned a very retrograde 
view of the ancient law of the country and of an improved practice...therefore section 
375 is grossly wrong on the grounds of principle and lower than what Smriti texts 
and medical texts sanctioned.’119 Indeed, it was argued that there was no intervention 
on the part of the state. Premature intercourse with female children was already an 
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offence according to the law, the aim of the proposed bill simply being to improve 
and correct the current law and turn a ‘vice into a crime.’120 
What one notices in the debate over the Age of Consent controversy is the 
emphasis placed upon the interpretation of the religious text belonging to the Hindu 
community. What one also notices is the role of the authorities in interpreting and 
reinterpreting religious texts according to need. Indeed, various authorities would 
offer vastly differing opinions. To some, the Shastras were sacred and should not be 
interfered with whilst others argued that women had possessed more freedom in the 
ancient Vedic period, meaning that the Shastric rules were more recent and could not 
be classified as a religious practice. The diversity of opinion led to many local 
authorities expressing the view that it was unwise to interfere in socio-religious 
questions. When such questions did demand the attention of the authorities, they had 
to carefully undermine the religious aspect. Thus, the death of Phulmoni, and the 
subsequent discussion of the high number of female deaths resulting from forcible 
intercourse, had led to an interpretation of the Shastras in such a way that the 
religious text condemned premature consummation because it would create a sickly, 
degenerate population. It was due to the careful but constant emphasis upon this, and 
upon the laws of Manu condemning premature consummation, that the change in law 
could be implemented.  
Ultimately the change in legislation which increased the age of 
consummation had little effect. But what the controversy did demonstrate was the 
way in which the colonial state could interpret and reinterpret according to need and 
circumstance. Luchmin, the proposals of Malabari and other cases of a domestic 
nature were undermined by emphasising the importance of the policy of non-





intervention. The case of Phulmonee would to an extent reverse the argument. But 
even in that case it was not the committal of an offence, and the sole authority of the 
colonial state to punish it according to law, that was the main point of contention. It 
was the discussion centred around the female body, discussions about the relevance 
and indeed importance of the Garbhadhan ceremony in the Shastras, discussions 
designed to demonstrate to the Hindu community, that the law of the state was no 
threat to their personal sphere, that were a central feature of the controversy. Thus, 
the controversy, and the cases that arose in the years before it, emphasised that in the 
tussle between the law of the colonial state and the personal ‘moral’ sphere of the 
colonised subjects, the former would be moulded according to the needs of the latter, 




This chapter began with the predicament voiced by a crime writer who questioned 
the role of the law in bettering the moral nature of its subjects. In the context of 
British India, a land in which the all-important policy of non-interference coexisted 
alongside the ‘civilising mission’, the disparity between the two pillars of the 
civilising mission-law and morality- became sharply visible. The aim to improve the 
morality of the colonised subjects was always a secondary concern when compared 
to the policy of non-intervention. This was recognised and accepted by the colonial 
authorities. The unwillingness to get involved in the affairs of a village mirrored the 
inability of the state to penetrate the interior. Complete control was never possible, 
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the authorities responding only when ordinary crime had reached unacceptable 
levels.  
The fear of ‘mass rebellion’ and controlling groups was always the central 
focus of the colonial government. This concern was also apparent in the debates 
surrounding hook-swinging in 1892, or what the colonial authorities referred to as 
‘self torture’.121 Discussions on whether to ban the practice or not focused on the 
threats that a ban would pose to the religious liberties of the people.122 Yet, crucially, 
whilst it was noted that hook-swinging was primarily practised by lower classes and 
was not recognised by the Hindu Shastras, a text that would be a focal point in 
attempts to justify both intervention and non-intervention, it was concluded that any 
ban would be a dangerous move. Dabbling with any socio-religious topic, 
particularly in the aftermath of the Age of Consent controversy, would, it was feared, 
lead to mass revolt, the avoidance of which had always been a primary concern of 
the colonial government. The fact that the authorities were interested in banning only 
public displays of hook-swinging that would attract large numbers of crowds further 
demonstrates that the control of specific threats was always going to be the 
overriding concern for the colonial authorities. 
The importance of broader imperial interests would always require the law of 
the state to be of a somewhat flexible nature, ready to be moulded according to need 
and circumstance. Thus, whilst in the early days of colonial rule, William Sleeman 
had successfully employed a number of both scientific and legal techniques, 
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themselves a product of British anxieties about the colony, to create a ‘cult’ which 
required an ‘extralegal’ response, dealing with the professional poisoner of the late 
nineteenth century, proved to be a much more difficult process. Broader interests, 
involving those of both European firms and local rural communities, would 
undermine calls to deal with the crime in the same manner as Sleeman had dealt with 
the thugs. Future regulation would reflect the reluctance of the authorities to upset 
the status quo.  
The cautious approach adopted by the authorities was also reflected in their 
handling of ‘social crime’. In response to the proposals put forward by B.M. 
Malabari, the Acting Under Secretary to the Government of Bombay had 
significantly pointed out that whilst sati and infanticide, were ‘dealt with as crimes 
and thus stood on a different footing...no amount of appeal will clothe the question of 
widow marriage as such with a criminal aspect.’123 This assertion is important in two 
respects. Firstly, there is the direct recognition that a criminal element had to be 
present before the government could interfere via legislation. Secondly, is the 
implication that the government itself could transform an act into a crime, and make 
it punishable by the law of the colonial state, according to need and circumstance. 
Luchmin was forcibly returned to her husband because Magistrate Quinn was able to 
reinterpret the law in a way that maintained the policy of non-interference. The 
proposals of Malabari were rejected on the grounds that they were counter to colonial 
policy. The Age of Consent controversy led to a cautious reinterpretation of the 
religious texts of the Hindus, by which the authorities could, on the one hand 
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undermine the religious scriptures, and on the other emphasise the criminal aspect of 
the case. 
Moulding the law according to broader interests, however, was not without its 
problems. Concerns arose when cases came before the colonial authorities which 
suggested that the law itself was contributing to the state of immorality amongst the 
native population. This was clearly apparent in the account of C.M. Edwards, who 
whilst describing the transformation of the criminal tribes into law-abiding, 
disciplined, orderly citizens, also noted that there was still a distinct lack of morality. 
He also noted that members of the tribes thought that the government itself was to 
blame for this state of affairs, a woman informing him that ‘in the old days marriage 
cost Rs. 300 then Sahib said no marriage must cost more that Rs.30 so men cannot 
acquire large sums of money...who can expect us to be bound by a Rs. 30 
marriage?’124 Whilst it could be argued that Edwards was simply strengthening the 
stereotype, that of an immoral community which always required the assistance of 
the colonial rulers, other instances would emphasise similar concerns.The 
Muhammedan Marriages Act as well as legislation regarding Hindu widows, for 
instance, reflected an anxiety that colonial rule was itself implicated in creating the 
‘depraved immorality’ of the colonised population. 
What these various dilemmas and broader interests, in which the role of the 
law was adapted according to the needs of different groups, led to was the 
strengthening of a multilayered stereotype of crime and the criminal in India. For 
instance, the difficulties in bringing the professional poisoner within the confines of 
legislation were compensated by the stereotype which is visible in a number of 
colonial memoirs.  What the colonial authorities placed emphasis upon was the 
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invisibility of the professional poisoner, which would be presented as proof of the 
potential threat he posed to unsuspecting victims. Through this process, the idea of 
the Dhatura thug would emerge, and was a constant presence in the memoirs. What 
would be constantly emphasised was that his very invisibility demanded British 
presence in India. This stereotype was a powerful tool by which it could 
simultaneously assume and avoid responsibility. On the one hand, law was the gift 
that the British presented to a previously ‘lawless’ land. On the other, the native of 
India possessed a ‘flawed’ native morality and until this morality was improved, the 
law of the colonial state would be ineffective. The dangers of this stereotype were, 
however, pointed out by some.  The reviewer of one particular ‘authoritative’ 
account of crime in India, produced following the rise of revolutionary crime in the 
colony, argued that painting the native character in too negative a light would only 
further strain the relationship between ruler and ruled, leading to disaffected natives 
from engaging in further acts of disloyalty towards the colonial government.125 
The circumstances which demanded that the British implement a legal 
structure that was flexible in nature meant that the legal institutions of the colonial 
state would be employed in very specific ways by the local community. Indeed, the 
fluid nature of colonial law itself was indeed taken advantage of by Luchmin, who 
combined an orthodox Hindu view – that as a widow, she could not remarry – with a 
foreign colonial law, which considered a female over fourteen ‘as her own mistress.’ 
That she was able to add ‘her immoral’ mother into her account made her the ideal 
candidate for a civilising mission which portrayed the native subject as one who 
required protection of the benevolent British authorities from ‘physical and moral 
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ruin’. That they chose to do otherwise, and the manner in which it was done, 
demonstrates the powerful influence of broader interests in the shaping and reshaping 






































Chapter Three:  ‘Unofficial’ Local Agencies versus the  
‘Official’ Policing Network: The Chowkidar, 
the Panchayat and the State, 1870-1914 
 
Sir Lawrence informed me that there are only 
   three classes of officials (or ranks I should say) 
   who have any power in India – the Tehsildar, the 
   District Officer and the Governor General. I told 




The power of the village watchman, continued Legislative Council Member George 
Henry Mildmay Ricketts, was established through an ‘acquisition of knowledge 
gained from mixing amongst the people in town and country.’2 The local population, 
in many instances, were unwilling to officially report cases to the regular police, 
thereby creating an absence of official authority in the countryside. The employment 
of an alternative agency to acquire knowledge of criminal affairs, thus, was 
necessary. It was the village watchman, or chowkidar, who, with his direct access to 
the customs and habits of local communities to which he himself belonged, could 
operate as the crucial ‘link’ between the rural village and the district police. By 
redirecting information, primarily of a criminal nature, from the interior to the 
district headquarters, he was in effect the eyes and ears of the government, the ‘very 
foundation of the police force.’3 Acting as the first point of contact for members of 
the local community, how this rural agent handled their complaint could have a 
direct impact upon the use they made of colonial institutions such as the police and 
the courts of law. In addition to these duties, the chowkidar was also the agent upon 
whom the government ultimately depended for information relating to district 
matters. It was he who was held responsible for the reporting of births and deaths, 
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diagnosis in the cases of death and all other ‘vital statistics’. Thus, the significance of 
the watchman as a vital source of information within the colonial network was 
clearly not lost on Ricketts.  
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, it is to examine the ambiguous 
role of the chowkidar within the chain of criminal administration. Secondly, the aim 
is to examine the local influences which determined how he operated within the 
colonial network of control. The clash between the requirements of the colonial state 
and the practical needs of the locality form a central part of this chapter.  Section one 
of this chapter discusses the impact of Act (VI) of 1870, the purpose of which was to 
transform the chowkidar into a respectable and trusted agent within the chain of 
criminal administration. Section two discusses the impact of broader imperial 
objectives upon the working of Act (VI) of 1870. The third and final section 
examines why the panchayat, responsible for ensuring that the conditions of the Act 
were complied with in the interior districts, operated in ways that were at odds with 
the requirements of the government. 
The initial exclusion of the watchman in the opening extract above reveals a 
long standing anomaly.  Despite his central role within the network, he was never 
designated as an ‘official’ member of the police, being appointed instead as a 
supplementary agent. By law he was under the control of the sub-inspector, yet in 
practice he still served the village landlord. What concerned the executive authorities 
about this system in which the chowkidar served two masters – the police and the 
local zamindar – was the ability of the latter to disrupt the ‘flow’ of information 
between the chowkidar and the police. Moreover, the post of a chowkidar was also 
very far from being a respectable one. It was occupied by those from lower caste 
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communities such as the Harees, Baghdees, Dusads and Domes, castes considered so 
inferior that they were ‘employed as scavengers and other such like degrading 
offices...no Hindoo native caste would even touch them.’4 There was also no uniform 
system of payment with chowkidars paid either in cash, kind or rent-free land. Wages 
were insufficient, paid irregularly or in arrears and rent-free land was often inferior 
in quality. As a direct result, argued officials, the watchman engaged in the very 
activities which he was supposed to prevent.  The chowkidars, described the Judge of 
Cuttack in 1838, were ‘employed during the day to assist the Zemindar in collecting 
his rents, and at night they act as the agents of the notorious characters to point out 
where property is to be found.’5 In 1856 the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal 
concluded that ‘they are all, or are linked to, thieves or robbers...when anyone is 
robbed in a village the first person suspected will be the village watchman.’6 The real 
detective of the country, the ‘entire backbone of the system’, was also considered to 
be a thief amongst thieves, a low caste, low paid and badly clothed member of the 
community often treated with disdain.  Indeed, the rather sarcastic referral to the 
watchman as ‘that wonderful person at the bottom end of the scale’7 in one account 
was treated as confirmation that for ‘all practical purposes of Police the watchman is 
utterly useless.’8 
Considered within this context, it can be understood why the rather 
‘undeserving’ chowkidar is excluded from a list including highly respected figures 
such as the Governor General. For Ricketts and his contemporaries the key concern 
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was to place this rural agent on a more respectable footing and transform him into a 
well ordered and established ‘visible’ figure whilst still preserving his place amongst 
the people. Such reform would require the recognition of, and solution to, dilemmas 
that had ‘remained unsolved for the past two generations.’9 How to transform a rural 
agent, independent from the centralised police force, into a ‘well respected’ and ‘well 
established’ unofficial officer without removing him from the village community, 
was one such dilemma. How to mould traditional village agencies supporting the 
chowkidar in ways that were conducive to state policy was the other.  
The district authorities seemed to have found the solution through the 
implementation of Act (VI) of 1870, the purpose of which was to provide an agency 
which could assist the police by ‘passing on all kinds of information and thus 
indirectly secure the better administration of the country in improving the position of 
the village chowkidar.’10 Central to the act was the belief that payment in land or 
kind only served to ensure chowkidari allegiance to the zamindar. What was needed 
instead was a regular, adequate cash salary which resulted in punctual reporting and 
the better surveillance of criminals.  The traditional institution of the village 
panchayat, an informal tribunal readjusted to meet colonial requirements, would act 
as the agency assisting the police.  A special tax would be extracted from the 
community to pay the salary of the chowkidar and it was the duty of this agency to 
collect this tax and ensure the regular and prompt payment of the chowkidar..11 
Regular payment, it was felt, would improve the condition and status of the 
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chowkidar, enabling him to enthusiastically assist the thana police. Furthermore, in 
contrast to previous legislation, the Act provided a specific procedure by which the 
magistrate could enforce the payment of the chowkidari salary. The panchayat, it 
was believed, would thus secure the elevation of this rural agent from despised to 
distinguished agent and strengthen the connection between the rural chowkidar and 
the district police. Self-governance was another key aspect of the Act. Paying for 
their own protection and selecting members of the panchayat were regarded by the 
state as steps in restoring the chowkidar as a servant of the village and not the 
landlord. Significantly, the police, whom the authorities believed were extremely 
unpopular with the local populace, were not to interfere in this exercise in self-
governance which would be in ‘accordance with the traditions and customs of the 
Indian people.’12  This exercise set the tone for developments which took place a 
decade later, with the colonial authorities attempting more vigorously to put the 
concept of local self-government into practice.13 Yet the development of this self-
governance was very much dependent upon the specific needs and requirements of 
the state rather than the rural community. Control ‘over their own affairs’, in other 
words, was closely followed by a compulsory set of rules and procedures, as well as 
enforced pay and official interference. 
The role of local level agencies within the colonial network of control has 
been the subject of much examination. Basudeb Chattopadhyah, Chittabrata Palit and 
Ranjan Chakrabarti in their respective studies have examined the fragile relationship 
between rural networks and the official network of control in early nineteenth 
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century Bengal.14 The conflicting demands made upon the chowkidar is also 
emphasised in these studies. Furthermore, Anand Yang has argued that collaboration 
with local level agencies, rather than complete control of these agencies, reflected the 
limitations of the network of control throughout the period of colonial rule in India.15 
As insightful as these studies are, what is missing is a closer examination of the ways 
in which colonial law made the fragile relationship even more visible in the period 
following Crown control in 1858. For instance, as the second section of this chapter 
plans to demonstrate, the Criminal Code of Procedure itself would further contribute 
to the uncertainty surrounding the role of the chowkidar within the chain of criminal 
administration. Furthermore, the practical difficulties experienced by the panchayats 
in adapting to self-governance, as defined by the colonial state, requires further 
examination. By examining these issues, the intention is to highlight the limitations 
of the official network within which local, more informal groups were forced to 
operate and how this ‘clash’ of ideals caused local agencies to act in ways widely at 
variance with the requirements of the Act of 1870 and subsequent legislation.  
 
3.1 The Impact of Act (VI) of 1870  
The progress of Act (VI) of 1870 is well documented in the police administration 
reports for the Lower Provinces of Bengal. Indeed, with the legislation being a 
product of many years of intense debate and discussion, the colonial authorities were 
eager to emphasise the positive impact it had on strengthening communications 
between the chowkidar and the police as well as improvements in his condition and 
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performance. Certainly, the instances quoted within the administration reports 
suggest that the Act was having the desired effect. The experiment was particularly 
successful in the Rajshaye division, where the Act was extended to no less than 3176 
villages.16 In this division, the inspector general of police reported that the 
chowkidars were ‘energetic in keeping watch than before, cases were being reported 
more punctually and the chowkidar was now attending the thana more regularly.’17 
He went on to report a decrease in cattle theft and housebreaking due to the 
‘chowkidar’s watchfulness’ in 1877 whilst in the Rungpore district of the division, he 
observed that ‘where a happy selection of the panchayat is made, the chowkidars are 
a useful body and keep the thana police informed of all matters in their elakas.’18 
Similarly, in Dinajpore, the Act had been introduced in 847 villages with success and 
not used for panchayati ends.19 Elsewhere in the Sarun district of Patna the 
‘chowkidar could complain now to the Magistrate who would subsequently release 
an order of payment to be made within seven days.’20  
It was further stated that whilst in 1894 fifty three percent of chowkidars were 
under the provisions of this Act, by 1904 this figure had increased to ninety three 
percent, thus demonstrating a ‘considerable advance within the last thirty five years, 
with the force being more disciplined under the Act and as a result no longer 
stigmatised by active criminal tendencies.’21  They were better clothed, better 
disciplined and were required to take part in regular parades at the local police 
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station.22 The Indian Police Commission also observed in 1902 that ‘where the 
responsibility of village authorities is enforced and their services utilised, their 
cooperation is of immense value.’23 Furthermore, it was found that following the 
establishment of the daffadar in 1904, or the officer who was to supervise the 
chowkidar and report back to the regular police, there were some improvements. 
Thus, in 1904, in Backergunge the daffadar and chowkidar were found to ‘be good 
value in the detection of crime, prevention of breaches of the peace and the arrest of 
absconders.’24  In Faridpur, it was claimed that within each union, chowkidars and 
daffadars were responsible as a body for the crime of the entire union which had 
resulted in a great decrease in riots and thefts.25  
What is striking about these instances of ‘improvement’ is the rarity with 
which they occur and the conditions upon which they are dependent.  For the system 
only ‘worked well’ if there was some form of enforcement from the district 
authorities or if the village agencies were in agreement. The chowkidar could 
complain to the magistrate but instances are never provided of any complaint 
actually being made. Where the Act did meet with success, it was still applied to the 
rural scene in ways that undermined the regulations set by the authorities. In 
Rajshahye, for instance, it was discovered that the success reported within that 
district had been achieved ‘without a single provision of the Act being attended to.’26 
Upon closer inspection of the accounts, the inspector general of police had found that 
chowkidars were ‘quite of the old style...in one case the chowkidar was twelve 
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months in arrears and the members of the panchayat seemed to know or care little 
about the matter.’27 Indeed, the conduct of the panchayat was one cause for concern. 
Required to include educated and respected members, in actual fact the panchayat 
was formed of illiterate villagers who ‘did not collect the tax in advance or realise 
arrears from defaulters and prepared false statements of collections’.28 Within a year 
of it being introduced in nineteen villages within the Bheerbhoom district, one of the 
members of the panchayat was convicted of embezzlement whilst in Tippera in 
1878, the panchayat were making illegal deductions from the wage of the chowkidar. 
The district superintendent of police for the Hooghly division in 1884 found that 
where accounts of the panchayat were kept, they were only kept for the ‘edification 
of inspecting officers, the real ‘khasra jumma karch’ (account file) never being 
produced.’29 
Most importantly, the panchayat failed to comply with the underlying 
principles of the Act.  The chowkidar did not receive a regular, legitimate wage nor 
was crime reported to the thana police. It was the concealment, as opposed to the 
reporting, of crime that raised serious concerns.  Rather than strengthen the 
relationship between the chowkidar and the police, it was found on many occasions 
that the panchayat actually obstructed the reporting of cases between the two offices 
and in some instances engaged in criminal activity themselves. In Serajgunj, a 
particular rape case was recorded within the reports. The father of the victim wished 
her to marry a certain individual whilst the panchayat of the village demanded that 
she be married to another. At the instigation of the panchayat, the accused, six in 
number, ‘removed the wife and two daughters and raped them...all six persons were 
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sent up for trial and the case was pending.’30 In Faridpur, to offer another example, in 
one case ‘the accused, owing to some land disputes, carried away the wife of the 
complainant to a jute field, and ravished her.’31 The rural police, it was found, tried to 
‘hush up the matter’ and as a result were prosecuted. Similarly, in the case of a girl 
murdered by her mother-in-law in the Dacca division, ‘money flowed freely. Her 
skull had proved to be fracturous but the chowkidar and the panchayat had been 
silenced in the first instance and practically the whole village said she died of 
dysentery.’32  
Attempts by the government to raise the condition and status of the 
chowkidar – another important aspect of the Act – were also futile. By the turn of the 
century, village watchmen still continued to be drawn from the lower castes.33 They 
were wanting in intelligence, interest and activity.34 With higher castes rejecting such 
a post, authorities by 1902 had concluded that lower castes, even those with criminal 
tendencies, were at least obedient and subservient whereas higher castes would never 
do any work.’35 Furthermore, the order to prohibit employment of chowkidars on 
menial employment had no impact. The district superintendent of Burdwan noticed 
the practice of employing chowkidars to carry dead bodies for post-mortem 
examination and burial.36 In the district of Gaya, a magistrate found the zamindar 
employing the chowkidar on menial service.  One court had even passed a decree 
                                                          
30
 Report on the Administration of the Police of the Lower Provinces, Bengal for the Year 1901 
31
 Report on the Administration of the Police of the Lower Provinces, Bengal for the Year 1900 
32
 Report on the Administration of the Police of the Lower Provinces, Bengal for the Year 1877 
33
 In many districts, Bagdis, Domes and Haris-the lowest stratum of the semi original community- 
were employed as chowkidars whereas in Dharbhanga, Patna Division, the chowkidari force included 
men from the Dosadh community. Many chowkidars belonged to the criminal classes. See Reports on 
the Administration of the Police in the Lower Provinces of Bengal 1870-1915 
34
 See Clive Dewey, ‘Patwari and Chaukidar: Subordinate Officials and the Reliability of India’s 
Agricultural Statistics’ in Clive Dewey and A.G. Hopkins (eds). The Imperial Impact in Africa and 
South Asia (London: Athlone Press for the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 1979) pp. 280-314 
35
 See Indian Police Commission 1902-03 
36
 Report on the Administration of Police in the Lower Provinces of Bengal for the Year 1894 
81 
 
against a chowkidar for money damages because he ‘had declined to carry the 
suitcase or luggage of a zamindar.’37 Even members of the regular force employed 
the watchman for similar purposes. In Ranchi, for example, the sub-inspector of one 
thana was dismissed for employing a chowkidar as a syce and then bringing false 
charges against him whilst the magistrate of Murshidabad stated that the ‘chowkidars 
are the slaves of the police officers in the thana and the mufassil...the chowkidars are 
simply luggage bearers of constables and head constables, drawers of water and 
grasscutters.’38 
The chowkidar, concluded one official, ‘still holds an inferior position, drawn 
as a rule from menial castes, who lives on the outskirts of the village. Some of his 
duties as general servant of the community are so degrading that the doors of village 
society are shut against him.’39 The Chowkidari Reward Fund was introduced with 
the intention of raising the morale of the force yet chowkidars still failed to receive 
any remuneration for good service. Indeed, the manner in which the fund was utilised 
would only increase the fragility of the system.40 By 1911, forty years after the Act 
was first enacted, the average wage of a chowkidar was still only four rupees and the 
wages of unskilled labour considerably higher.41 There were numerous instances 
where in large villages not a single man would come forward for a chowkidar’s post. 
Those individuals who were appointed as chowkidars were indifferent to their posts. 
Even the daffadar, through whom the daroga could keep in touch with the 
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chowkidar, yet another attempt at linking the village to the regular police, was a 
disappointment.42 L. M. Morshead, Inspector General of Police, noted in 1909 that 
the ‘daffadar was too much under the influence of the village police, whose clerks 
they basically are.’43 The chowkidar, who influenced the ‘very foundations of 
Executive Government’ therefore, was far removed from the image of the ‘ideal’ 
rural policeman.44 That government officers continued to depend for information on 
this rural agent, remarked the magistrate of Hooghly, was ‘an anomaly approaching 
the nature of the marvellous!’45 
The Act was therefore in many ways a ‘dead letter’. Successes were an 
exception; failure to follow the underlying principles of the Act the rule. The agency 
which was to set the whole system in motion – the panchayat – was acting in direct 
opposition to the requirements of the legislation. On one hand, it failed to improve 
the position of the chowkidar and on the other, undermined the ability of the district 
authorities to gain information regarding criminal activity. Thus, the fundamental 
aim of strengthening the link between the rural chowkidar and the district police 
through a suitable agency was constantly challenged. What this meant was that the 
government had to resort to official interference through the very agency they wished 
to avoid – the thana police – to gain any result. This in turn would inevitably 
compromise the other founding principle of self-governance. The authorities could 
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not avoid conceding that the Act had failed to produce the desired effect; nor, 
however, could they ignore the reasons why the conditions were so distasteful to the 
rural community. How the people chose to handle matters relating to the policing of 
their community differed from the state view of how the people should handle these 
matters. The chowkidar may still have been employed in menial tasks, yet the 
inspector general of police in 1894 also had to acknowledge that it was difficult to 
increase the status of the chowkidar because the general public, including members 
of the police, saw no harm in employing chowkidars to carry out menial work.46 
  Members of panchayats did not hesitate to point out to visiting officials that 
any successful working of the Act would involve much inconvenience and difficulty 
for a community that was accustomed to a much more informal system. Thus, Indian 
perceptions of law, economy and administration differed greatly from those of the 
British rulers. What widened the gap was the broader objectives of, and the 
practicalities of managing, a colonial state. Both factors were instrumental in 
moulding the Act into a very particular form of legislation, one that was at odds with 
its underlying principles as well as the requirements of a rural society. The remainder 
of this chapter examines both the clash between two foreign systems as well as the 
objectives of the state. By doing so, the intention is to demonstrate why the Act, and 
the agencies it was to ‘transform’, fell short of the expectations of a colonial 
government and the needs of the rural society it was to serve. How in this process 
local agencies were able to adapt state legislation in ways that suited their own needs 
will also be considered. 
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3.2 Self Governance versus Imperial Objectives 
If the purpose of the Act was to ensure that the rural community was to be held 
responsible and accountable in matters relating to the rural force, then it was by no 
means innovative. The principle of ‘self-help and self–reliance’ had been central to 
British policy since the early days of colonial rule. 47 Indeed, provisions had first been 
made in 1813, by Regulation XIII of that year, for the maintenance of the chowkidar 
in the cities of Patna, Murshidabad and Dacca. By this regulation, also known as the 
first municipal law to be enacted in Bengal, the chowkidar was to be remunerated by 
monthly stipends to be paid by the residents of these three cities on the principle that 
‘it is just and expedient that the communities for whose benefit and protection such 
establishments may be entertained, should defray the charge of their maintenance.’48 
The attitude of the residents towards these regulations was clearly summed up by one 
police official who declared that the ‘people cannot approve of the arrangement 
because it compels them to pay money without receiving the equivalent in return, the 
protection afforded by the chowkidars not being at all in proportion to the amount of 
their pay.’49 A similar reaction had also been expressed during the Bareilly 
Disturbances of 1816, where a similar system was in place. It was reported by the 
magistrate that the inhabitants, rising against the chowkidaree tax, could not 
comprehend why a demand was being placed upon them to support an establishment 
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they neither ‘seek nor require. The government may refer to it as a contribution. But 
to the contributor it is the same as a compulsory tax.’50 
 Plans to extend the regulations into the countryside were abandoned 
following the urban response to the compulsory nature of the provisions. However, 
magistrates still introduced a similar system and forced villagers to appoint 
chowkidars on fixed wages. If the chowkidar was unpaid, it was common practice to 
send four or five inhabitants of the village to the police station and for them to be 
kept there until payment was made. Chowkidars did not escape punishment either, 
with flogging a common practice when they were unable to discover the perpetrators 
of thefts in their village. A circular issued to magistrates in 1828 instructed them to 
‘refrain from inflicting corporal punishment as much as possible.’ However, it added, 
‘if it is necessary to flog, then flogging should be inflicted upon the posterior, not 
shoulders, to distinguish them from common thieves!’51  
The coercive measures were a direct result of the tenuous position which the 
chowkidar held within the colonial network. The Permanent Settlement of 1793 had 
established the thana police as the official representatives and symbol of the new 
rulers.  But if the rule of law allowed the daroga and his thana to fall within the new 
official legal framework, then the role of the chowkidar as a subsidiary ‘unofficial’ 
agent meant that there was no legal sanction to enforce the rural watchmen to 
perform their duties. Act XX of 1817 did regulate the duties of the chowkidar and 
prescribed a system of periodical reports at the thana. Yet although control of the 
system was vested in the magistrates, they ‘practically had no power of punishment, 
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short of dismissal, and no method of enforcing salaries.’52  What compounded the 
problem further was the influence of the zamindar over the chowkidar.  The 
Permanent Settlement of 1793 may have allowed the East India Company to subvert 
the local authority of the zamindars and monopolise the instruments of coercion, yet 
at the same time financial exigencies and the necessity of working through local 
native agencies ensured that the monopoly was only partially complete. As various 
scholars have concluded, if landlords could be made to assist in the policing of the 
interior, then there was no need to bear unnecessary expense. Thus, control over the 
watchman may have been transferred from zamindar to daroga, yet it was the 
zamindar who was still in charge of the nomination, appointment and payment of the 
chowkidar. With the power and influence of the landlord still intact, it was clear 
which master the chowkidar would obey. As a result, official interference and 
subsequent coercion would always be deemed necessary, with some even openly 
acknowledging the benefits of corporal punishment.53  
Thus, the principle of ‘self help and reliance’ upheld by the authorities was 
one that involved coercion, of making the people responsible for the remuneration of 
the chowkidar. But rather than reflect the might of the new administration, this 
coercive form of self-governance only revealed the ‘practical limits of colonial 
ambitions.’54 The Permanent Settlement may have established the rule of law but it 
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was a principle that was intended to serve the extractive policies of the new rulers. 
As scholars such as Ranjan Chakrabarti and Basudeb Chattopadhyay have noted, 
attempts to control crime and organise policing in the interior were geared towards 
ensuring the safe extraction of this revenue. Furthermore, financial constraints and 
lack of manpower in controlling a vast country were also factors that determined how 
the British authorities could practically govern the colony. Thus, indirect rule 
through local native agencies was a crucial aspect of colonial governance. The need 
to preserve this indirect rule became even more significant in the decade following 
the establishment of Crown control, when as Ann Callender has pointed out, the 
‘imperial budget lurched into deficit no fewer than seven times’ and the devolution 
of power on to local governments became even more of a pressing concern.55 The 
goal was to strengthen bureaucratic morale and improve imperial finances through 
the development of local taxes. The purpose was to decentralise, not to institute self-
government which was considered ‘undesirable unnecessary, and inimical to good 
government.’56  Even by 1916, it was pointed out by civil servant Henry Wheeler that 
out of the three forms of self-government, village government was the least 
important and real development lay instead in the rural boards and municipalities.57  
But failure to consider the village community meant that the authority of the state 
could not effectively penetrate the interior. Most importantly, it widened the distance 
between the state and the chowkidar. But if coercive measures employed to access 
information could alleviate this distance in the early days of colonial rule, the task 
had become difficult following Act V of 1861, which declared these coercive 
measures to be illegal, thus forcing magistrates in the interior to recognise that state 
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intervention would now have to be legalised.   Or, as another official put it more 
succinctly, the ‘Magistrates and Superintendents of Police need to be provided with 
the power to do now legally what they did before illegally.’58  
The impact of these broader imperial objectives on the chowkidari question 
was twofold. Firstly, the bill that preceded the Act was one that ultimately failed to 
instigate the root and branch reform that had been emphasised in earlier 
investigations. The theory that the chowkidar could be positively transformed by 
resuming any rent-free lands or payment in kind and substituting them for a single 
adequate payment was one that involved dispute, expense and much time. Settling 
these types of land, determining the exact rights of the chowkidar and the duties of 
the zamindars, was a lengthy, expensive process for the authorities and also likely to 
upset the system of indirect rule in the interior. The point instead was simply to 
introduce a law whereby chowkidars received a cash salary and that the leading 
members of the village were punished for not reporting crime to the authorities. 
Furthermore, the Act was not accepted favourably by all. To some, it was 
cumbersome, lengthy and confusing for a largely illiterate community to understand. 
Indeed, the failures of experiments in the urban areas were widely quoted in support 
of such arguments.59 To others, the Act was inapplicable to their subdivisions. The 
deputy magistrate of the subdivision of Banka in Bhagalpore District, for example, 
argued that in his subdivision, villages were ‘composed of miserable hamlets, widely 
separated from one another, in which neither adequate remuneration could be raised 
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nor could men fit enough be found to serve on Panchayats.’60 In the end it was 
recognised that it was the only practical, cost-effective scheme that could be adopted. 
Pay of the chowkidar needed to be raised somehow and as the magistrate of Nuddea 
pointed out, to ‘even attempt to impose a general chowkidaree tax was out of the 
question – each village must be assessed by a panchayat, consisting of its own 
headman and they must also collect the tax.’61 That the chowkidar of the Act of 1870 
had to exist alongside the chakeran (rent-free land) chowkidar, demonstrates that 
ultimately it was the wider objectives of an imperial government, rather than any 
promotion of self-government or the betterment of the chowkidar, which would 
always settle the chowkidari question. 
Secondly, the thana police continued to intervene in rural policing matters 
when they were required by the Act to have no involvement. But the rejection of the 
Act by the rural community meant that the state had no way of knowing about the 
affairs, particularly the criminal affairs, of the village. With the failure of the 
artificial systems created within the village, it was the state, through the thana police, 
that had to constantly intervene in chowkidari matters. This was also necessary 
because the district superintendent of regular police – the ‘one man who can organise 
them as an efficient adjunct to the regular force’– had in some districts, full powers 
of appointment, dismissal, punishment and reward, yet in others his authority 
conflicted with that of the district magistrate and subdivisional officer.62  
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The occurrence of frequent transfers, existence of large districts, poor 
communications and burden of routine and office work also increased the distance 
between the authorities and the village community. The only representative of 
government in rural Bengal, concluded the Chief Secretary to the Government of 
Bengal, was the thana police, an agency considered to be unpopular. Thus, it was the 
state that had to employ coercive measures to ensure that information was obtained. 
Indeed, attempts to improve the system introduced in 1870, whether it be through the 
introduction of the circle officer or the leading member of the panchayat being 
designated as president, were all geared towards strengthening the link between the 
thana police and the chowkidar.  Thus, the introduction of the chowkidari reward 
fund, the provision of uniforms and the parade system, which required them to attend 
the thana and report criminal occurrences, were all measures designed to increase the 
efficiency of the chowkidar and turn him into an ‘unofficial’ member of the police 
rather than a representative of his community. 
It is significant to note that whilst the authorities were anxious to legalise 
their intervention in rural policing matters, they were content for the chowkidar to 
remain a supplementary agent to the official police. Indeed, this unofficial status, 
which permitted him to work outside the legal framework established by the 
authorities, was necessary in order for the colonial government to overcome the 
practical limitations of their rule. It allowed the chowkidar to avoid the restrictions 
that were placed upon the regular police force. Under the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, a police officer would either have to ‘arrest a man or let him alone...as 
long as the investigation and the guilt of the accused is only a matter of suspicion, he 
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cannot be safely arrested and yet he cannot be allowed to run away.’63 It is here that 
the chowkidar had a crucial role in the extraction of information relating to crime. 
One judge offered a lengthy description of exactly how the system operated: 
  The investigating officer would send for the suspected person 
and then make him over to the chowkidar and village men to  
  learn the truth from him. This takes a long time, and when the  
  accused makes a confession, true or false, he is brought to 
  the investigating officer who records his statement and takes  
  him into formal custody. Thus, what is called ‘formal arrest’ 
  is made after officer records the confession.64 
 
 ‘Rotten and illegal’ the above procedure may have been, however it could not be 
denied that it was the only way in which cases could be brought to the attention of 
the authorities.65 The sub-inspector, a central character in the legal framework 
established by the state, could not, due to the restrictions placed upon him, adhere to 
legal guidelines. Hence he would always be dependent upon the informal network 
provided by the chowkidar. But this informal network could also act as a double-
edged sword. Despite his key role, the unofficial status of the watchman had meant 
that, according to section fifty four of the Criminal Code of Procedure, he had no 
power of arrest without warrant and that any accused arrested by him, or passed over 
to him by any private person, who subsequently escaped was not seen to be 
committing an offence.66 Moreover, the law gave neither the chowkidar nor any 
private person a right to arrest except for an offence committed in their view. In other 
words, because the village chowkidar was not properly regarded as a police officer 
then any person arrested by him would not be in lawful custody. In instances where 
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an accused could be legally punished according to one section of the code, another 
section would conflict with the decision and the initial verdict would be overruled.67 
Regardless of whether custody met the terms and conditions of the code the 
chowkidar could still be liable to departmental punishment.68  
In 1898 it was proposed that section fifty four be amended to declare the 
chowkidar as a member of the official force which would provide him with that legal 
sanction. Crucially, however, he, unlike other officers, was to be exempt from the 
rule, or section sixty one, which stated that any accused would have to be released 
after twenty-four hours. The suggestion caused an outcry with some arguing that if 
the chowkidar was to be an official member, then he should also face the same 
restrictions as other officers.69 However, it was the proposed role of the state that 
raised uncomfortable questions over what should and should not fall within the legal 
purview of the colonial government. The excessive ways of the thana police had 
always been known as well as their successful attempts to evade the ‘twenty four 
detention rule’ by collaborating with the chowkidar. Thus, the police and the 
chowkidar, who would not be restricted by any time rule, could wilfully arrest 
accused persons for indefinite periods of time through the procedure described in the 
above extract. This relationship, although widely criticised, was tolerated as it was 
conducive to the needs of the state. What bothered the authorities about the proposed 
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amendment was that it would legalise the ‘rotten, mischievous and illegal system’ 
and provide the stamp of official approval to a process that was widely condemned.  
In the end the code remained unchanged and the chowkidar continued to act 
as a supplementary agent to the police. The row over the proposal demonstrates that 
the legal framework could be shaped according to the wider objectives of the state. 
On the one hand, as demonstrated earlier, it could allow the state to legally intervene 
and coerce natives to comply with the regulations set by the authorities. Yet at the 
same time, as the above procedure described by the judge clearly illustrates, full 
legalisation, which would essentially bring the chowkidar within that official 
network, was recognised as being detrimental to these objectives. It was one thing to 
legalise state intervention in the guise of self-governance and to tolerate an 
investigative procedure subject to much abuse and excess. Indeed, it was only 
through this procedure that results could be produced in the interior. But to approve 
such a system would only damage the image of benevolent authority that was 
presented to the community and, most importantly, lose the connection between the 
chowkidar and the community. As noted by officials, to remove chowkidars from 
their personal settings would only alienate members of the community, which in turn 
would lead to loss of information and the ability to deal with criminal cases.  
Ultimately, the outcome of the proposal demonstrates that the informal 
network, however much it was criticised and despised, would always form the basis 
of the formal policing network. In 1874, for example, Commissioner Gordon of 
Bhagalpore introduced an experiment simply referred to as the ‘Gordon system’. 
This scheme of Gordon rested on the idea that the ‘criminal castes’ to which 
chowkidars belonged had their own sirdars . Thus, whenever a chowkidar was found 
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to be acknowledged as a sirdar of his caste, he was appointed as sirdar of the 
chowkidars and made responsible for the behaviour of those under his jurisdiction, 
whether chowkidar or badmash (bad characters). It may have been a long-standing 
grievance of the authorities that chowkidars were lower caste ‘criminals’ more likely 
to engage in crime than to actually prevent it, but Gordon chose to work upon the 
knowledge that the chowkidars ‘as a body set a value on their appointments and so 
can exert control over them.’70  
It was reported that, as a result of the Gordon scheme, there was a ninety five 
percent decrease in criminal offences in the Sudder division. However, this system 
was still subject to widespread criticism at a time when the authorities wished to 
improve the image of the chowkidar and indeed the system was never applied in any 
other district. What it does illustrate, however, is the ability of some officials to 
recognise that a complete overhaul would never be possible and that it was more 
conducive to the purposes of the state to try and adapt to the ‘informal methods’ of 
controlling crime.  
The necessity of informal methods is also apparent in the memoir of retired 
police official Girish Chandra Basu who described a system in which he was heavily 
dependent upon the ‘invaluable’ intelligence he received from the chowkidars to 
counter the high levels of dacoity in his area.71 Their successful collaboration was 
attributed by Basu to his willingness to ‘take on their advice and work alongside 
them throughout the night.’ That these chowkidars also acted as ‘lathials’ for local 
landholders to gain extra income, was of no concern to Basu.  Their participation in 
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the lathial system, one condemned by the authorities, was accepted by him as an 
aspect of local networks. He did not ‘think of a centralised state system...to him local 
powers were reality.’72 What was of importance to him was their determination to 
assist him in handling dacoities within their own jurisdictions and to bring security to 
their inhabitants. As far as that was the only objective, then the partnership would be 
a close and successful one.73 
 The account of Basu may have been one relating to police prior to 
establishment of the new police in 1861 but its similarity to the procedure criticised 
in 1898, clearly demonstrates the importance of the interplay between official and 
unofficial methods of gathering information and controlling criminal activity. For, if 
activity was punished according to official methods, then of equal importance were 
the informal methods that located such occurrences and placed them with the official 
gaze. One could not operate without the other. To legalise the informal methods 
could place both networks on an equal footing but it would effectively disable the 
process of gathering information. What was more important to the state is clearly 
apparent in the outright rejection of the proposed amendment and the preservation of 
a code whose conflicting regulations, rather than clarifying the exact role of the 
chowkidar, only served to uphold his anomalous position.  
The fruitful relationship that could be formed between the official policeman 
and his supplementary agent is also described in the memoirs of police official 
Charles Elphinstone Gouldsbury. Gouldsbury recalled that his success in tackling 




 Indeed, Basu cites many examples of camaraderie and loyalty. To provide one instance, the 
chowkidars provided Basu with a hookah for his ‘fatigued body’. It was the ‘best tobacco he had ever 
tasted’. Furthermore, Basu also mentions the sense of paternal responsibility that he felt towards the 




crime was due to the relationship that he formed with the wily Kali Dass, a 
chowkidar who also happened to be part of a criminal gang. After receiving 
sufficient inducement, Kali Dass would be employed as an informer.74  He would, 
Gouldsbury noted, turn out to be an ‘excellent detective... through information 
supplied by him the police succeeded in arresting several members of the different 
gangs, and in finally dispersing most of them.’75 Gouldsbury and Kali Dass would 
continue their successful ‘partnership’ which would only end when Kali Dass’ 
original criminal associates ‘discovered he was aiding the police and threatened to 
kill him if he was found to be assisting them again.’76  
Thus, the manner in which the legal framework could be shaped according to 
different requirements demonstrates that it was the practicalities and anxieties of 
empire that determined the form of the Act of 1870. Indeed, the dependence of the 
government on an agent who was considered to be a ‘complete disgrace’ and their 
attempts to turn him into a ‘very bad form of policeman’ illustrates how limited state 
options really were.77 It was practical and cost-effective to ‘assess’ the people 
through a very particular form of governance. The intrusion of the thana police was 
necessary to ensure that these conditions were met, and it was even more convenient 
to turn a blind eye to the ‘questionable’ coercive measures applied by the chowkidar, 
measures that could not be applied legally by the official police. Such measures 
demonstrate that information relating to crime and the control of such occurrences, 
and thereby filling the gaps existing within the colonial ‘information network’, 
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would always be the overriding aim of the state with the needs of the citizens being 
relegated to a secondary position. The state, in other words, would always be willing 
to bend the rules over questions of ‘legality’ and ‘illegality’ in order to preserve their 
own interests as well as a level of stability and order in the interior. The negative 
response to the proposed amendment confirms the reluctance to upset the balance 
whilst the memoir of Basu demonstrates that even ‘illegal’ practices could still 
produce an effective working relationship as long as the complexities of the rural 
watch were understood and accepted.78 
But state attempts to mould the legal framework according to their interests 
would also heighten the clash between native and British forms of policing and 
authority. The Act of 1870 only served to further accentuate these differences. It did 
not seek full legalisation of the watchman yet by legalising state intervention in 
chowkidari matters it placed the village community in a very difficult position. They 
were to control their own affairs yet this ‘self-governance’ would be regulated by the 
state. Indeed, the Code of Criminal Procedure had specifically stated that a sub 
inspector could direct neighbours to take charge of the accused and that leading 
members of the village community were legally obliged to report criminal 
occurrences to the police. How village members chose to perceive the regulations 
and handle the responsibility delegated to them proved to be widely at variance with 
state perceptions of law and authority. Furthermore, with many cases still failing to 
be reported, the observation that the  ‘police are disinclined to swell their returns 
with reported crime which they feel unable to detect and which entail troublesome 
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and infructuous enquiries’ only heightened the difficulties of gaining access to 
knowledge of criminal affairs.79 These ‘troublesome’ enquiries were resolved 
through arbitration within the community. Ultimately, resorting to arbitration 
revealed the wide gap between these visions of the people and those of the state, and 
the provisions of the Act failed to meet the needs of the rural society it was to serve. 
However, at the same time, if the Act could be shaped to meet specifically colonial 
requirements then the rural society could also adhere to the Act in ways that were 
more conducive to their own interests. Indeed, it was suggested by one official that 
the petty complaints that were made were ‘without foundation with a view to 
substantiate or bolster up a civil claim...in other cases a person is purposefully 
framed due to some personal enmity.’80 It is the aim of the following section to 
discuss the clash between colonial requirements and native practices and the impact 
this had on the response of the people to the form of governance introduced by the 
state. 
 
3.3 Panchayats, Presidents and the State: A Conflict of Interests 
The clash between native systems and the system of the foreign rulers has been 
examined by various scholars. John McLane has described native political authority 
as ‘fragmented, delegated and then sub delegated, a hierarchy in which “kingship” 
was practised informally at many levels and dependence was owed to particular 
persons, extending only as far as physical communication permitted.’81 There was 
minimum state intervention in the working of local level systems, which of course 
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was in direct opposition to the centralisation sought by the British rulers. In a similar 
vein, P. J. Musgrave concludes that the estate, rather than being a tightly organised 
system controlled by the all-powerful landlord, contained a ‘loose clump of 
relationships with a hierarchy of employees to manage the estate.’
82
 
 Anand Yang, who has written extensively on native systems of control 
within the interior, although questioning the emphasis Musgrave places upon the 
many layers of influence,83 also demonstrates the importance of local levels of 
control. He has argued that the colonial state actually worked through local systems 
in order to facilitate its economic interests and to ‘provide a semblance of authority – 
thus it allowed vast arenas of power and control to devolve on its local allies.’84 
Devolution of control thus ensured that the state could never fully penetrate the 
interior and thus local systems could continue to exist and adapt in their own way to 
the changes introduced by the state.  
The different objectives of both systems have also been examined. Land was 
important to both British rulers and their Indian subjects. However, as Ainslee 
Embree has argued, whilst the British placed an emphasis upon the exclusive 
ownership of land, of private property being central to the concept of liberty and 
economic development, Indians were concerned, not with ownership, but defending 
‘interests’ of different groups.85 Thus, Walter McNeale has argued that whilst the 
British focus was upon profit, efficiency and improvement, the native system centred 
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on the issues of caste, village factions and kinship. Gaining and maintaining the 
support of important groups was crucial in upholding political power. Ritual, 
prestige, patronage and obligation to their fellow villagers, and thus preserving the 
‘moral economy’ were all key elements in maintaining such power within a village.86 
In a similar vein, Chitta Panda has taken the view that the estate was not simply an 
element in economic activity but was a site where one could assert and enhance their 
authority and local influence. It was, Panda continues, an expression of lordship and 
a mark of social position.87 Although Panda has referred primarily to the zamindars, 
the estate can also be considered an arena in which power, wealth and prestige could 
be distributed amongst several groups. Thus, rather than economic improvement, the 
Indian social system rested upon kinship, upon the idea of security resulting from the 
effective management of people. As McNeale has concluded, to ‘manage a village 
means to manage people by manipulating the rules of their hierarchy’.88 And, as 
Thomas Metcalf has stated, the chowkidar and the patwari were vital within this 
network, as it was through them that a landlord could increase his number of 
dependants and his power in the locality.89 Thus, the indigenous system was flexible 
enough to allow the coexistence of several groups trying to establish their power and 
authority. 
This of course clashed with the British vision of a sole authority. The impact 
of aggressive extractive policies of the British rulers which disrupted this native 
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‘hierarchy of authorities’ has been widely examined. Chitta Panda for example has 
pointed out that the purpose of the Permanent Settlement was to establish the 
government as the final authority to interpret the rights to property- and to make this 
known to the indigenous population.90 John McLane has similarly asserted that these 
policies led to a weakening of the local kingship system.  Zamindars could not, at 
least not to the same extent, carry out their paternalistic role which strengthened their 
position on the one hand and preserved the moral economy of the village on the 
other. Patronage in the form of revenue free land and gifts was no longer viable 
whilst state monopoly of policing powers led to unemployment of low level villagers 
who turned, as a result, to crime. Other scholarly work has focused attention on the 
impact of a legal apparatus designed to preserve the new rule of property. 91  For the 
British, it was necessary to codify the law and, in the words of Basudeb 
Chattopadhyay, ‘gain a monopoly over the instruments of coercion’ as well as 
establish legitimate institutions, such as the court and prison, which would ensure the 
smooth operation of the law. 92 
To the rural community, the new principles differed widely from their own 
informal traditional system. Theirs was a system, Marc Galanter has commented, in 
which there was ‘no systematic state control of the administration of law...disputes in 
villages were not settled by royal courts but by tribunals of the locality of the caste 
within which the dispute arose, or of guilds and associations of traders and 
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artisans.’93 However, the system introduced by the British was one which entailed 
much time, expense and delay for the ordinary villager.94 Thus, as Ranjan 
Chakrabarti has concluded, the rule of law was one that marked a vital shift ‘from 
status to contract, from the varying currents of customary law to a fixed form of law 
and from compromise to decision.’95  
 This ‘vital shift’ also applied to the panchayat, or a gathering of village 
leaders who assembled to resolve a dispute through consensus and compromise. It 
was a ‘council of elders’ requiring no formal membership, their ‘composition 
varying with time and circumstance, reflecting the politically significant leadership 
within the village.’96 Leaders would meet informally to hear complaints and negotiate 
a solution which was acceptable to all participants. The role envisaged by the British 
for this agency and their subsequent reshaping of it has been the subject of 
significant scholarly interest. Indeed, this has proved fruitful for those who have 
critically analysed the conduct of panchayats in independent India. S.S. Khera has 
argued that panchayats can only work effectively if the legal framework on which 
they rest, one created by the British, is amended to accommodate more active 
participation by village bodies.97 Marc Galanter, as well as Ralph Retzlaff, on the 
other hand has raised awareness about the difficulty which the state has faced in 
ensuring public participation without compromising their access to the people for the 
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purpose of development.98 Erin Moore, in her study of dispute resolution in the Nara 
district of Rajasthan, has also examined the various ‘dispute processing forums’ that 
are available to the Indian villager as well as the circumstances that determine which 
forums are employed and at what point they are made use of.99 
Considering the issue from another perspective, Crispin Bates has made the 
point that the panchayat can also be considered as a construction of the colonial 
mind, one that could be used to create an ‘Orientalist’ image of rural India as being 
frozen in antiquity. This image of a timeless and passive community assisted the 
colonisers in portraying the villager as being ‘loyal’ to the British regime. The 
construction of this particular image could thus serve as a powerful tool with which 
the British could legitimise and defend their policies in India.100  This was clearly 
demonstrated in a meeting of the Legislative Council in 1892. Members of the 
Council had assembled to discuss whether a process of election should be introduced 
in the villages to allow people to elect panchayati members. It was agreed in India 
that ‘selection’ was the better term for they followed a system that was ‘primitive 
and ancient that we can read in Greek and Sanskrit literature...the people get together 
and talk and eventually an opinion emerges which is the opinion of them all...this is 
the mode through which primitive tribes and races have elected their private 
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assemblies.’101 Furthermore, what further reinforced the image was the belief that the 
panchayat was wise and all-powerful as it ‘held in its hands the great ancient social 
engine – caste’. Panchayati control over these affairs could be tolerated as they did 
not conflict with the British courts but issues such as property were to remain 
‘official matters’ due to the possibility of boundless litigation.  
Simultaneously, alongside this colonial construction, the British had also 
envisaged a more practical role for the panchayat. Significantly, this role mirrored 
early colonial attempts to delegate, decentralise and alleviate the financial and 
administrative burdens of imperial rule. This further demonstrated that, rather than 
forming part of an innovative process which would involve the promotion of local 
self-government, the panchayat was shaped according to the needs and requirements 
of the colonial state. The state simply required the panchayat to act as a tax 
collecting body and as a medium through which information relating to crime would 
pass from the watchman to the regular police. It was also intended to serve as a more 
acceptable substitute for the thana police, which could never act as effective link 
between the interior and the state. Moreover, whether the Act of 1870 was suited to 
the conditions of Bengal was not of primary importance. Rather, the most important 
objective was to provide machinery for the pay and supervision of the chowkidar 
without ‘cutting them off from the daily life of their village’ and make this system 
legal and therefore compulsory.102  
Through a system of delegation, not only could the state evade the costs of 
policing in the interior but also reallocate lengthy ‘municipal’ business such as 
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sanitation and petty theft. One inspector general commented that too much was 
expected from this new form of panchayat. Whilst in former times: 
panchayats managed villagers in an informal ‘give and take’ system with 
very little supervision...but our policy has been to destroy this system  
and the panchayat has been revived as a part of our executive machinery  
and we expect from the members a strict and exact performance of duties,  




The panchayat and the self-governance envisaged by the colonial government 
collided with native conditions and expectations on many levels.  On a practical 
level, as noted earlier, the authorities had introduced a lengthy and cumbersome Act, 
one steeped in confusing legal terminology, which was to be followed by a largely 
illiterate community. This was a community in which personal relationships and 
rumour, rather than the rule of law, played a central role in how they made sense of 
their world, and indeed, colonial rule. The colonisers may have been able to create an 
Orientalist image of the villager but the image of the coloniser in the native mind was 
held in a more realistic light.  Thus, during the Bareilly Disturbance of 1816 forcible 
taxation was the grievance. Nearly half a century later, the same grievance resurfaced 
in the first official census carried out by the government. The census of 1872 was 
believed to be ‘connected with taxation or something equally distasteful. In Orissa 
rumour had spread that tax would fall on those who trod on village path, who carried 
an umbrella, or those who fed Brahmins.’104 Rumours of forcible conversion, of 
people being the subject of a headcount so as to serve in war, of plague being 
‘introduced in order to thin out people where they were too dense’, further highlight 
the distance between the government and the people .105 At the same time, however, 
villagers attempted to work within the system. In one case they ‘subscribed eight 
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annas or a rupee amongst themselves and sent it in by the chowkidar who took the 
returns to the thana in the hope of making it all right and preventing the returns from 
being sent back.’106 The British may have wrestled with the dilemma of preserving 
the needs of a colonial state whilst appearing just and benevolent to their ‘loyal’ 
village community, but to that community the true nature of the government would 
always be clearly visible.  As Hugh Tinker has noted, local self-government, in the 
mind of the native individual ‘could only mean one thing – imposition of new 
regulations and taxes.’107 
The principles upon which the Act of 1870 was founded also served to 
undermine the moral economy and the relationships that had bound the village 
community together. The new Act provided the chowkidar with the power to demand 
his remuneration from village members. But this was an agent whose remuneration 
was traditionally dependent upon the goodwill and custom of the community. He 
took whatever each villager could afford to give him at the times that were most 
convenient to them. These included contributions of grain as well as the various 
miscellaneous ‘fees and perquisites called ‘haq’ for attendance at hats, feasts and 
festivals and guarding shops, carts and travellers...free services of the barber, potter 
and other artisans were also available.’108 By carrying out the compulsory orders of 
the state, the watchman would only alienate himself from a community already 
hostile to any change introduced by the colonial government. During the 1872 census 
the commissioner of the presidency division had noted that in the registers of one 
thana in Hooghly:  
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the names set down as enumerators were of people who  
could not read or write. With the census being treated with  
suspicion, educated people had threatened to beat the  
village watchman if he put down their names. As a result,  
the watchman simply puts down the names of people of whom 
he was not afraid.
109
 
Therefore, the chowkidar, when representing the state on official business, could 
elicit a very negative response from his fellow villagers, who themselves tried to 
evade the chowkidari tax whenever possible.110 The authorities may have wished him 
to remain a part of the village community for their own purposes. However, 
ironically, by introducing a system unpopular with the villagers, a system in which 
the chowkidar played a central role, the authorities were only serving to weaken the 
relationship between watchman and villager. For the British, the chowkidar 
represented a watchman in the sense that he guarded property during the night. But 
for the Indians, including the chowkidar himself, he was more than a watch and ward 
character. He was involved in the tilling of his land, in collecting rents and 
summoning refractory tenants to the zamindar’s cutcherry. It was the nature of these 
duties which enabled him to possess knowledge of all that went on within his village. 
Any attempt to jeopardise this state of affairs would inevitably affect his relationship 
with members of his community.  
The Deputy Superintendent of Police in Mymensingh reported in 1874 that 
there was reason to believe that many chowkidars had taken the chuprass against 
their own will at the coercion of the amlah, zamindar or his fellow villagers.111  
Indeed, it was reported in Khulna that a daffadar, the immediate superior of the 
watchman, was killed by a ‘dao whilst sleeping because some bad characters had 
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become annoyed at his watching them.’112 Thus, the responsibilities required from the 
chowkidar by the state could evoke a hostile response from his fellow villagers. 
Circumstances, however, could also evoke a certain response from the chowkidar. 
For example, he could take advantage of his position when it came to poor, illiterate 
villagers. In the district of Backergunge, it was found that one chowkidar had 
extorted money under the pretence that he had been ordered to measure the height of 
the women and the breadth of their chests.113  
 The conditions also placed the members of the panchayat in a difficult 
position. In contrast to the informal nature of the traditional forum, the defining 
feature of the new panchayat was its compulsory nature. The rules and guidelines of 
the new system were legally binding and could not be ignored without ‘incurring the 
penalties of the law.’114 Penalties could include a fine of fifty rupees or having their 
goods distrained if payment was not collected or made. Punishment was severe in 
matters relating to crime.115  Furthermore, it was of indefinite duration, with members 
possibly spending up to three years in the same post. What made this post distasteful 
was that it entailed a great amount of personal trouble and responsibility, with the 
police station or magisterial headquarters located at quite a distance from the village. 
Added to this was the loss of dignity felt by higher caste villagers who were simply 
not at ease with the idea of having to go round the village from door to door 
collecting tax from those from an inferior caste or low social status. Most 
importantly, however, to serve on such a panchayat and adhere to the guidelines set 
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by the state would mean that members would have to alter the moral economy of the 
traditional system and their position within it. It was not in the interest of leading 
village members to upset this delicate balance. The extraction of revenue may have 
been central to British policy in India but in the native system an effective landlord 
was not necessarily one who was economically efficient. Indeed, as Walter McNeale 
has pointed out, a landlord who was too economically efficient could potentially 
alienate local support, which was the base upon which his power rested. 
Furthermore, in a social system which depended very much on patronage and 
obligation, members of the panchayat could incur the wrath of fellow villagers if 
demands they deemed as unnecessary were placed upon them. This was certainly the 
case for one panchayati member in Chittagong who ‘once went to the length of 
selling up a defaulter...in revenge his house was burnt down and Rs. 2000 of property 
destroyed.’116 In many cases it was simply wiser, if the tax was not collected, to pay 
out of their own pockets. Events could also take a more dangerous turn in matters of 
crime. In 1899, for example, a panchayati member in Midnapore was ‘decoyed into 
an empty house, by the wife of a villager he had imprisoned, and killed.’117 
 Therefore, to follow the guidelines set by the state would mean placing 
themselves in a position that conflicted with their traditional role. Their ‘traditional 
role’, concluded the joint magistrate of Chittagong, had allowed important men of 
the village, to ‘generally exercise as much power as they desired and therefore they 
had nothing to gain by becoming members of a panchayat.’118 It was also reported by 
magistrates that the residents themselves were not in favour of a change. When 
village leaders were required by law to become panchayati members, they chose to 
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serve in ways that met their own needs as well as those of the community. The 
disregard for the new system was illustrated in the Purneah district in 1878 when it 
was discovered by a visiting official that the ‘copy of the Act under which one 
panchayat was conducting its affairs was found to be a translation of Dr MacLeod’s 
cattle disease!’119 This was not an isolated instance of the law being ‘ignored’. The 
police administration reports offer many instances of panchayats failing to comply 
with the provisions, particularly with regard to collection and payment. The general 
consensus held by inspecting officials was that panchayati accounts were purely 
fictitious, kept only for the purposes for official inspection; that members of the 
panchayat were unwilling to collect arrears by attachment of the property of 
defaulters; that many chowkidars were in arrears, although the account books 
implied that their salaries had been paid in full.120 Panchayati members were by law 
required to collect the tax and pay the chowkidar. Yet it was found in many instances 
that it was the chowkidar himself who had to collect his own pay. It was also 
discovered that methods of evading tax employed during the early days of colonial 
rule were still in practice and members of the panchayat had their own personal 
‘agendas’. Wealthier members of the community, often friends or family of members 
on the panchayat, were lightly taxed whilst the poorest villagers had to bear the 
majority of the cost.  Furthermore, argued the joint magistrate of Chittagong in 1890, 
the assessment of tax ‘enabled the successful faction to wreak its spite upon the 
unsuccessful one and under-assess its own members.’121 
At the same time, however, the dialogue between panchayati members and 
visiting officials recorded within these administration reports can also reveal 
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instances where efforts were made to preserve traditional practices. It was noted by 
the magistrate of Nuddea in 1868 that the general rate varied from two pice to four 
pice a month and the chowkidar received ‘half the wage in Bhadro at the early 
harvest and half in Pous at winter harvest.’122 With the minimum wage set by the Act 
of 1870 at four rupees it was clear that it was a demand that a largely poor 
community could not meet. The result was that traditional methods of remuneration 
continued to be employed. Indeed, a visiting official inspecting panchayati accounts 
in Chittagong in 1878 reported that the practice, as he saw, was to ‘realise by a 
course of dunning three to six months after the time for which salaries are due.’123  In 
another example, the deputy inspector general of Dharbhanga, Rajshaye division, 
described an alternative system,  one in which it was usual for members of the 
panchayat to give chowkidars a list of those defaulters who had not paid and the 
amounts that were to be paid. Once the chowkidar visited the defaulter and presented 
him with a receipt: 
   both parties made their own arrangements, with the ryot 
   giving the chowkidar so much in grain, so much in cash, or 
   part payment only and coming to some sort of agreement 
   as to how the remaining balance was to be paid.
124
  
    
Furthermore, in the Patna division it was found that panchayats could not realise the 
tax with punctuality because they had to wait until it was convenient for the ryots to 
pay. Normally payment could only be made after their crops had been harvested. 
Similarly, in the Bhagulpore district it was noted that chowkidars were ‘content, and 
even preferred, to wait’ until harvest time.125 What these instances illustrate is an 
attempt by all members of the village community to preserve the moral economy of 
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the village. The Act may have stated that a certain amount had to be paid within a 
specific period of time. Yet these conditions were simply not suited to the 
requirements of an agricultural community who were able to pay in kind at times 
suited to their form of employment.  Those serving on the panchayat were clearly 
aware of these conditions, with some openly stating that the inhabitants were ‘very 
poor and they did not like to seize their goods.’126 This may have been a poor 
explanation for the authorities but for a leader of the village serving on the 
panchayat, it was important to recognise the limits of his power. It could be argued 
that it was in the interests of the village to allow an informal method of payment, 
largely in kind, to continue.  It still provided a form of remuneration for the 
chowkidar whilst at the same time alleviating pressure from an agricultural 
community whose conditions ensured that a strict compliance with the Act would 
never be fully possible.  
The state was purely concerned with the regular payment of the chowkidar. 
Members of the panchayat, on the other hand, had to take into consideration the 
ability of the village community, as well as their own personal agendas, to meet these 
state demands. The inspector general of police in 1881, when discussing the impact 
of the system, noted that any reports of improvement only reached him at the time 
when the annual report was to be submitted, ‘a most noteworthy circumstance!’ 
What was recognised by him was that a deeper probe would reveal that the system as 
it was actually worked by the native people would always be reflective of local 
conditions and customs rather than the requirements of the state.  
The type of self-governance exercised by those serving on the panchayat 
often clashed with the type which was demanded by the state. Although the 





panchayat nominated a candidate for the position of the chowkidar, the appointment 
would be made by the magistrate. But as the district superintendent of Dinajpur 
remarked, ‘in effect the panchayat appoint, for they make the post untenable to any 
chawkidar not appointed by them…they are said to take something for each 
appointment and sometimes arrange for pay at less than the nominal rate.’127 
Elsewhere, the district superintendent of Hooghly, a district notorious for dacoities, 
in many cases refused to accept the panchayat’s nominee having discovered that he 
had been in prison for dacoity or burglary. The panchayat objected to the district 
superintendent’s action, refused to nominate another person, and used their influence 
to prevent anyone from coming forward for the post.128 Furthermore, competition for 
the office, only ‘took place in villages where faction spirit ran high…in these villages 
the control of the chawkidars is an important matter.’129  
These examples clearly demonstrate the difference between native and state 
expectations. The members of the panchayat were indeed complying with the law, as 
the law had stated that nomination was within their control. But the manner in which 
they chose to nominate, and whom they chose to nominate, directly impacted on the 
kind of information that the authorities received. Certainly, this was confirmed by the 
discovery that chowkidars were still under panchayati influence and only reported 
what the panchayat permitted them to. The general practice, noted the inspector 
general of police in the Burdwan division, was for the chowkidar first to visit the 
village panchayat who would hold a preliminary irregular enquiry. When reports of 
the crime finally did reach the station, they had been ‘modified and facts coloured in 
such a way by the panchayat so as not to compromise the safety of persons 
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charged.’130 The concealment, rather than the reporting of crime, appeared to be the 
rule rather than the exception. The authorities, thus, only served to strengthen, rather 
than weaken, the system in which the chowkidar served ‘two masters’. The 
panchayat took the place of the zamindar and that too without the latter losing his 
influence. In other words, the chowkidar simply changed masters and as a result 
continued to be heavily influenced by local powers.  
The preservation, rather than the weakening, of the native system led to a 
heavy reliance by the district magistrate on the thana police. This was in direct 
violation of the Act, which had declared that it was the panchayat, and not the police, 
that was to handle chowkidari matters. But with the panchayats failing to act as an 
effective link in the passing of information between watchman and the police, the 
central aim of the Act, police intervention was always inevitable.  Reservations about 
the questionable conduct of the police in the nomination of the panchayati members, 
including their attempts to make money out of the unpopularity of the post by selling 
the privilege of exemption or nominating their ‘enemies’ for a position on the 
panchayat, were placed to one side.  In 1892, following the repeated failure to infuse 
public spirit into the panchayat, there were attempts to centralise the village 
watchman and add him to the official police structure. Yet considerations of 
economy as well as the necessity of preserving the informal network within which 
the chowkidar worked always impeded any efforts to fully centralise the watchman. 
The only alternative was to maintain a specific type of self-governance, one in 
which, as the Police Commission of 1902 noted, it was of ‘paramount importance to 
maintain and foster existing village agencies for police work.’131  




 Indian Police Commission 1902-03, p. 30 
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This objective was at the forefront of the reforms introduced by Henry 
Wheeler in 1905, which were designed to raise the status and efficiency of the 
panchayat through the creation of the post of the president.  The main feature of this 
new system was the transfer of control of the village police in all matters except the 
assistance in the investigation of crime, from the police to the panchayat.132 They 
were also provided with certain magisterial powers. But the same difficulties 
remained. The president, instead of easing the flow of information from the 
chowkidar to the police station, was actually blocking the network. Control being 
passed over to the president meant that the thana still had no contact with the 
watchman. Added to that, attempts to seek a better form of president proved fruitless 
as those who were employed proved to be lazy and disinterested in reporting the 
movement of bad characters. No single president, claimed the superintendent of 
police, in the district of Khulna, ‘used the powers conferred upon him under sections 
64, 127 and 128 of the Indian Police Code.’133  Even in districts where well-to-do 
presidents from the Brahmin and Kayastha castes were appointed, there was little or 
no improvement.   
 Presidents were also directly challenging the authority of the regular police. 
L. F. Morshead found that presidents, proud of their magisterial powers, were ready 
to assert their authority in belittling the police – one president even refused to give 
evidence before the inspector unless he was summoned by the joint magistrate.134 
Furthermore, the system could be abused. In one district, the president had used the 
                                                          
132
 Henry Wheeler, Local Self Government in Bengal (1916) 
133
 Administration Report for the Administration of Bengal for the Year 1909 
134
 Administration Report for the Administration of Bengal for the Year 1909 
116 
 
panchayat as a platform to promote the Swadeshi movement. Presidents could also 
exercise a very local form of justice.135  
The system of dual control, whereby the chowkidar continued to serve two 
authorities continued. For this ‘arrangement’ to have worked in their favour, the 
state, Anand Yang has concluded, would have had to remove the chowkidar from 
local level structures.  However, they simply could not weaken local level controls, 
nor did they really wish to as they already had control of the major instruments of 
coercion in the form of the army. Smaller instruments such as the village police, they 
could leave to native intermediaries. Yet how these native functionaries chose to 
operate directly affected the ability of the thana police to gain information relating to 
crime within the distant interior. To the state, the chowkidar reporting directly to the 
panchayat, rather than the police, was a great defect of the system.136 Yet native 
intermediaries operated within a system in which power was delegated. It could be 
argued that members of the panchayat, those who had influence, were simply 
following, as Thomas Metcalf has asserted, behaviours and customs which were 
natural within an Indian environment, customs that were accepted by the Indian 
people.137   
With the Indian social system centring around the themes of kinship and 
groups trying to build up support in their community, serving in a system in which 
they simply exercised a supervisory role was of no benefit. Thus, as the British 
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Indian association pointed out in their opposition to the Act of 1870 the “power” 
offered by the new legislation was ‘just for show.’138 Not only would they risk 
alienating village members with the compulsory demands of the Act, but they would 
not gain influence by serving on such an agency. Authority to oversee the building of 
roads, sanitation and so forth were of little importance to individuals possessing 
power and status. The central aim was to build up local support in order to preserve 
their power, not to police the area under their control. 
 Prior to the passing of the Act in 1870, it was pointed out by one official that 
the key flaw of the proposed legislation was its focus upon the theory that in each 
village there was a ‘compactly constituted little community’ ready ‘to our hand with 
a recognised headman through whom we can work arrangements without being 
impelled by any collateral influence.’139 This he recognised was a false perception.  
The native community, in stark opposition to the Orientalist image of a passive 
society, was part of a much more complex network in which power was delegated 
amongst various groups, a network in which influence was dependent upon the 
control of a number of resources as well as the support of the people. What the 
British wanted was simply cooperation of the people in the reporting of crime. In 
other words, what was required was an agency to provide the thana police with this 
information.  
It was the panchayat that was to fulfil this role and act as the link between 
chowkidar and police. But the inability of the state to fully remove the chowkidar 
from local level systems ensured an uneasy coexistence between the official system 
planted by the state and the informal networks favoured by the community. That the 
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balance would often tilt in favour of the latter demonstrates the weakness of the 
authority of the state in the interior. Indeed, the authorities were forced to admit that 
crime reporting was actually of an acceptable standard in the district of Bankura, 
where the Act of 1870 was not introduced. Therefore, as long as indigenous groups 
had space to exercise a level of control, in effect the delegation of power to which 
they were traditionally accustomed, then they were more willing to cooperate with 
the state.  As one survey found, local leaders were willing to serve the state provided 
they were given more authority over the chowkidar and also addressed as ‘village 
magistrates’ directly subordinate to the magistrate and not the police.140 The inability 
of the state to meet these demands served to highlight another aspect of the Act – to 
make leading men feel that their post was of significance. To feel as if they 
possessed power was of no practical use to these men. To exercise fully this power 
within their own jurisdiction, according to their own traditional practices, was what 
they were accustomed to. The necessity to maintain a system of dual control in the 
interior, a system in which the authorities could never fully gain control of the 
chowkidar due to their dependency upon local networks, ensured that the status quo 
in the village community would always be maintained. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
  If the police can manage the country without the aid and  
influence of the zamindars, which was never successfully 
  done, then we may make the chowkidars paid government 
  servants; but if we cannot dispense with the aid of the 
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This was the opinion of one police officer in 1838. What is revealing about his 
observation is that there is no mention of a complete overhaul of the rural network. 
The purpose was simply to ‘manage’ in the best way possible. In 1870, the 
government remained in a similar position. The limitations and practicalities of 
colonial rule would ensure the continuation of state dependency upon local level 
agencies in the interior. In other words, the authorities could not place the chowkidar 
within the official framework, which would make him a paid government servant. If 
this was not possible, then officials tried to weaken zamindari influence through 
other means. The aim of the Act VI of 1870, declared ‘revolutionary’ upon its 
introduction, was to ‘dispense’ with the aid of the landholders by passing on 
responsibility for reporting crime, and overseeing the remuneration of the chowkidar, 
to the recognised headmen of each village. However, this change either led to a 
transferral of power and influence, from the landholder to the panchayat, or the 
traditional system remained intact as headmen were usually the agents of the 
landholders. In neither case was the traditional structure of the village community 
upset. Nor was the proposal to create one type of chowkidar, acting under Act VI and 
remunerated with a cash salary, fully executed, as the chowkidar continued to receive 
different kinds of remuneration.  
If the native community resisted attempts of the state to pass on the costs of 
maintaining the chowkidar during the early days of colonial rule, the same grievance 
remained after the passing of the Chowkidari Act in 1870. Whether it was during the 
Bareilly Disturbances of 1816 or the attempts to evade the assessment at the turn of 
the twentieth century, ‘contribution’ was still perceived as a tax by the native 
community. What these facts reveal is a sense of continuity, of still trying to 
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‘manage’, rather than any significant change. Thus, the Act of 1870, and its various 
amendments thereafter, was far from the innovation it was claimed to be. 
 For the Act to have been truly innovatory, it would have had to adhere to the 
principle of self-governance as was recognised by the native community. But 
innovation was not what the state required; all that was desired was a straightforward 
process where village agencies could be utilised for police work and to ensure that 
the chowkidar received adequate remuneration. Furthermore, the aim was to ease 
financial difficulties by shifting the charges for local requirements on to new local 
taxes.142 The role of the chowkidar, and that of the agencies created to assist him, was 
simply to report information relating to crime. The fact that the government placed 
importance upon a village agent who was traditionally responsible for crime 
detecting and reporting within their locality illustrates that the aim was to extract this 
particular kind of information. And despite calls at the turn of the century to improve 
local level agencies and to delegate more responsibilities on to them, it was made 
clear that the only ‘improvement’ required was to ensure that these agencies were 
manned by people of sufficient education and public spirit who were willing and 
capable of discharging honorary duties for the State.143  Thus, the main aim of the 
agencies that were to act as a medium of friendly communication between the people 
and state – whether panchayat, president or the circle officer– was to act as an 
effective link that would ensure the smooth flow of information from the interior to 
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the government rather than exercise complete self-governance according to their own 
traditions and customs.144  
Efforts to reorganise local agencies in order to meet the practical 
requirements of a colonial government would always be limited in their impact. As 
Anand Yang has argued, British authority could never effectively transform local 
agencies as that would in effect have involved completely restructuring local level 
networks.  Indigenous society was one in which many authorities existed, in which 
there existed different views of crime and justice and one in which faction, village 
cliques and maintaining the moral economy of the village were crucial. Furthermore, 
native systems were part of a more flexible network in which groups, whilst 
recognising the authority of the distant state, still had their own space to exercise 
their own local ‘kingship’. Thus, as Thomas Metcalf has argued, the concern of 
individuals holding power and influence within the village was not to police the area 
under their control, for that was not the most important task, but to rally as much 
support behind them in order to secure their influence amongst the villagers. 
Following the British model, in which crime and control was vital, would only have 
led to alienation of the villagers and as a result the loss of position and power within 
the village. 
 The response of rural personalities to state institutions would always be 
defined by these native objectives. The system of the British offered no scope to 
build power and influence and as a result it would have a limited impact upon the 
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working of local level systems. Indeed, the Monro Committee of 1883 found that in 
cases where the ‘panchayat were left to collect the tax in a slovenly and slipshod 
manner on the principle of non interference, membership had not been unpopular. 
But once the Magistrate insisted upon punctual payment, membership at once 
became odious.’145  Even by 1918, thirteen years after the president system was 
introduced, it had to be admitted that the president had little idea of the amount of 
crime being committed in his union and seldom endeavoured to organise or initiate 
measures to control the crime that he did know about.  
The chowkidar, the all-seeing, all-knowing agent, who was a central character 
for the colonial authorities, failed to meet British expectations of a uniformed, fully 
disciplined supplementary agent. The dilemma of trying to make this agent carry out 
the role of an ‘official’ officer without including him within the formal network 
ensured the continuation of a system of dual control, which required the chowkidar 
to serve ‘two masters’. With his rural superior in close proximity, as opposed to the 
distant state, it was clear which master he would obey. Thus, chowkidars cared little 
about being fined and punished according to the system introduced by the British as 
very few of them depended solely on their salaries, and still considered panchayats 
to be their proper masters.  
A further drawback for the colonial rulers was that the native image of a 
chowkidar could differ widely from the image held by the authorities. The post, in 
the native system, was ‘still often hereditary, and more than once held by infants, 
whose duties were performed by proxy.’146 In 1889, in the district of Nuddea, a 
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woman was found acting as a chowkidar and there was some trouble about getting 
her dismissed, as reports were unanimously in her favour and the office is generally 
looked upon as hereditary.147 A similar case occurred in Dinajpore where the 
chowkidar was a small boy whose mother was said to take care of him when he went 
on rounds at night. In actual fact, however, there were no rounds at all but no one 
raised any objection.148 Indeed, it was noted by one official that many villagers 
actually had no chowkidars, a ‘nominal man being put forward as the occasion 
required.’149 Furthermore, it was also suggested that chakeran chowkidars, those who 
received land rather than money payment, were more contented and respected by 
their fellow villagers, as the possession of land, hereditary in some cases, served as a 
common bond between the watchman and other members of his community.150  
Therefore, native attitude towards the issues of power, authority and self-
governance were differed in many ways from those of the colonial rulers. The 
broader objectives and limitations of British rule in India also ensured that theirs was 
a distant authority, visible but interpreted by the village community in ways that 
were conducive to their own needs and interests. The refusal of village agents to act 
as employees of the state meant that the image of the sole and superior authority 
could never effectively be rooted in the native mind. As a result, the state 
continuously depended upon the police, who remained the sign of British rule, might 
and authority. Certainly, the entire purpose of the Act VI of 1870, and subsequent 
legislation, had been to utilise village agencies for police work. Self-governance 
according to the traditions of the people would always be a secondary concern. With 
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local agencies failing to fulfil this role, the intervention of these agents of the state in 
rural matters would always be a necessity.  Even the much celebrated Village Self 
Government Act of 1919, which was to ‘give the thana police no authority 
whatsoever over rural agencies’, could not limit their interference in rural affairs. As 
with previous legislation, that Act could not solve the recurring problem of the 
chowkidar serving two masters – the rural elite on the one hand, the state on the 
other.151 Perhaps acknowledging that their distance gave the rural elite the upper 
hand, the state would always have to employ the services of the police, ‘the only 
visible representatives of the power of the government in the eyes of the great 
majority of the people.’152  Visible the authority may have been, but the response of 
the native community to the attempted reorganisation of their rural networks, 
indicated that it was an authority that would always be secondary to that exercised by 
the rural elites of the village community. The chowkidar may have been required to 
act as the unofficial policeman of the state, and the replacement of his traditional 
‘vile’ dress with the instantly recognisable blue ‘puggree’ and antique bludgeon may 
have signified as much, but he would always remain tied to local level networks 
which the state could never effectively weaken. Furthermore, as the next chapter will 
argue, the police themselves were closely tied to the moral economy of their locality, 
which would further undermine the network of control. 
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Chapter Four: The Police and the State- Imperial Objectives  
                         versus Native Expectations, 1860-1914 
 
In 1886 an unnamed sub inspector of police in the district of Bhagalpur was 
discovered ill-treating two bad characters in order to compel them to give 
information regarding a case of robbery. During his trial, it was noted by the trying 
magistrate that the villagers residing within the officer’s jurisdiction displayed a 
marked sympathy towards him. This observation had followed similar remarks made 
by the district superintendent of police who had stumbled upon the assault quite by 
accident during his visit to the village, the purpose of which was to enquire about 
certain thefts which had not been reported.1 The sub inspector was convicted and 
fined as a result of his conduct, his punishment reflective of a legal system in which 
the role of the policeman was closely defined and restricted. Yet the manner in which 
the case developed following his conviction would also demonstrate how adaptive 
that system had to be to the local environment. The behaviour of the local 
community may have been disregarded at the first trial but during the appeal lodged 
by the officer against his conviction, local opinion would become a central factor in 
his reinstatement.  The judge concluded the case by stating that ‘public opinion of the 
place demands that bad characters be intimidated....for an omelette eggs must be 
broken and one must not look with too curious eyes upon every small excess 
committed by an investigating officer.’2 The sub inspector was duly permitted to 
return to his post and resume a career that had spanned eighteen years. 
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 The main purpose of this chapter is to examine the ways in which the official 
network of police was continuously remoulded according to time and circumstance. 
The chapter is divided into four main sections. Section one considers the various 
restrictions which the law imposed upon the police as well as some of the ways in 
which they deviated from official procedure. Section two critiques the definition of 
corruption, the aim being to re-consider the stereotype of the ‘corrupt, brutal Indian 
police.’ Section three will consider the ways in which the colonial police readjusted 
official procedures to meet the conditions and requirements of the locality. The 
fourth section will examine the ways in which the same network was readjusted by 
the colonial government during times of political upheaval, when the ordinary 
machinery of law was suspended in favour of repressive legislation. By examining 
these issues, the intention is to emphasise the flexibility of the ordinary machinery of 
law and order, which was adapted throughout colonial rule, in order to meet the 
demands of both state and local society.  
Various studies have argued that the unpopularity of the police was directly 
linked to their primary role of defending the colonial state. David Arnold has offered 
valuable insights about the nature of colonial policing and has concluded that the 
colonial state, where and when it mattered most, could be decisive and ruthless.3 In a 
similar vein, Anandswarup Gupta has argued that defects of the police lay in the fact 
that they were required to focus on crimes which were a direct threat to empire rather 
than focus on their primary role of detecting and preventing crime.4 David Campion, 
in his examination of the conflicting dilemmas which faced the colonial police in the 
United Provinces, has attributed the shortcomings of the police to the incompatibility 
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of their twin duties – preserving political stability on the one hand and maintaining 
public safety on the other. Coercion and consent, Campion argues, were the two 
conflicting demands which defined policing in a colonial context. ‘For the policeman 
to do one of these jobs well’, he concludes, ‘was invariably to make the other job 
more difficult.’5 Michael Silvestri, in a similar vein, has maintained that the 
policeman remained a detested figure in colonial society.6 The dilemmas faced by the 
colonial police are also present in the postcolonial period and David Bayley has 
pointed out that the basic structure of the police has remained unchanged since 
1861.7 Kirpal Dhillon, in contrast, has linked the repressive nature of the Indian 
police to the ‘ruler supportive ethic’ which predates British rule.8 
The focus of existing studies relating to colonial policing is upon the 
constraints and dilemmas faced by the police within the empire. However, it is also 
necessary to examine in closer detail the ways in which the ordinary police officer 
operated in practice, ways that did not necessarily involve the policeman employing 
brutal, physical coercion. If his status as a supplementary agent allowed the 
chowkidar to, in a sense, escape the official gaze of the state, the policeman was at 
the centre of a colonial network whose requirements often clashed with the 
expectations and demands of the local population he was to serve. Perhaps more 
emphasis can be placed upon the ways in which the local police helped to maintain 
the moral economy of the area under their control. As the example cited above 
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concerning the rather fortunate sub inspector of Bhagalpur demonstrates, official 
procedure was often at odds with public opinion. The policeman could not just 
simply ignore this public opinion. Indeed, the fact that the sub inspector managed to 
keep his post successfully for eighteen years suggests that it was not only achieved 
by resorting to oppressive practices. It also indicates awareness by the officer that a 
balance had to be maintained without alienating the local community, who in this 
case demanded more than the routine questions which were initially put forward to 
the two individuals by the sub inspector.9 At the same time, his lengthy tenure in the 
force could also be the result of recognition by the colonial authorities that their 
limited reach within the interior always required acts of leniency such as the one 
demonstrated above.10 The difficulties he faced in adapting the official system to the 
conditions of village society, and indeed the ways in which he could distort the 
imperial system to meet the needs of the local society, thus forms an important part 
of this chapter. 
Leniency and compromise were features of the system of criminal 
administration which were quietly tolerated in times of peace. They would disguise 
the shortcomings of the official network of policing whilst allowing the local police 
to adapt the system according to need. During periods of tension, however, these 
shortcomings could not be concealed so easily. However, the ‘physical and 
psychological strain’ mentioned in the memoirs of retired police officials, suggests 
that ruthless coercion and force were not the only features of a department that was 
required to maintain civil order. The partition of Bengal in 1905 was one such event 
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which sparked off a politically tumultuous period that threatened to disable the 
colonial administration. The Swadeshi movement and the subsequent aspirations for 
self-rule allowed the Indian National Congress to ‘make the cause of Bengal, India’s 
cause.’11 However, the rise of terrorism in the years following partition meant that the 
‘government was faced with what seemed like a revolution.’12 As revolutionary 
terrorism gathered pace between 1907 and 1917, and as criminality became a 
prominent feature in Indian politics, the ordinary machinery of law and order created 
a number of obstacles for the colonial authorities and it was the police who found 
themselves at the centre of criticism and controversy throughout the campaign to 
suppress the movement. The ordinary system of law, which could be quietly adapted 
by the police in times of peace, worked against them during times of political 
tension. How this impacted on the manner in which the force operated will be 
considered in the final section of this chapter. 
 
4.1 The Policeman: A ‘Byword for Oppression’ 
Considered as the second link within the system of criminal administration, the 
colonial police force was an integral part of the criminal justice system. As the most 
visible representative of colonial rule in direct contact with the native population, the 
policeman was at the very centre of an official network governed by Act V of 1861, 
which had established the police as a separate department organised, trained and 
controlled by its own officers.  In effect, the aim of the police, with its clearly 
defined posts separated by rank and race, was to ‘provide a strict, minute and 
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incessant supervision in a gradually widening circle over every policeman.’13 With 
legislation providing strict procedures regarding conduct in the reporting of crime, 
investigation and arrest, the policeman was entrusted with enforcing the rules and 
regulations of the colonial state. The policeman proved to be an indispensable agent 
for the British authorities primarily because he was the symbol of foreign authority. 
Furthermore, in the vast system of criminal justice composed of police, courts and 
prisons, argues criminologist S.K. Ghosh, it was the policeman who ‘largely 
determined what the system would do since he decided who for the most part would 
come into and set the terms for subsequent deliberations.’14   
Unlike the chowkidar, the policeman was completely incorporated into the 
official network of the state, thereby ensuring that his actions were subject to closer 
scrutiny. He was governed by a whole host of rules and regulations intended to 
closely regulate and control him at every stage of the investigative process.15 Within 
this network, he was completely subordinate to the magistrate who determined the 
guilt of the accused, following an examination of the evidence forwarded by the 
police. What was also stressed, under the Indian Evidence Act of 1872, was that no 
confession made to a police officer was admissible as evidence. Evidence could only 
be admissible if recorded by a magistrate, who also had to ensure that statements 
made to the police were made voluntarily. Any confession secured by the police 
through force was forbidden and punishable by law. 
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The importance of the police as a key agency within the colonial 
administration contrasted with a recurring negative stereotype of the officer. In 
various types of records, whether official records or memoirs, what constantly 
emerges is the image of the police as oppressive, corrupt and brutal. It was 
acknowledged that drill and discipline had made British authority visible in the 
interior following the establishment of the New Police.16 Yet, the image of the 
subordinate policeman, the one official of the government who was in continuous 
contact with the native public, was still marred by allegations of torture and 
corruption. It was an issue that was raised in the House of Lords in 1911, where it 
was recognised that the practice of police ‘working for confessions in gross abuse of 
their powers’ was still a pressing concern.17 
The negative stereotype of the police, one in which their brutality and the 
inefficiency of the force were emphasised, endured precisely because the police 
operated outside the official network of control of which the force was a central part. 
It was the ability of the police to conceal information from the official records which 
troubled the authorities. The misuse of what was known as the private diary was a 
particular cause for concern. Amongst the many technical and lengthy procedures to 
be followed by the investigating officer, he had to record statements of witnesses 
under two different sections of the Criminal Code of Procedure, one of which could 
be cross examined in court. The other statement was recorded in the private diary, 
which was not open to public viewing. The impact of such a ruling allowed the 
private diary to be used as a device to conceal rulings, as happened in the case of 
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Sheru Shah & Others versus Queen Empress.18 In this particular case, it was argued 
by the defence that statements eligible for cross-examination were purposefully 
recorded by the investigating officer in his private diary so as to avoid the necessity 
of producing the statement in court. 
 Nor were witness statements recorded satisfactorily.  Such statements were 
crucial as evidence in any trial yet it was often found that they had been recorded by 
subordinate officers of low educational attainment.19 The magistrate of Howrah, F.W. 
Duke, found that officers made ‘rough notes in the first instance, and wrote up what 
purport to be statements hours or days afterwards.’20  The statements recorded by 
barely literate officers could be labelled as ‘garbled nonsense’ but the fact that they 
placed enormous power in the hands of the police officer could not be ignored.21  
The manner in which the subordinate police chose to work within the official 
system had a direct impact on statistics relating to crime reporting and the outcome 
of cases investigated. In 1891, John Beames concluded that upwards of ‘seventy 
percent of cases went unpunished and at least ninety percent of the most dangerous 
offences against property remained undetected.’22 Many people chose not to report 
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the occurrence of a crime to the police, with former police official Charles 
Elphinstone Gouldsbury stating that not one half of murders committed were ‘ever 
brought home to the criminal.’23 Of the cases which were investigated and passed on 
to the court, many broke down due to the manner in which the police recorded 
information, which led to many cases ending in an acquittal.24 
 The colonial policeman, therefore, was an agent marred by allegations of 
corruption and oppression, an agent whose inefficiencies distorted the system of 
criminal administration. Yet, one also has to examine in closer detail the conditions 
within which the policeman worked, both in his official post and the local rural 
environment of which he was part. If corruption can be defined as the abuse of public 
office for private gain, then the conduct of the policeman can be termed as such. But 
if public office determines the extent of corruption, then it is important to consider 
the nature of that public office. The next section will examine the different 
interpretations of corruption in different contexts. 
 
4.2 Corruption, the Policeman and the Colonial State 
The impact of corruption upon the functioning of democratic institutions has 
attracted much scholarly attention. Political scientist Joseph Nye has defined 
corruption as ‘behaviour which deviates from the normal duties of a public role 
because of private regarding, pecuniary or status gain.’25 Several scholars have since 
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applied the western description proposed by Nye to the non-western environment. In 
other words, it is this particular definition that is popularly used to measure the 
prevalence of corruption and its effects upon the administration of government. 
Within the Indian context, A. Ranga Reddy, through his discussions about crime and 
corruption in the developing state, has placed emphasis upon the negative impact that 
the abuse of public office has upon social, economic and political development.26 
R.K. Raghavan has reached similar conclusions, arguing that corrupt practices within 
the Indian police force run counter to the democratic processes of the country. S.K. 
Ghosh and Arvind Verma, in their respective studies have also pointed to the 
brutality, oppression and corruption of a police force that has remained unchanged in 
organisation, structure and attitude since the days of the British Raj.27  
  The solutions to the problem of corruption may vary but the studies share 
similarities in two important respects. First, is the shared view that the flaws of the 
modern police in India can be attributed to the colonial objectives which ultimately 
determined how the police would function.  That these objectives, centring around 
the maintenance of power for the ruling elite, have remained unchanged in 
postcolonial India is also emphasised. The second similarity is the labelling of the 
police force as ‘corrupt’ because officers are seen to deviate from the rules and 
regulations as set in the codes of law and, as a result, abuse their public office. In 
other words, the western definition of what is, and is not, ‘corruption’ is accepted 
without question by the authors of these studies. 
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 The use of western definitions to measure levels of progress and growth has 
not, however, prevented certain scholars from offering their own critique of the term. 
Indeed, a critical analysis of the term within the context of the developed society has 
been the topic of much discussion. Arvind Jain in his study has concluded that ‘how 
corruption is defined actually ends up determining what gets modelled and 
measured.’28 This is a view which has been echoed by David Redlawsk and James 
McCann in their study on corruption existing within the legal institutions of the 
American state. They, in opposition to the view proposed by Joseph Nye that 
corruption equates lawlessness, have stated that there is ‘more to corruption than 
breaking the law...many behaviours that are technically legal might nonetheless 
break well established communal norms.’29 Furthermore, they have added that a rigid 
definition of corruption is problematic as it is often perceived in different ways by 
various groups.30 In a similar vein, Lawrence Sherman, in his analysis of corruption 
within the ranks of the American police force, has stressed that although the police 
may be subjected to political influence, they nevertheless must also follow the norms 
of the local community. His examination of both public attitudes towards the police, 
as well as the beliefs of the officers themselves, has led him to the conclusion that the 
community tolerates, and can even support, behaviour labelled as corrupt.31 
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Crucially, he has added, this tolerance expressed by the community, ‘encourages the 
police to define its behaviour as proper rather than deviant.’32 
The shortcomings of a definition that fails to take into account alternative 
perceptions of other groups are made even more apparent when considered within 
the context of the non-Western environment. The prevalence of corruption in 
developing states, it is argued, is the result of the difficult transition from one moral 
code to another. What makes corruption so visible in developing nations is the 
expansion of democracy, which sharpens the distinction between the private and the 
public sphere. What is popularly considered as an accepted ‘social practice’ 
transforms into a corrupt one once the switch between spheres occurs. Theodore 
Smith has examined how traditional, informal practices of the Javanese community 
came to be redefined with a critical gaze by a colonial establishment intent upon 
creating an autonomous rationality of the state, a single authority which the 
subjugated population would obey. Smith has concluded his study by stating that 
what occurs is a new definition of corrupt practices rather than a change in traditional 
behaviour.33   
The impact of foreign definitions of power and authority upon indigenous 
practices has been discussed by Sandra Freitag and Radhika Singha, in their 
respective studies.34 They have pointed out that whilst in pre-British India, power 
was delegated and dispersed amongst many groups and the criminal still remained an 
active member of society, the arrival of the British ushered in a period of attempts to 
establish a distinctly colonial conception of justice and authority. It was one in which 
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the state alone controlled the instruments of coercion and redefined criminal 
behaviour, thereby labelling a whole host of activities as ‘criminal’. This process 
seemed complete with the codification of the law in the mid-nineteenth century, with 
the introduction of a vast array of rules and regulations designed to control every 
aspect of policing and at the same time ensuring that British authority superseded all 
other indigenous forms of control. Thus, it was the policeman, as the official 
employee of the state, who was expected to enforce the codes of law which upheld 
this single, colonial authority. He was required to ensure that the native community 
adhered to a new legal order, one that was designed to replace the symbolic authority 
of the local zamindar with the laws and codes of the British rulers. The difficulty 
faced by the policeman in this role was clearly expressed by the inspector general of 
police in 1866, when he referred to a certain case in Shahabad in which the police, 
having arrested certain men now classed as ‘Budmashes’, faced great opposition 
from their zamindars, ‘who at once came forward to certify they were the most 
respectable of characters.’35 
The response of the native community to the establishment of new forms of 
control, including the policeman who is subjected to this type of transformation, can 
be considered in a number of ways. Lauren Benton, in her examination of colonial 
legal regimes, has put forward the argument that conquered groups can respond in 
ways that include ‘accommodation, advocacy within the system, subtle 
delegitimisation and outright rebellion.’36 Colin Leys, in his excellent analysis of 
corruption in modern African states has examined the different ways in which 
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corruption can be interpreted by those employed by the state and has argued that they 
have their own idea of what the rule should be:  
   it may be the same as that of the official (they may 
regard themselves as corrupt); or quite different (behaving 
   honourably according to their own standards and regard 
   critics’ standards as irrelevant; or they may be men of ‘two 
   worlds’ partly adhering to two standards which are incompatible, 
   and ending up exasperated and indifferent...these options affect 
   the whole society who may have the same attitude.
37
 
Leys is keen to emphasise that corruption involves the breaking of some written or 
unwritten rule and that it can be viewed in a number of ways by different groups. 
One can also add that the state itself can redefine the term, even allow corrupt 
practices to continue, to suit its own ends. Some colonial observers sympathised with 
the plight of the native policeman. As one official noted, in ‘traditional systems a 
bribe was not a bribe but was custom...but in our British system they have to be 
persuaded that whatever the contractual custom elsewhere, their services are now 
free to all...only possible method was in terms of black and white.’38  
The very nature of colonial rule, however, ensured that, far from being ‘black 
and white, right or wrong’ the process of ‘corruption’ was one that could not easily 
fit into rigid categories. The definition of corruption, of behaviour undermining the 
authority of the state, may have centred around clear policies and whether they had 
been clearly broken yet these ‘clear’ rules were very much dependent upon wider 
imperial objectives and constraints which required the state to frequently ‘bend the 
rules’. The following section aims to consider these wider objectives and the ways in 
which the policeman could respond to them. 
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4.3 The Police, the Locality and State Objectives 
Collaboration and compromise proved to be a necessity as ideology always came 
second to the practicality of running a lightly manned Empire.39 And that too in the 
most cost-effective manner possible.40 Matters of economy in particular were always 
a central concern, especially when they involved the question of improving the force. 
The inspector general of police in 1911 ruefully noted that despite the pledge of the 
police commission held in 1902 to spend one million pounds on police reform, the 
provincial governments within India only received a ‘few lakh rupees... the Bengal 
force received only twelve lakhs.’41 Above all, the practicalities of empire ensured a 
focus on activities threatening the state, as opposed to ordinary crime affecting 
person and property.42  
The need to maintain order went on to influence attitudes about the type of 
policeman to be recruited. ‘The Bengalis’, noted former Bengal official Walter Cyril 
Holman, ‘viewed uniform as a form of fancy dress. Whilst other Indians wear 
attractive pugrees, the Bengali makes do with his umbrella.’43  Michael Silvestri has 
pointed out that ideas of ‘martial’ and ‘non martial’ races led to an influx of up-
country men from other parts of the colony to police a Bengali population considered 
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‘feeble and effeminate.’44 The Bengali, Silvestre has added, was seen to dislike the 
drill and discipline that policing involved and that as a result, the force was a 
predominantly non-Bengali one. Thus, the police, and the rule of law it was to 
implement may have been at the very centre of a campaign by which the British 
sought to legitimise their rule and shape the social order of native society.45 However, 
it was very much shaped, and reshaped, according to broader imperial concerns. As 
Peter Robb has concluded, the police remained a ‘largely visible, symbolic 
representative of power and order...a marker of the importance of the State.’46 It was 
the visibility of British authority, to be seen in the form of the policeman who would 
be in direct contact with the native population, which was of utmost importance. 
The broader considerations of empire ensured that the public office of the 
police was a largely undesirable one for the native policeman. There was a need to 
preserve order as cheaply as possible.47 This meant that for the native policeman, the 
post would remain poorly paid, involve poor working conditions as well as the 
constant vilification by the state. Upper caste individuals found the post distasteful 
because, as pointed out by one British official in his memoirs, a high caste Brahmin 
officer had to perform acts which were in conflict with his caste beliefs. He was 
required to arrest persons of a lower caste and even come into contact with a corpse, 
both acts which ‘made him unclean...when he returned to his quarters he would have 
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to purify himself with ablutions and prayers.’48 In 1891, John Beames in his official 
report on the force in Bengal, had noted that the constable, paid only six rupees, was 
forced often to ‘undergo great fatigue engaged in escort duty, be badly lodged and be 
compelled to drink indifferent water.’49 He added that economic necessity would 
form the main reason behind the decision to enter the force. It was only in districts 
where food and labour were cheap, he continued, that men of a respectable caste 
were ready to enlist as constables. The same could not be said in suburban districts 
such as Hooghly and Howrah, where the wages of unskilled labour could meet the 
high expense of living in these districts. Unskilled labour was also seen to be a more 
attractive option when compared to the ‘heaviest and most irksome work that a 
policeman is called upon to do.’50 By 1918, the chief secretary to the government of 
Bengal noted that despite an increase in pay, it was ‘insufficient for the class of men 
required and that it does not suffice to attract even the better classes of Anglo Indians 
who earn more on railways and in mercantile firms.’51  
Furthermore, subordinate officers had little contact with their superiors, with 
the district superintendent of police often managing to inspect the stations within 
their jurisdiction only once or twice a year. These visits, when they occurred, rather 
than closely examining how the police went about their duties, simply focused on the 
outward appearance of the police buildings as well as that of the police officers 
themselves. The check on appearance, on ensuring that authority was at least visible, 
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was often the purpose behind official visits.  Indeed, it must be noted that the district 
superintendent himself was restricted in his role as he continued to act in 
subordination to the district magistrate. The government, upon the introduction of the 
new police in 1861, may have emphasised the separation of judicial and executive 
functions, but the fact remained that the power and influence of the district 
magistrate never quite diminished. Magistrates in different districts continued to 
adapt the police according to their own model, resulting in a lack of uniformity 
within the force. The magistrate justified his interference in police affairs by arguing 
that as native society was adapted to despotic rule, all functions of administration had 
to be placed in the hands of one official. In other words, the district magistrate 
considered himself as the rightful ‘king of his district’, and considered his 
competitor, the police, with contempt and disdain.  
The response of the subordinate officer to a post associated with poor pay, 
low status and constant condemnation took various forms. Of course, he could 
employ visibly corrupt and violent methods against members of the native 
community. In other instances, he acted in accordance with his own standards. 
Former police official Edmund Cox recalled an interesting case in his memoir in 
which one subordinate ‘openly took bribes’.52 Hidayat Ali, he continued, would 
‘accept fifty or one hundred rupees from the accused, and this sum had to be paid to 
him in his office in the presence of his clerks, his subordinate police, and as many 
witnesses as were obtainable.’53  
In the first instance, the example of Hidayat Ali can be viewed as a survival 
strategy or as a means to supplement a meagre income, rather than as a strictly 
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deviant process. Secondly, what is noticeable about this particular case is the fact that 
the transaction does not take place secretly. It is very much a public affair, 
emphasising the authority and influence of the officer and the thana he occupies. If 
one adopts the view put forward by David Bayley, then the transaction, rather than a 
bribe, was ‘very much a social practice in which the giving of gratuities to 
government officers is an indispensable courtesy and civilised way of carrying on 
business.’54 Thus, the transaction is one that is beneficial for both parties. For the 
policeman, it gives his official post a level of importance and influence that the 
official police system, with its poor pay, poor status and low morale, cannot provide. 
Cox does not disclose exactly what deviant act the ‘guilty person’ is supposed to 
have committed, but the fact that the ‘bribe’ is exchanged in the presence of an 
audience, suggests that perhaps those present do not consider him, or his act, as 
‘deviant’.  
The occurrence of this informal practice within a formal setting, and that too 
in the presence of a wider audience, also gains credibility if one accepts the argument 
put forward by anthropologist Akhil Gupta. Gupta has argued that bribery is not 
simply an economic transaction but a ‘cultural practice requiring a great deal of 
performative competence.’55 Accusations of corruption, he continues, are not simply 
a response to exclusion from costly governmental services. Rather, such accusations 
are made because individuals ‘lack the cultural capital required to negotiate deftly for 
those services.’56 
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Hidayat Ali also had to, in a sense, perform once he was discovered by the 
authorities. Upon being exposed, Ali went on to use the public nature of this 
exchange as a form of defence in court. ‘How could it be believed possible’, he 
argued, ‘that an officer would take bribes openly?...an eater of bribes would take 
every precaution for secrecy!’57 The argument was accepted by the court and Ali was 
acquitted. That Ali was able to use the state definition of bribery to escape 
prosecution demonstrates the various ways in which subordinates employed the rules 
of the system and adapted them in ways that enhanced their own authority. But an 
officer also had to be careful not to ask for too much or he faced the wrath of 
subordinates who could refer to the laws and regulations to their own advantage and 
accuse him of misconduct. The much publicised case of Inspector Babu Sital Prasad, 
dismissed from his post in the Hazaribagh district in Bengal, provides an interesting 
account of how the police functioned at the thana level. His subordinates were 
required to provide him with a customary fee, or rasad, and provide him with various 
articles of consumption from their own pay. Inspector Prasad was also accused of 
taking monthly sums from stations within his vicinity. Those subordinates who 
refused to engage in this process were either dismissed, transferred or subjected to 
what was known as the ‘black mark system’.58 This was a system authorised by a 
senior official, Deputy Superintendent Bamber, to act as a check on the behaviour of 
officers within the force.59  
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What follows in the case against Sital Prasad is a description of bribery, 
corruption and illegal gratification which was regarded as a common feature within 
the subordinate ranks. The viceroy may have argued that these methods were only 
part of the subordinate ranks of the force, but in this case the behaviour of Prasad and 
his subordinates was also influenced by his own superior, District Superintendent 
Bamber. It was discovered that officers were overworked to save him time. The 
deputy inspector general found that instead of having the special diaries read out to 
him, they were all ‘translated word for word by the head mohurrir...the District 
Superintendent’s excuse for this, was that his time was more valuable than the head 
mohurrir’s.’60 
What is clear in the case of Sital Prasad is that the District Superintendent, a 
member of the superior rank, permitted the practice to continue. This is an important 
point as it sheds light on why coercive methods were central to police investigation 
and the role of the colonial administration within this process. Low education, the 
‘Oriental’ nature of the police, and indeed the community he served, were amongst 
the reasons given to explain why many cases upon being sent to trial, collapsed. It 
was discovered that the police, who were not to have any part in confessions, used 
force to extort false confessions. This resulted in a high number of acquittals, with 
the percentage of convictions remaining low. Corruption, the viceroy had argued, 
existed only in the subordinate ranks because it was a ‘practice innate to the people 
of India.’61  
The practice of corruption may have been attributed to the nature of the 
Indian people but what could not be denied was that superior authorities themselves 
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placed pressure on their subordinates to reach a conviction. In the year 1900, the 
inspector general stated that although the main duties of the force included the 
protection of property and prevention of theft, the reality was that ‘it was by the 
success in the detection of crime that their work was primarily judged.’62 This view 
was also expressed in the Police Commission Report of 1902 in which it was noted 
that the promotion of officers was dependent upon the number of cases which 
successfully ended in conviction. Thus, the colonial authorities would vilify the 
‘illegal’ practices employed by the police to try to gain a conviction. Yet at the same 
time the police was still placed under pressure to try to maintain a high ratio of 
convictions and low ratio of crime – pressure which would ultimately lead to the use 
of coercive methods.      
 The pressure to meet the demands of the superior authorities is best illustrated 
in the discovery of a secret circular introduced in the district of Backergunge. Indeed, 
the existence of the circular raised much concern amongst official circles and the 
issue reached the debating hall of the House of Commons. In 1893, the District 
Superintendent of Police for Barisal threatened, by circular, his subordinates with 
loss of promotion and even their posts if they failed to secure a seventy five percent 
conviction rate in cases sent up by them for trial.63 In an article entitled ‘No 
Conviction, No Promotion’, published by the Amrita Patrika Bazar, the editor argued 
that the ‘government is lying if it says it knew nothing!...the District Superintendent 
of Police takes orders from the higher executive authorities.’64 Furthermore, it was 
claimed that the District Magistrate of Backergunge had ordered all subordinate 
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magistrates to call for a fresh batch of witnesses from the police, if the ‘evidence of 
the witnesses already sent up would not make out a case.’65 The government may 
have pointed to the corrupt nature of the subordinate officer, yet, concluded the 
editor of the article, ‘what can the poor fellows do with this circular of a Damocles 
sword passing over their heads?...it can only lead to the fabrication of false evidence 
and the torturing of witnesses by the police to procure this evidence.’66 Thus, the 
particular methods employed by the force, although publicly condemned were also a 
product of the demands of the colonial state. These ‘native’ methods were tolerated 
as long as they served the objectives of the state. 
The complicity of the colonial authorities in allowing informal methods to be 
employed was again demonstrated in 1911. In that year, frequent correspondence 
took place between the Viceroy of India, Charles Hardinge and the Under Secretary 
of State, Edwin Montagu. The subject of the correspondence was the treatment of 
under trial prisoners by the police and the punishment officers should receive for 
their conduct in cases of gross torture. In particular, discussions centred around the 
proposed amendment of the Indian Penal Code. The purpose of the amendment was 
to try to curb the occurrence of cases in which the excessive conduct of the 
policeman resulted in the death of the accused. Under the Penal Code as it stood, 
guilty knowledge and intention to harm were essential elements in the definition of 
murder. Suggestions involving the modification of this definition were put forward 
so as to ‘create a new offence to apply exclusively to policemen resorting to torture, 







which would result in a conviction for murder irrespective of the knowledge or 
intention.’67  
The viceroy was not convinced by the proposed measure, arguing that 
‘torture by the police is seldom inflicted with the intention or knowledge that it will 
result in murder...the object is to make the prisoner confess, not kill him.’68 Under 
Secretary Edwin Montagu asserted that the death penalty should be inflicted upon 
policemen implicated in cases of torture which resulted in death. However, he agreed 
with the viceroy that the strict application of the proposed modification was 
problematic. Montagu argued that death was never intentional, stating that in the 
majority of cases in which the police tried to secure confessions improperly injury 
caused was ‘only of a slight nature – a shove, a slap, a cut with a cane, or a cuff.’69  
The debate concerning whether more stringent measures should be employed 
to curb the abuses of the police was important in two respects. On the one hand, there 
was recognition that informal networks and methods were the foundation of the 
official network of control. The system of criminal administration could not operate 
without the information which these informal methods supplied – a point that was 
highlighted during the contentious debates over whether to include the chowkidar 
within the official network of control.70 At the same time, one also senses an unease 
as both officials tried to justify the continuation of an illegal act – that of torture – 
within the colonial legal framework of control.  
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The authorities used both rhetorical and practical arguments to justify the 
decision not to apply the proposed measures. Thus, Montagu argued that the 
statistical reports demonstrated that torture was a ‘rare exception.’71 He combined 
this practical reason with a rhetorical justification, stating that it was against the 
principles of British justice to convict a policeman without proof of intent. The 
Secretary of State for India, John Morley, added yet another layer to the process of 
justification, emphasising the stereotype of the Orient. He implied that the principles 
of justice were inapplicable in the colony, arguing that, ‘if people here use cheap 
unbridled language against the shameless qualities of the Indian police, they forget 
that after all, the police are recruited from the Indian people... if they are hopeless 
rascals, those from whom they come are likely to be a pin better.’72 The justifications 
may have differed, from Montagu’s cautious wording to Morley’s more explicit 
criticism of the local population, but there was an awareness of the limitations faced 
by the policeman, who had to distort the formal network of control in order to meet 
the requirements of both state and locality.  
The attempts of the subordinate force to try to meet the demands of the state 
and increase the percentage of convictions emphasised the necessity of compromise 
between two different systems. How to work within a public office which was 
limited in many respects, and adapt it to the needs of a native population accustomed 
to a ‘quick and ready form of justice’ was an issue that the ordinary policeman had to 
address. The ways in which both police and population adapted the system according 
to their needs, will be considered in the following paragraphs, which examine the 
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ways in which the police had to adapt official procedure to the conditions of the 
locality.  
The policeman needed to adapt the requirements of the official network to a 
native environment in which indirect enquiries were a necessary stage before the 
truth could be established. The colonial state may have set in place a formal system 
in which circumstantial evidence was a key aspect and the fate of the accused was 
going to be decided in the British court, but the real facts of the case could be 
discovered with surprising ease when the officer worked outside this system and 
instead employed methods of informal investigation.  Indeed, a common theme 
running through the memoirs of retired police officials is the prevalence of unofficial 
methods of policing employed when solving any particular case.73 
In a community in which the culprit was already known, the British system of 
justice, with its emphasis upon circumstantial evidence, and with the time, distance 
and inconvenience it involved, was one that did not serve local purposes. But this 
native procedure was in direct opposition to the regulations set by the British 
administration which emphasised that confessions were only to be made in the 
presence of a magistrate. The clash between the colonial system and local networks 
resulted in recognition amongst officials that the system had to be compromised.  
Indeed, compromise was necessary, with officials pointing out that the law protected 
the criminal rather than aiding the police in their investigations.74  
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There was an implicit understanding that cases could not be solved if the 
official system of law and order was strictly applied. In one particular case, police 
official Samuel Thomas Hollins, upon being dissatisfied that the law was not being 
complied with, complained to his superior, only to be told that ‘Indian officers use 
methods we cannot use ourselves...crime must be checked by some method other 
than we have been able to devise.’75 To offer another example, the freedom with 
which Bengal police official Charles Elphinstone Gouldsbury provided his native 
informer Kali Dass in getting to the ‘real facts’ of the case was central to the success 
of their ‘collaboration.’76  
In an interesting analysis, one official, Arthur Jules Dash, argued that 
violence, or even siding with influential cliques within the village, was not the only 
image that should be associated with the native officer. The average police sub 
inspector, he argued, was always ‘careful to avoid causing unnecessary trouble, using 
pressure or torture to elicit information when necessary. Provided that the anonymity 
of the informant was secure and that nobody “got into trouble that had not been 
foreseen”, the real facts could be disclosed fairly easily.’77  Dash was keen to point 
out that whilst the police officer could express openly oppressive behaviour towards 
the community, he was also aware that a balance had to be maintained. He was 
operating in an environment in which he had to employ his resources carefully.  He 
may have been an employee of the state, but he was also conscious that he needed to 
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operate local networks in a way that would maintain the moral economy of the 
locality and ensure his own survival within this environment. This was an 
environment in which disputes were often resolved locally. It was a community, 
which in many instances, disliked the interference and expense associated with the 
legal institutions of the state.78 And, when members of the locality wanted the police 
to get involved, they required the police to give out justice that was acceptable to 
them, a form that was directly at odds with that of the colonial rulers.79  
In the system of criminal administration set up by the colonial government, 
the object of a criminal enquiry was not to ensure a conviction but to find out 
whether the accused was innocent or guilty. In this legal system, pointed Inspector 
General L.F.Morshead, a confession was only the beginning.80  But the ‘real facts’ 
for the policeman were a confession which, for him, signalled the end of a case. The 
clash between the different methods led to the negative stereotype of the policeman 
being further highlighted. The investigating officer, it was argued, often had his own 
theory about the case and would record the evidence in ways that strengthened his 
case.  
But if one considers the point made by Dash, that anonymity of informants 
was a crucial factor in gaining information, one can understand why the evidence 
recorded by the investigating officer defied both rules and the authority of the 
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magistrate as well as deprived the courts of the ‘true facts of the case.’81 The facts 
were already known within the local environment. The problem was that the 
investigating officer had to respect the anonymity of the informant, which clashed 
with an elaborate official system requiring informants to forego any anonymity. 
Colonial authorities argued that first information reports were often written in the 
concluding stages of the investigation so as to harmonise with the theory held by the 
officer. But if one considers the observations of Dash, then it can be suggested that 
the first information reports were written in a way that harmonised relations within 
the village community. It protected the anonymity sought by informers and 
prevented them from entering the confines of a cumbersome colonial justice system. 
 Furthermore, accusations levelled at the police relating to the low level of 
convictions and high number of acquittals can be better understood if one considers 
the argument put forward by one magistrate. Appealing against his suspension, Surya 
Kumar Agasti had argued that the large number of acquittals in his district were due 
to the fact that for ‘purposes of justice, an acquittal or compromise is really a 
conviction. The complainant certainly gains his point substantially at any rate...and 
receives some form of compensation.’82 Thus, what was often regarded as acquittal 
resulting from the flaws in police methods and investigation was often the product of 
compromise between disputing parties. 
The inapplicability of full legal procedure within a native environment had a 
direct impact upon the way in which the police operated within the locality.  In 
instances where cooperation was less than forthcoming, the sub inspector could 
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employ methods which did not necessarily involve physical coercion. According to 
one account, prolonging investigation, in cases where members of the village 
community had to provide the officer with food and shelter, was one way to extract 
information. Officials would often label this process as oppressive, an example of the 
policeman taking advantage of his authority, but the policeman viewed the situation 
differently. Knowing that villagers would not easily disclose information, he would 
‘outstay his welcome, knowing that they would tire of the entertainment and start to 
provide him with useful information.’83 He was aware that villagers could not easily 
refuse to accommodate him because according to long-standing usage and custom 
members of the community were expected to accommodate and provide ‘any other 
article that the visiting officer may require.’84  
 Another method involved appealing to the moral sensibilities of the village 
community by raising the issue of caste. The issue of faith was believed to be a 
powerful tool. In 1911, for instance, the Viceroy of India offered his thoughts on a 
particular case in Birbhum, in which the accused was a sub inspector. He was 
eventually acquitted by Indian assessors. The viceroy argued the ‘acquittal of the 
Sub-Inspector, of whose guilt there was very little doubt, is the fact that he is a high 
caste Brahmin.’85 In another revealing case, a Coolin Brahmin, threatened to ‘strip 
himself of his clothing and neither eat nor drink nor clothe himself again until the 
accused handed himself over to the police...the Sub-Inspector knowing full well that, 
the village being composed entirely of Hindus, they would bring pressure to bear 
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rather than see a Brahmin suffer such discomfort.’86 Upon being reprimanded by his 
superior, the sub inspector replied ‘but Sahib, I was only doing my duty!’87 The 
rather indignant response of the sub inspector highlights the difficulty faced by the 
native inspector in trying to fulfil his official obligations within a native setting. 
Working strictly in accordance with procedure was likely to cause much annoyance 
amongst the locality which in turn risked his ability to gain useful information. 
Strict adherence to official procedure, then, placed a number of restrictions in 
the way of the officer. Debkamal Ganguly has examined in particular a series of 
detective stories by colonial detective Priyonath Mukhopadhyay.88 Ganguly has 
examined the ways in which Mukhopadhyay, by transforming real-life events into 
fiction, highlighted some of the difficulties the ordinary policeman faced when 
adhering to the official system. In one case, known as The Fake Coins, the culprit 
was known to the policeman who took shelter in a neighbouring household to watch 
the culprit engaging in criminal activity. Both were aware of the other’s presence, 
with the culprit making no attempt to hide his actions. It is only when he tried to 
catch him red-handed by involving his superiors in the operation that the officer 
failed to succeed in his objective. Knowing that the officer needed to have his eye-
witness account corroborated by his superiors or constables, the culprit was easily 
able to evade detection. 
 The policeman could employ physical coercion and accentuate the negative 
stereotype with which he was associated. But to do so was to make himself 
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vulnerable to attack from the local community. Despite being cloaked in official 
authority, he had to contend with other authorities at the village level, such as the 
panchayat and the chowkidar. The officer was aware that cooperation was vital not 
only for gaining access to the real facts but also because he could himself be victim 
of various plots at the village level. In 1889, for instance, a charge against a sub 
inspector in Bogra turned out, on enquiry, to be the result of having offended the 
people concerned in an investigation by speaking roughly to their women.89  Indeed, 
Akhil Gupta has argued that the discourse of corruption can act as a powerful tool by 
which local communities can vent their frustrations against a distant state whom they 
may feel is neglecting their needs. By attacking the institutions of the state in this 
way, local communities, continues Gupta, although lacking material resources, can 
still strike a blow through such accusations.90  
In the colonial context, allegations of corruption took various forms. In the 
district of Dinajpur in 1902, it was found that witnesses and complainants refused to 
make a statement to the police if their local Dewania was absent. In one particular 
case, in which a sub inspector slapped a ‘Hari’ woman for creating a disturbance, the 
‘Dewania got hold of her to falsely charge the Sub-Inspector with having raped her 
granddaughter.’91 It was later discovered that the sub inspector had offended the 
Dewania in an earlier incident.92 In 1885, a pleader, in the district of Dacca, whose 
house had been searched by the police, put in a false charge of torture against them.93 
In some instances, the extreme lengths to which some individuals could go to when 
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making accusations against the police, was a cause for concern.94 In a murder case 
which arose in 1894, the widow of the victim stated that the sub inspector remained 
in her house for six days during the investigation. She argued that he ‘simply sat in 
her baitkkhana and wrote squires of paper rather than go out and search.’95 The sub 
inspector was immediately suspended. The problem continued to persist over the 
years. In 1911, 115 charges had been recorded against the police, not a significant 
number according to the inspector general, yet still demonstrating that if ‘police 
officers sin it is evident that they are sinned against and must run the full gauntlet of 
accusation.’96  
 The official network of policing proved flexible enough for various groups to 
meet their own specific requirements. For the policeman, the network allowed him to 
work outside the system established by the state using informal methods of enquiry 
which would provide information that was not so forthcoming when the officer 
worked according to official procedure. It was one in which he had to make careful 
use of his resources, applying coercion when necessary. Failure to maintain a level of 
cooperation within the local community could make the all-powerful policeman 
vulnerable to accusations of misconduct. This could all too easily be made by a 
village community capable of using the unpopularity of the policeman amongst 
official circles to their own advantage. Above all, the broader practicalities of empire 
allowed this state of affairs to continue, one in which the need for sufficient evidence 
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went hand in hand with the low conviction rate. It was a situation which the 
authorities could acknowledge in less difficult times, content to blame the Oriental 
nature of the native character and the subsequent lack of moral progress for the 
shortcomings of the system of criminal law. But it was the politically tumultuous 
decade at the turn of the twentieth century, during which crime and revolutionary 
politics were closely linked, that exposed the fragility of the ordinary system of law. 
The need to establish evidence and convict politically threatening groups was 
necessary to uphold British authority. The ways in which the ordinary legal 
framework undermined the role of the police in trying to contain this political threat, 
and how the revolutionary movement took advantage of such shortcomings, is 
discussed in the following section. 
 
4.4 Swadeshi, Revolution and the Ordinary Methods of Law 
In October 1905, the province of Bengal was partitioned following the proposals 
made two years previously by Viceroy Curzon. He had argued that splitting the 
region would make a large and unwieldy area easier for the authorities to control. 
The division would also make it difficult for nationalist opinion to pass back and 
forth between the cities of Calcutta and Dacca.  The backlash had begun as soon as 
the proposals were made public. Resentment over the fact that public opinion 
regarding the proposals had not been sought, as well as a belief that the Bengali race 
would be divided, led to protests forming as early as January 1904. By July 1905, the 
Swadeshi movement began in earnest, with the declaration of boycotting imported, in 
particular English, goods. The agitation, as the Inspector General of Police of the 
Lower Provinces of Bengal C.J. Stevenson Moore noted in 1906, was essentially 
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confined to a small, educated and influential section of the community. Attempts 
were made to give the movement a mass character which would extend beyond the 
cities to include the rural population, through an appeal to religious sentiments as 
well as an emphasis on the economic benefits which the boycott would produce.97 
For all its intentions to transform into a mass movement, however, the Swadeshi 
agitation was decidedly limited in its impact, never extending beyond a discontented 
Hindu middle class in select areas.98 The poorer classes, it was noted, continued to 
use and sell foreign goods, dismissing the movement as nothing more than ‘Babu 
Tamasha.’99   
The failure of the movement to expand into a mass agitation against the 
partition was attributed by Inspector General Stevenson Moore to the hidden political 
agenda underlying the movement. The movement, concluded Stevenson Moore, was 
ultimately a political weapon, any promise of economic or social reform serving as a 
smokescreen to the real agenda of the agitators. It was this ulterior motive which 
would cause the colonial government concern. Indeed, the Swadeshi movement did 
produce far-reaching political developments by providing a public platform for more 
extreme versions of nationalism. The partition had created a divide between the 
moderates and extremists within the Indian National Congress, which ultimately 
resulted in a split in December 1907. The Congress aimed for a system of 
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government which was similar to that adopted by other self-governing members of 
the empire and went on to support the method of boycott as promoted by the 
Swadeshi movement. The revolutionaries, on the other hand, placed more emphasis 
upon more extreme acts including terrorism, political assassination and dacoity to 
finance the cause. These methods were no sporadic attempts to attack the authorities 
but were the product of a vast, well-organised system which had been developing 
since the turn of the century – the objective being to end British rule in India.100 
International events, such as the victory of Japan over Russia also spurred on 
revolutionary activity, serving as evidence that Western rule was not invincible 
whilst the war led to the revolutionary network extending as far as America and 
Germany.   
Alongside the intense seditious activity,101 as well as there being no fewer 
than eleven political dacoities in 1911, the colonial government would also 
experience a rise in crimes unrelated to revolutionary activity. In the new province of 
Eastern Bengal and Assam the number of riot cases had increased from 425 to 2096 
between 1905 and 1907 whilst in 1909, Inspector General Knyvett reported his 
department lacked the necessary manpower to handle ordinary and everyday crime 
which had soared during that year. 
The troubled political environment ensured that the police played an 
increasingly repressive role in handling the agitation and a series of repressive 
measures were introduced. Ordinance No. 1 of 1907 regulated public meetings by 
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stating that ‘a notice had to be given to the police if a meeting was to be held and the 
police were to attend in large forces and take notes of the proceeding.’102  In 1908, 
three significant acts were passed – the Explosives Substances Act (VI of 1908), 
dealing with terrorist crimes, the Newspapers (Incitement to Offences) Act (VII of 
1908) and the Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act (XIV of 1908), which provided 
for the ‘more speedy trial of anarchical offences.’103 Circulars were produced, 
instructing universities and colleges to prevent students from engaging in any form 
of political protest, with teachers and heads to act as ‘special constables’.104  
The Amrita Bazar Patrika, raised fears about the ‘secret doings of the police’, 
referring to the sudden visit by the district superintendent to the home of a well-
known pleader. ‘If a respected pleader could be interrogated at 1am’, as was argued 
in the paper, ‘then what can the common man expect?!’105 Thus, the movement 
ensured that grievances were publicly aired, resulting in ‘peaceful pickets being 
beaten and sent to jail, meetings being broken up by lathi charges by the police and 
popular outbreaks and riots, particularly in the Hooghly and Muzzafarpur districts, 
suppressed with extreme severity.’106  
The repressive role of the police was further aided by key legislation. 
Regulation III of 1818 allowed the deportation of criminals whilst the Defence of 
India Act of 1915 gave ‘wide powers of censorship, search and arrest to the police 
and empowered the tribunals, which tried the cases to pass sentences of special 
detention...by 1917 most of the main leaders were under detention and main 
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conspiracies under control.’107 For members of the legislative council, who opposed 
legislation increasing the powers of the police, the provisions made the police, who 
were the ‘eye and ear of the government, absolute masters of the people...the people 
will be handed over to the tender mercies of a body of public servants who are not 
the most efficient or immaculate.’108 
The police may have had a significant part to play in suppressing agitation 
but the circumstances in which they were forced to operate suggest that police 
control over the people was not absolute. They faced a number of obstacles which 
made them vulnerable to attack both from the agitators and the government that they 
were to serve. One problem was the lack of police numbers. Alongside the defective 
telegraphic communication which ensured difficulties and delays in tracking the 
movements of suspects, there was the problem of police manpower required to 
contain political as well as ordinary crime. C.J. Stevenson Moore in his report for the 
year 1905 stated that additional police had to be appointed in a number of cases. The 
strength of the armed police was increased and kept up to its full strength and in an 
efficient state so that men could be moved immediately if required. Inspector General 
Knyvett in 1909 reported that political crime had increased to such an extent that the 
services of the military police companies at Hooghly, Ranchi and Bhagalpur had 
been utilised on twelve occasions, to the equivalent of half a company for four 
months, chiefly in the districts around Calcutta and in connection with political 
trouble.109 In 1912, it was reported that the authorities were prepared to grant wealthy 
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merchants a licence which would permit them to employ their own sepoys in an 
attempt to prevent dacoity.110 
The shortage of police staff required to maintain order was made more acute 
by the attacks on members of the police force. The police, as the most visible 
representatives of foreign rule, were the agency subjected to violent attack by the 
political agitators. Targeting the agencies of law and order was considered an integral 
part of the plan to disable the colonial administration. Thus, by 1906, the 
manufacturing of explosives and the use of bombs and firearms was underway, 
leading to a series of high-profile political murders such as that of Sir William 
Curzon Wyllie, Political Assistant Deputy Commissioner at the India office in July 
1909 and the attempted assassinations of District Judge Mr Kingsford in 1908, Sir 
Andrew Fraser, the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal in 1907 and even the viceroy of 
India in 1910.111 Such instances strained the relationship between police, both regular 
and detective, and the public. Whilst students of the swadeshi movement hurled 
abuse and even attacked the police, the terrorist movement also pursued a campaign 
of terror against the police. It led to the often brutal murders of influential policemen 
as well as a number of magistrates trying important cases. Others were seriously 
wounded. Even Charles Augustus Tegart, one of the most influential officers who 
served in the Intelligence Branch, was a major target of the movement and there were 
a number of failed attempts on his life.112 Between 1907 and 1917, twenty police 
officers, most of them Indian, were assassinated. The Defence of India Act, 
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introduced in 1915, was sparingly applied and did not eliminate the reservations 
which existed amongst official circles about the suspension of ordinary law. These 
reservations were put aside in June 1916 with the murder of Deputy Superintendent 
Basanta Kumar Chatterji, a key figure in the response to the revolutionary campaign. 
It was with his death that the authorities were convinced that extraordinary measures 
were necessary to stop the revolutionary movement from realising one of their key 
aims, which was the demoralisation of the police. To demoralise the police was to 
disable completely the colonial administration. To prevent this, it was clear, argued 
Sidney Rowlatt in his report, that the police had to be provided with measures that 
allowed them to bypass ordinary regulations and ‘get inside the movement’ to 
maintain a level of control. 
The murder of Deputy Superintendent Chatterji was also significant because 
it demonstrated that revolutionary crime could not be contained through ordinary 
channels of law and order. Ordinary channels required overwhelming evidence to 
convict. Even during less threatening times, when faced with ‘ordinary’ crime, this 
evidence was difficult to acquire and the authorities tolerated the inadequacies of the 
system. The ways in which the native community could adapt the legal system to 
their own requirements could be dismissed through racial stereotypes. But when 
faced with revolutionary crime, the aim of which was to end British rule in India, 
conviction became a necessity. Yet that was difficult to obtain through ordinary 
channels, which suspects could evade so easily. Because confessions were not 
admissible as evidence if made in the presence of the police, many suspects openly 
admitted their complicity in the crime to the police. Facts, as Sidney Rowlatt pointed 
out, were known by the police because they could not be proved, as was the case 
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with suspects questioned over the Bhowanipore Murders.113 This was also 
acknowledged by Charles Augustus Tegart. He had noted that in spite of the ‘secret 
service system’ of approvers and spies which he had established and through which 
he had discovered major terrorist plots, prosecution was fraught with difficulties. 114 
Statements made to his officers were never accepted as evidence nor did witnesses 
come forward to testify. Information was difficult to obtain, due to the disconnected 
and complex organisation of revolutionary groups.115 It was also impossible to use as 
evidence if not made in the presence of a magistrate. Furthermore, the methods 
employed by the police in trying to extract information under ordinary procedure 
were also placed under intense scrutiny. One conspiracy case in 1908, in which a 
suspect was kept in police custody for seven days before making a confession to the 
deputy magistrate, was cited as an example of gross police torture. Of those suspects 
facing trial, acquittal was often the product of lengthy proceedings spanning months 
as well as a detailed cross-examination of ‘every minute point, however unimportant, 
to a degree unknown in England’.116 Attempts to contain revolutionary crime through 
the ordinary system of justice, thus, proved futile. Between 1907 and 1917, the 
revolutionary party in Bengal was responsible for 210 outrages and 101 attempts to 
commit such outrages. The police had definite information of the complicity of no 
fewer than 1038 persons in these offences, but they had only been able to obtain 
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convictions against eighty-four of them for specific offences, against sixty-three on 
charges of conspiracy and against fifty-eight in connection with the illegal possession 
of arms and explosives. 
  One of the key concerns about political crime was the attempt to disable the 
colonial administration and political assassination was cited as an effort to 
demoralise the police. But the lack of success in gaining a conviction demonstrates 
that the colonial authorities also had a part to play in what Sir Henry Wheeler called, 
the ‘lack of wholeheartedness’ of the police. The police may have been at the 
forefront of repressing the revolutionary movement yet the government they were 
trying to protect continued to question and attack the force. Tegart himself was 
dismayed at the ‘unmerited’ attacks on the police, citing the Mussalmanpara Lane 
case of 1914 as an example of the police being unfairly discredited. A failed bomb 
throwing attempt was made by Nagen Sen Gupta, although no one witnessed him 
committing this act and he claimed to be a passer-by. Once taken into custody, he 
stated before the High Court judges that the ‘bomb had been planted by the 
police…he was unanimously acquitted and one judge made caustic comments about 
the police present at the time.’117 Eleven years later, in 1925, Gupta admitted his part 
in the case. But despite calls to the Legislative Council to ‘clear the police of a 
longstanding charge against them’ members of the Council remained ‘unmoved as 
they had known this all along...they regarded false accusations as a fair means of 
attack and would continue to use them.’118 In the period following the assassination 
of Deputy Superintendent Shamsul Alam, it had been argued by suspects during their 
trial that it was Alam himself who had manufactured evidence himself during the 
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Howrah-Sibpur political dacoity case of 1910,  and as a result was ‘justly removed.’ 
This line of argument was accepted by the chief justice, who in his judgement 
pointed to the role of Alam of tutoring the particular approver before sending him to 
the magistrate to make his statement. Out of the forty-six men sent up to court in the 
case, only six would be convicted. 
Lack of support and faith from their superiors added to the psychological 
strain of working in an environment in which they faced not only physical attack but 
also social boycott from their own communities. The Officiating Commissioner of 
Dacca in his correspondence with the Chief Secretary to the Government of Eastern 
Bengal and Assam discussed in depth the problem of containing agitation in a new 
province in which lack of resources, particularly the shortage of police, was a 
growing concern. In response to criticism of the police in the handling of various 
rioting cases, the Officiating Commisioner argued that the conditions within which 
the police worked caused ‘injury to the health and nerves of the police and district 
officers.’119 In 1912, the Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal 
stated that forty seven percent of men of the armed reserve were admitted to hospital 
as opposed to forty percent the previous year. Staff shortages and the subsequent 
mental stress this caused were cited as the reasons behind the removal of the District 
Magistrate of Mymensingh from his post. The District Magistrate of Backergunge 
similarly experienced ‘a constant stretch of the faculties’ and threatened to resign if 
he was not provided with additional police. Alongside the abuse in the press as well 
as the false accusations of torture, Hindu officers, who belonged to the same classes 
as the agitators, faced social boycott which was often difficult for them to withstand. 
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In certain cases, the Commissioner of Dacca argued, it was difficult for some officers 
to marry off their daughters.  
 The purpose of revolutionary crime was to end British rule. The response to it 
demonstrated that once again legal procedure had to be adapted.  In times of peace, 
the police, or the community it was to protect, failed to act in accordance with the 
law and the government responded to it by tolerating the way in which police really 
operated in the native context. Revolutionary crime, in line with previous forms of 
protest threatening colonial rule, required a more direct response. Bypassing legal 
procedure through special laws was key to preserving order. These laws may have 
provided the police with power to openly coerce and suppress agitators but they were 
far from the masters of the people. Instead, they occupied a rather thankless role of 
protecting a government who would provide it with special powers but would fail to 
fully trust or support the police, particularly in the matter of conviction. Trying to 
meet the objectives of the state placed them in direct opposition to the expectations 
of the native community which resented the presence of additional police in 
troublesome areas. Physical attack, social boycott and potentially fatal encounters 
with members of the revolutionary organisation which aimed to paralyse the police 
force followed the repressive measures introduced by the colonial state. Thus, 
repressive measures may have placed the police at the forefront of the state response 
to revolutionary crime but far from being absolute masters of the people, they were 
often isolated figures caught between the public and the state, neither of which fully 






    If he does his duty, as laid in the Police Code he 
    cannot get to the truth of the case and fails as a 
    detective; if he lays himself out to detect the case;  
    he must run the risks and deviate from procedure
120
 
This was the response of A.D. Knyvett, the Inspector General of Police for the Lower 
Provinces of Bengal, to an official who emphasised the corrupt and oppressive nature 
of the police in the Indian Police Commission Report of 1902. The argument put 
forward by Knyvett is revealing in that it emphasises the unsuitability of the ordinary 
procedures of law within the native environment. This was an environment in which 
those involved in land disputes and family quarrels, issues of a personal nature, were 
very reluctant to invoke the official machinery of the state. Information was key to 
the solving of any case and this often required the application of more informal 
methods to gain access to a local community which, as many officials noted, often 
already knew who the culprit was. John Beames in his report expressed dismay that 
common talk and gossip, which provided good evidence pointing to the guilty party, 
were difficult to establish as legal evidence in the courts established in India by the 
British. 
 The policeman was himself serving as officer and judge which undermined 
the court, yet the nature of colonial rule meant that the ordinary procedures of law 
always required a level of adjustment at the local level. Financial exigencies, lack of 
police manpower as well as a lack of official contact with the interior, always 
determined how the police operated in practice. Indeed, the practicalities of empire 
always demanded the need for compromise between the two systems. In 1905, a 
dispute between an uncle and nephew over land was not settled by the regular police. 
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Instead, it was deemed that peace could only be preserved by conferring the status of 
special police officers upon the leaders of the two feuding parties.121 Charles 
Elphinstone Gouldsbury would also describe the ‘arbitrary interpretation of the law’ 
when settling disturbances in the district of Fureedpore. Leaders of each party were 
appointed as special constables and the nature of their dispute was then examined 
and referred to court, whereupon the case would be decided to the mutual satisfaction 
of both parties.122 
The methods employed by the police of course could involve physical 
coercion but the popular image of the policeman as oppressive and corrupt, targeting 
innocent individuals was only one aspect of the tale. This chapter has tried to 
highlight those individual instances and scenarios where the actions of the police 
undermined the stereotype with which they were associated. In reality, the local 
police had to defy official procedure in order to meet the conditions of the locality. 
This did not necessarily mean that they were rebelling against the official system. 
Rather, they had to maintain a balance between meeting the needs of both state and 
the locality. Only by defying procedure and acting outside the network of control, 
could they gain access to any information. By operating in this way, the local 
policeman avoided alienating the locality whilst providing the statistics for the crime 
registers which were so valued by the colonial government. That these statistics were 
often questionable was of course a concern for the government keenly aware of how 
fragile the network of information was in the colony. But the availability of this 
information, at the very least, made colonial rule visible to the local population. 
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The popular stereotype of the policeman concealed the many needs of the 
local community which he had to take into account. In one native memoir, Lal 
Behari Day recalled a case in which a constable, in agreement with members of the 
village, did not make an official report upon the discovery of a drowned body 
because ‘according to Hindu custom, cremation would have to take place 
immediately...official procedure and the time, delay and distance to the Station it 
would entail would simply not allow this.’123  The existence of practices which were 
at odds with the system of justice set in place by the British always elicited a 
somewhat uneasy response from the colonial rulers.  
The ordinary system of law was unsuited to the native environment and led to 
a state of affairs in which the government often silently tolerated the irregular 
workings of the police. Issues of pay were a recurring problem which the 
government was never able to solve. It was cheaper meanwhile for the government to 
tolerate the bribery, often resorted to by the police in order to supplement their poor 
wages. To successfully tackle the problems of pay and corruption required financial 
resources, which the state lacked, and a more rigorous application of official 
procedure aimed at improving the moral behaviour of the people was not as pressing 
as the need to preserve order.124 However, the colonial government could never 
publicly admit that they tolerated these informal practices.  
                                                          
123
 Lal Behary Day, Govinda Samanta Or The History of a Bengal Raiyat (London: Macmillan & Co., 
1874), p. 162 
124
 Constable Training Schools were established in 1905 in Nathnagar and Purulia, where they were 
taught ‘drill, gymnastics, rifle exercise, guard and sentry duties, physical drill, bayonet exercise and 
riot drill and were taught to be clean, to put on their uniform neatly and how to conduct themselves in 
front of a superior officer’. This clearly illustrated that rather than engage in ordinary police duties, 
suppress ordinary crime and protect public safety, the police were being further militarised and were 
used to suppress the public and preserve order. Report on the Police Administration of the Lower 
Provinces of Bengal for the Year 1905, p. 12 
172 
 
 The proposal to modify the Indian Penal Code as a means to restrict further 
the opportunities for improper conduct may have been rejected but its existence 
demonstrates a clear distrust of the police force. The Viceroy Charles Hardinge, in 
his correspondence with Under Secretary Edwin Montagu may have tried to 
downplay the severity of the methods employed by officers in extracting confessions 
but the occurrence of such cases were a source of anxiety for the colonial authorities 
as they concerned official agents of the colonial government – the police – operating 
in ways outside the formal, legal structure introduced by the state. Furthermore, the 
views of both the viceroy and under secretary suggest a resignation to the ways in 
which the police chose to operate, particularly since contact with the population 
would always be limited.125  
The police, the visible representatives of colonial rule, was part of the official 
system and every effort had to be made to give the impression that problems 
regarding pay, corruption, and the deviation of the police from official procedures 
were being tackled. Thus, various reports over the years, from the Beames 
Committee of 1891 to the Indian Police Commission of 1902, were all produced with 
these objectives in mind. None of the reports went on to produce any favourable 
results. To apply justice strictly in accordance with official codes and procedures 
only served to highlight the clash between local practices and the Western system of 
law and order. It also stretched the resources of an empire, for which questions of 
finance and manpower always ultimately determined how a colony was governed. It 
was easier to allow the system to be compromised and adapted to the local 
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environment, allowing local agencies to respond to the system in ways which ranged 
from outright rejection to the manipulation of key agencies in order to meet with 
personal agendas. Thus, the ordinary machinery of law and order was always subject 
to the requirements of the local environment, even if in the public eye the 
government constantly emphasised the efforts being made to improve the police 
force. 
 The colonial authorities needed to overlook the machinery of law and order 
particularly when faced with agitations which threatened British rule in India. In 
times of peace, the authorities could turn a blind eye to the workings of the police in 
handling crime and criminals.  In the politically tumultuous period following the 
Swadeshi movement, there was again the recognition that ordinary legal procedures 
were unsuited to the broader objectives of the state. Revolutionary crime indeed 
illustrated that ordinary procedures could place British rule at risk due to the 
protection it afforded suspects and the difficulties it posed for the police in 
successfully convicting suspects and suppressing the movement. The vulnerability of 
the police was a feature which persisted until the end of British rule.126 It was a 
vulnerability which resulted in the Defence of India Act in 1915 by which ordinary 
policing procedures were suspended.  
That the ordinary machinery of law and order was unsuited to the politically 
charged environment of the inter-war years was most publicly demonstrated in 1918. 
That year, the report of Sidney Rowlatt proposed that special laws be permanently 
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invoked to suspend habeas corpus and other core legal procedures.127 In England, the 
Rowlatt Act was shrouded in secrecy and in India it was repealed in 1922 following 
public protests, most notably the catastrophic Jallianwalla Bagh massacre of 1919 
and Mahatma Gandhi’s non-cooperation movement of 1920-22. The politically 
fragile situation led to the introduction of the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act, 
despite the bill having being rejected by a majority of nine votes in the provincial 
legislative assembly. This again demonstrated how the ordinary machinery of law 
and order, and the functioning of the police within this structure, was always 
adapted, or even ignored, depending on the circumstances of the moment and the 
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Chapter Five: Justice in the British Court 
 
Laxmi:   Justice, O Lord of generosity! Justice, O Nourisher  
                of the poor! I am dead altogether! I am a widow. 
               Ram Singh came to my house – 
  Clerk (unmoved):Stand up and take the oath 
  Laxmi:  What? 
  Clerk:   Say what I say – according to my religion, in the 
                presence of the Almighty, whatever I shall say  
                in this case will be the truth and nothing but the 
                truth  
  Laxmi:  In the presence of the Almighty (breaks away) 
                Justice, O Lord! I don’t understand. I am a widow. 
                Ram Singh came to my shop and –- 
  Clerk (angry): Take the oath! 
  Laxmi (subdued):Justice, O Lord… 
  Clerk   (repeats oath several times) 
  Laxmi:   In accordance with…(breaks away again) Of course 
                 I shall tell the truth! Have I come here to tell lies?! 
                Justice oh my Lord, my mabap (mother-father)! 
Ram Singh came to – 
  Clerk:   Listen you Laxmi, if you will not take the oath, the 




After several more failed attempts, Laxmi Telinee was able to recite the oath and 
have her case heard. By doing so, she has satisfied magistrate George Graham that 
she publicly acknowledges the British court as the legitimate arena which will 
provide the justice that she demands with such great volubility. The ceremony and 
procedure surrounding this arena is an integral part of the process, as it is not enough 
for Graham to be referred to as the giver of justice. What he, and the body he 
represents, wants is official confirmation of this and for it to be visible. Once this is 
received, Graham can move on to the next, and most important, stage of finding out 
the truth and resolving the dispute. The eventual outcome, however, only serves to 
highlight the sharp contrast between visibility and practice. A few days later, just 
moments before the magistrate writes his judgement on the case, an excited Laxmi 
bursts into the courtroom once again, this time with the accused, and cries out for a 
compromise. This, Graham is only too happy to grant because, as he recalls in his 
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memoir, ‘he simply did not know the truth’ despite the lengthy cross-examination 
and countless witnesses brought forward by both sides. Subsequent experiences, he 
continues, suggested to him that the accusation of assault was probably false, the 
theatrical behaviour of Laxmi and the eventual decision of the parties to settle the 
matter privately, only serving to strengthen his suspicions. 2  
 The purpose of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, it aims to examine why, and 
exactly when, the local population made use of the colonial court and adapted the 
resources of the court to suit their own requirements. How the constraints and 
limitations of colonial rule created an environment which made it legally possible for 
complainants to adapt the court according to need is also considered. Adapting 
features of the legal system to meet the needs of different groups, as well as the 
demands of a colony, were not without controversy. The second aim, then, of this 
chapter is to examine the trial by jury system in India and the tensions and dilemmas 
of colonial rule which it would bring into sharper focus as a result of its introduction. 
 As the instrument responsible for providing the laws and rules of the colonial 
state, the British court was a vital legitimising tool of the colonial government in 
India. This was the site where the benefits of codification would be most visible, 
with many officials stressing that the legal codes introduced following the 
assumption of Crown control were the greatest achievement of the British 
administration in India.3 Their stress upon the beneficial effects of the legal codes 
was also, however, followed by their acknowledgement that applying the codes to a 
rural environment was a much more problematic affair. That the court was far from a 
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3
 See, for example, Joseph Chailley Administrative Problems of British India (London: Macmillan and 
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great boon to the people is reflected in the statistics provided by the administration 
reports, which suggest that given the size of the population of the province, the court 
was in fact rarely resorted to.4 Time, cost, distance and delay were the practical 
factors that lay behind the decision to stay away from this legal institution. And when 
it was used, problems of false evidence, false witness, the image of the ‘litigious 
Indian’ and the high number of acquittals as opposed to convictions in criminal 
cases, plagued the authorities over the course of the colonial period.5 The real 
culprits, it was found, managed to escape punishment through the various loopholes 
provided by the same legal codes which could be used to trap innocent members of 
the rural community. In other words, there was an uneasy recognition amongst the 
colonial authorities, that rather than providing justice, the court was instead 
responsible for much injustice.  
The legal institutions of colonial India, and the weaknesses inherent within 
them, have been the subject of much scholarly attention. Radhika Singha has 
examined the clash between two different visions of sovereign right and authority 
and the subsequent ‘piecemeal’ way in which the British would try to place ‘the rule 
of law in a dominant position amongst the symbols of authority’ in the early colonial 
period.6 In a similar vein, Kartik Kalyan Raman has concluded that the utilitarian 
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178 
 
ideals were adapted to meet the practical demands of the Indian colony, whilst Jon 
Stewart has argued that codification, much lauded as the greatest gift to India by the 
colonial authorities, was in reality the product of anxiety and uncertainty.7  Elizabeth 
Kolsky has put forward the argument that the legal codes of the colonial state were 
based upon racial divisions and inequalities, thus ensuring that justice would be a 
very one-sided affair, whilst David Washbrook has examined the ‘Janus-faced’ 
nature of the colonial legal system and the implications that the contradictory 
implications would have for the economic, social and political development of the 
colony.8  
The placement, therefore, of law and justice within a broader context 
provides a valuable insight into how the contradictions of colonial rule could shape 
the response to law, order and justice in the colony. Yet, perhaps more emphasis can 
be placed on the workings of the court of law at the local level and the ways in which 
various groups could undermine imperial agendas and assert themselves in the 
process. These groups would include not only indigenous groups but also officials 
working within the system. In particular, the memorials of dismissed officials offer a 
glimpse into how official procedure had to be set aside by individual magistrates in 
order to maintain the moral economy of the rural environment. This would prove 
necessary due to the differences in British and Indian perceptions of justice, which 
subsequently would be responsible for the ways in which the resources of the court 
were manipulated and adapted according to local need. The ways in which the local 
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population could employ the court to their own advantage and how local officials 
could assist in this process will be further explored in this chapter. The memorials 
also expose the difficult relationship which existed between the upper and lower 
levels of the administration which would further undermine the visibility of British 
power in the interior districts. The peculiarities of the legal structure, such as the 
system of appeals as well as the placing of judicial-executive functions in the hands 
of one official, heightened further the tensions which existed within the colonial 
network itself. How these tensions played out in local courts, and the impact they 
would have on the giving of justice, will also be examined in this chapter. 
 The other main intention of this chapter is to examine the system of trial by 
jury in India. It is important to examine this system due to two reasons. Firstly, its 
significance in colonial India has been little discussed by scholars, often serving as 
the backdrop to more significant events rather than being the central point of any 
scholarly investigation.9 Secondly, the jury system, as this chapter will try to 
demonstrate, highlighted exactly what was and what was not acceptable amongst 
official circles. Quiet tolerance of local customs was one thing but to allow an Indian 
juror to sit within the British court, the very marker of colonial rule, and deliver 
justice his way was quite another. At the same time the legal safeguards with which 
jury trial would provide the European community posed the difficulty of explaining 
why this ‘bulwark of liberty’ was suitable for one group, but not the other. The 
difficulties and dilemmas that the colonial government faced in dealing with a 
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system that was the subject of debate and criticism both in India and Britain, will 
thus be explored. By doing so, this chapter will be able to emphasise the fact that the 
giving and receiving of impartial justice in court was very much influenced by the 
conflicting and often contradictory needs and demands of both state and local 
society. 
 
5.1 Justice, the Rural Community and the Colonial State 
The problem of giving and receiving justice through the institutions of the state is an 
issue that has received scholarly attention across various disciplines. At the heart of 
any given definition of justice lies the idea of fairness, conformity to the standards of 
a community as well as the adherence to some form of law. Social psychologist 
Morton Deutsch, who places the idea of injustice at the heart of any given conflict, 
has examined the theories and models of justice that can alleviate conflict. Central to 
his view on conflict resolution is the idea of a ‘shared moral community’ that 
engages in the process of negotiation and reconciliation.10  Michel Foucault, on the 
other hand, has stated that justice is an idea invented by different types of societies as 
an instrument of a certain political and economic power or as a weapon against that 
power – an argument that has been critiqued as widely as the hypothesis of political 
theorist John Rawls.11 The argument of Rawls, which can be considered to be the 
exact opposite of that of Foucault, centres on the idea of providing justice through 
what he has labelled ‘the veil of ignorance’. In other words, the veil is one that 
‘blinds people to all facts about themselves which may cloud their judgement...only 
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 Morton Deutsch, "Justice and Conflict." In Morton Deutsch and Peter T. Coleman, (eds), The 
Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice (San Francisco: Jossey-Bas Publishers, 2000), 
pp. 41-64 
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 See Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, 2
nd
 edition, (New York: 
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through ignorance of these details can principles of justice that are fair to all be 
formed.’12 Thus, whilst Foucault has deconstructed the term justice and has 
concluded that it is an idea that is closely linked to wider power structures, Rawls has 
offered an idealist hypothesis whereby the principles of justice can be decided upon 
through a  complete separation from the moral values and beliefs that bind together a 
community. 
 A theory which ignores moral values and aspirations in favour of impartiality, 
however, is much weakened when one considers the broader problems associated 
with justice and the institutions that are designed to provide it. Michelle Maiese has 
pointed out that whilst in a broader sense justice can be defined as action in 
accordance with the requirements of some law, in a narrower sense it can be defined 
as fairness which is more ‘context bound...parties concerned with fairness typically 
strive to work out something comfortable...they work to ensure that disputants 
receive their fair share of benefits and burdens and adapt to a system of fair play.’13 
This context-bound justice can however come into direct conflict with the legal 
systems of the state. John Darley has expressed the view that citizens can feel 
alienated from authority when there is a clash in the principles that people and legal 
codes use to assign responsibility. This may ultimately weaken the ability of the legal 
system to act as an institution which represents the moral values of the society.14 The 
issue for a legal institution such as the court, he has continued, is to reduce any 
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feelings of injustice and failure to do so can result in the court deepening, rather than 
resolving, the dispute.  
 Legal systems, then, are not entities within themselves and must reflect the 
beliefs and values of the society that they represent.15 When this consensus is absent, 
citizens can withdraw support for what they now consider unjust institutions and 
possibly rebel and create new institutions.16 The problem is compounded when 
people from different cultures and holding different views on justice, come into 
conflict and there is difficulty in reconciling their different perceptions of justice. 
Donna Artz, in her study of international criminal courts in war-torn regions and how 
they are perceived by the local population, has pointed to the difficulties that such 
tribunals experience in trying to get the local populace to understand the benefits of 
international institutions. Furthermore, she has argued that just because an 
‘institution is international does not mean that the local population think it is better or 
that it has enhanced moral authority to punish wrongdoing.’
17
 Whether justice is 
done, she continues, is also dependent upon more than a foreign court simply giving 
out what it considers to be fair justice. Whilst the legal institutions of the state have 
rigid guidelines about crime committed and its subsequent punishment, the views of 
the local populace regarding any wrongdoing extend beyond any simple theories of 
crime and punishment.18 Louise Anderson, in her examination of Australian courts 
and their relationship with the Aborigine population, has similarly concluded that 
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justice transcends the complex and often rigid technicalities of state law. Rather, 
justice is flexible enough to ‘recognise and respect difference.’19 
The association of the court with the giving of justice, and the analysis of 
whether it actually succeeds in doing so, is thus a main theme of various scholars. A 
further line of enquiry has resulted in some scholars going as far as to question the 
importance of ‘gaining justice’ to disputants who take their grievances to court. 
Indeed, the views of Michel Foucault on justice, whereby he has placed the term 
within the wider context of class struggle and has concluded that justice is merely an 
instrument of power, are echoed in academic literature on legal institutions. Robert 
Kidder, in his critical analysis of civil dispute settlements in America, has put 
forward the argument that individuals may resort to the court not to gain justice but 
to engage in what he calls a ‘cold blooded struggle over a limited resource...both 
sides claim prior “rights” or the violation of some form of principle of “justice” only 
because that is the appropriate language for those fora, not because it is what the 
partisans feel.’20  
Marc Galanter, in his examination of dispute resolution forums in America, 
has similarly argued that law courts are resorted to by organisations who wish to 
discipline certain individuals. Access to the legal institutions of the state, argues 
Galanter, is very much determined by factors such as wealth. As the law expands and 
becomes more complex, those with the financial means and, significantly, more 
experience with procedures of the Court, can employ such changes to their own 
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personal advantage. What results, Galanter has concluded, is that the law court 
exacerbates the inequalities that it is designed to eradicate.21 
The influence of personal motive and differing perceptions of justice upon the 
working of law courts is particularly marked when placed within a colonial context. 
What highlights the differences even further is the placement of indigenous agents 
within the law courts. This was clearly visible in the manner in which the criminal 
court in colonial Bengal responded to agents required to act as either assessors or 
members of a jury within the court. The system of assessors and jury trial had 
different functions during the course of a criminal trial.22 But they would both 
experience similar obstacles when serving in a colonial court of law. The jury system 
in particular was used in a very small number of cases. An examination of how it was 
operated by local jury members is still, however, useful because it can highlight the 
disparities between two different models of justice. It can also emphasise attempts 
made by Indian agency, in the form of the Indian jury members, to assert themselves 
in a system far removed from their own local forms of decision making as well as the 
ways in which they could adapt the system according to their own understanding of 
punishment and justice.  
It would be useful at this point to consider the differences between the jury 
system of the British court and the indigenous panchayat. Although both Indian 
jurors and assessors were required to operate according to the rules and regulations 
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of the state, yet the beliefs of the jurors themselves resembled those found in native 
agencies such as the panchayat, which was even referred to as the ‘Indian trial by 
Jury’ by some.  Robert Hayden, then, has argued that clashes arise because state 
institutions and indigenous forums require very different types of performance. The 
role of the court is to determine the facts through the hearing of evidence. 
Determination of facts in front of a caste panchayat, however, is not necessary 
because the facts are already known to the people. The aim, Hayden continues, is not 
to attach a categorical label to behaviour once facts are determined but to take 
‘known behaviour and weigh its propriety.’23 In a similar vein, Donald Breinneis in 
his analysis of  the Fiji-Indian ‘pancayat’ as a therapeutic site, has argued that the 
aim of such an agency is not to judge competing accounts but to provide an 
opportunity to mend damaged interpersonal relations.24  Bernard Cohn has stated that 
the panchayat is a ‘sounding board and public arena for venting feelings of 
injustice...the aim is to find a solution which will not sever ties but maintain them.’25 
It was precisely the desire to preserve relations rather than to specifically 
isolate deviant members of the community that placed Indians working within the 
court in a difficult position. To give justice according to the official procedure of the 
court required an examination of different elements of a case and furthermore to 
categorise those different elements according to the Indian Penal Code. Such 
procedure also distinguished between the roles of both judge and jury, with the jury 
deciding questions of fact and the judge those of law. Evidence and circumstance 
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were central in providing justice according to this model with the criminal law 
providing the regulations which would label and categorise deviant behaviour and 
punish accordingly. That such a lengthy and complex process was disliked by those 
having to decide criminal cases is clearly evident in official correspondence. In the 
correspondence relating to problems associated with criminal sessions trials, the 
inspector general of police in 1879 wrote to the Secretary to the Government of 
Bengal stating that the system of assessors was effectively useless with the 
authorities unable to procure suitable candidates.26 Echoing the problems associated 
with the establishment of chawkidari panchayats, discussed in a previous chapter, 
reluctance to participate was due to differing perceptions as well as practical 
concerns of money, time and inconvenience. There was also the potential loss of 
status with the inspector general noting that zamindars did not fully appreciate the 
‘honour of assisting the bench because such an honour involved their sitting with a 
trader who in ordinary circumstances, would only be allowed to stand in their 
presence.’27 Reluctance to serve as assessors was still strong nearly twenty years later 
when the sessions judge of Bhagalpur noted that Marwaris were extremely reluctant 
to express an opinion and would often remark that they ‘only know how to sell 
clothes, not try cases.’28 
The ‘time honoured institution’ known as the jury would fare no better. 
Introduced in 1862 in an attempt to allow Indians to familiarise themselves with a 
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foreign law, the jury system in Bengal highlighted some of the problems of planting 
a foreign institution amongst a people whose views and sensibilities on punishment 
differed from those of the colonial government. As was noted in the previous 
chapter, it was difficult for employees of the state such as the policeman to penetrate 
rural networks using official methods. The only solution was to adapt official 
procedure according to rural practices. Inside the courtroom, the Indian juror 
similarly could not remove public opinion from his decision-making process which 
would be at odds with their official duties when deciding any criminal case. Some 
officials would note the inability of Indian jurors to fully understand the criminal law 
as well as their peculiar reasoning in reaching a verdict.29 Others would take a more 
sympathetic view in which jurors tried to reach what they considered to be ‘just’ 
decisions.30 The Indian members of the jury, it was often remarked, ‘disliked the 
severity of the Indian Penal Code, with the sessions judge of Hooghly noting that 
they considered the colonial penal system ‘unduly harsh and inelastic.’31 In the 
correspondence relating to the controversial decision of the Lieutenant Governor of 
Bengal to further restrict the role of the Indian jury in 1892, to be discussed more 
fully further on in this study, various district officials noted that jurors were reluctant 
to convict in cases of capital punishment, often evading the responsibility by 
acquitting the accused instead and even intervening in cases when they considered 
the penalty too severe a punishment.32  
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How jurors chose to act when serving on the jury, a western innovation 
widely considered as an experiment on Indian soil, proved to be a cause for concern 
amongst official circles. The inspector general of police in 1890 dismissed the jury 
system as a ‘useless exotic’, stating that if native magistrates were fearful of 
convicting a criminal then little could be expected from a native juror. 33 The issue of 
faith was also said to influence the verdict of the jury, with some officials arguing 
that it was difficult to convince jury members to convict a Brahmin accused.34 Whilst 
the district magistrate of Murshidabad upon further enquiry of a murder case found 
that the jury had acquitted the accused because the ‘trial had been held in the month 
of Baisakh, which should be devoted to works of charity and mercy!’35 The inspector 
general of police  also regarded any discussion of the case by the jurors outside the 
court as evidence they had ‘been got at by interested outsiders’, further noting that 
there had been a case in one district in which the verdict had been ‘openly talked 
about for three days before the trial ended.’36  
The discussion of conflict amongst members of the community, then, 
conflicted with what the inspector general regarded as official procedure, with its 
emphasis upon the removal from any external factors which would impede the 
attempts to provide fair and impartial justice. However, as has been noted, if one 
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accepts the view that native agencies show interest in the extended discussion of 
conflict and maintaining relations rather than the complete removal of deviant 
members from the community, then the decision to ‘openly talk for three days’ does 
not seem so out of place within the Indian environment.  
The role of the jury in India may have been declared as essential by some 
because it provided the Indians with a say and responsibility in a colonial 
administration foreign to their habits and customs. However, official emphasis upon 
circumstantial evidence and the inferences of fact in the process of discriminating 
between truth and falsehood only highlighted the differences between the two 
systems, with the methods of the jury often considered unacceptable by the court.37 In 
theory at least, the Indian jury would be referred to as the ‘sole judges of fact’, with 
the judge assisting them in making sense of available evidence and determining 
exactly what the punishment should be according to law.  
 In practice, however, the lines between questions of law and questions of fact 
were often blurred and the clash between judge and jury made itself apparent in a 
number of ways. In the first instance, jurors were often conscious of having to 
deliver any verdict in accordance with the views of the judge, with many altering 
their original verdicts following ‘suggestions’ from the supervising judge, if only to 
bring a speedy conclusion to the case and escape the responsibility of serving on the 
jury.38 
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A desire to avoid serving on the jury was not only due to the odious nature of 
critically examining key evidence but also because it involved jury members in 
judging complex rural relationships according to legal criteria. The Trial of Shama 
Charan Pal was a case involving the murder of a Brahmin by his fellow panchayat 
member and concerned questions of adultery and intrigue. In the end, the original 
verdict of guilty would be overturned in favour of an acquittal, suggesting not that 
the jury were ‘completely convinced of the innocence of the accused’ but that the 
flawed evidence highlighted by the defence provided them with an opportunity to 
avoid giving out a harsher punishment. To have acted strictly according to law would 
have been to ignore the complexity of local relationships, particularly those 
involving indigenous institutions like the panchayat, which required more than a 
simple verdict of guilty or not, to restore order or resolve disputes within a locality.   
Other instances made visible the difficulty of native jurors working within a 
foreign system which demanded a complete monopoly of methods of punishment as 
well as the procedure which preceded punishment. But emphasis upon discovery of 
truth and evidence when the truth was already known to the local community 
undermined the purpose of the jury system as well as control over how the institution 
would work. One juror privately remarked on his decision to acquit five people in a 
murder case that it was better that ‘one man be killed than five others be killed for 
killing him.’39 Others would set aside cumbersome and lengthy procedure. The 
sessions judge of Murshidabad, for instance, recalling a murder case over which he 
presided in 1880, noted that the eventual verdict of the jury, that of guilty, was not 
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the result of an analysis of circumstantial evidence but instead was the result of a 
much simpler process, the jury admitting that they knew the evidence was clearly 
concocted but ‘everyone knew who the men were...so we convicted.’40 
 The importance placed upon the idea of certainty is also reflected in an 
instance provided by the inspector general in 1882 who noted the ‘odd notions’ that 
jurors held about their duties, with one juror ‘justifying his acquittal of one case on 
the grounds that he was not as certain of the prisoner’s guilt than he was of the 
existence of the table standing in the room where he was sitting.’41 Within the native 
context, certainty was a key feature in the process of determining appropriate 
punishment, a feature aided by the fact that culprits were often known to the local 
community.  
The colonial court of law also demanded certainty. But it was a certainty 
which rested solely upon circumstantial evidence, the examination of which would 
be further complicated by complex and lengthy legal procedures. Guilt or innocence 
rested upon whether this evidence met the requirements of various legal codes. The 
inspector general may have branded the decision making process of the jury 
members as ‘odd’ but the fact remains that, circumstantial evidence, which was a key 
feature of the British system of justice, could itself be easily tampered with. And that 
too was made possible by the inconsistencies inherent within the legal procedures. 
The British system of law was one which could also easily allow an accused to 
escape punishment on the basis that there was a lack of evidence.  The fact that the 
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British publicly insisted on adhering to this flawed legal procedure would have 
appeared just as odd to Indian jury members. 
The manner in which the Indian juror chose to respond to the jury system 
within the court demonstrates the attempt to adapt the system according to their own 
sensibilities. In the process, one can observe the ways in which jurors asserted 
themselves within the confines of a foreign system. By realising that the system was 
incompatible with more local forms of decision making, jurors proceeded to work the 
jury system in ways that were more suited to their own, and the locality of which 
they were a part, views about justice. In this way, they could subvert imperial 
agendas by undermining British power within the court. At the same time, however, 
one can also suggest that there was no deliberate intention to undermine this power. 
Jury members, in a sense, did try to follow the procedures of a foreign court. The 
system of jury trial was a form of collaboration in which members of the locality, 
aided by the state, would mete out justice to the people. Collaboration involves, in a 
sense, the ability to mould and re-shape a system so that newer ideas can also be 
accommodated. Members serving on the jury trial did attempt to follow the rules of 
the court. But the application of a rigid system, one which required jury systems to 
provide a final verdict, was unworkable in an environment in which there were  a 
number of alternative interpretations, all considered equally valid and given equal 
levels of importance.  
 It was perhaps in recognition of the differences between foreign and native 
legal views that the colonial authorities ensured that the trial by jury in India was as 
limited an experiment in India as it was foreign.  Introduced in only six of Bengal’s 
forty-two districts in 1862, and those too in what were considered to be advanced and 
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educated districts surrounding the metropolis, the Indian juror would be excluded 
from considering cases involving political crimes. In cases which were triable by a 
jury, the authorities were careful to place stringent checks on the independence of the 
jury.42 Even by the turn of the twentieth century, statistical reports would 
demonstrate that juries tried a very small number of cases leading many officials to 
assert that the jury system had no impact on criminal returns.43  
The attempts by the colonial authorities to severely restrict the system did 
not, however, prevent the local community from employing other resources of the 
court to gain their own type of justice, one that, as noted earlier, involved a 
compromise rather than outright victory. The focus on gaining justice that suited 
their own sensibilities was commented upon by one Punjab official, who noted that 
outside the presidency towns, the ‘laws were badly constructed, awkwardly 
borrowed from Europe and India has no need for them at all.’44  He emphasised the 
conflict between law members ignorant of the conditions of India, and the district 
officers who were aware of the practicalities of colonial rule in India and the 
subsequent need to adapt to the local environment. Thus, the process of Indians 
trying to gain their own kind of justice was aided by the magistrates themselves, 
whose memorials appealing against their dismissal would demonstrate that they had 
to operate in ways that were more in line with the moral economy of the area in 
which they were posted. The following section considers some of the ways in which 
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justice was gained and the ways in which magistrates had to adapt official procedure 
in order to meet the expectations of the local populace. 
 
5.2 Justice in the Mofussil 
Access to justice in colonial India was influenced by factors ranging from difference 
and inequality to the clash between British and Indian perceptions of justice. Indeed, 
it was here that the Western preoccupation with solving disputes met local forms, 
where the emphasis was on fairness rather than outright victory. The impact of the 
clash between two different models of justice has been examined by various scholars. 
Bernard Cohn has emphasised the disparity between Western theories and 
practicalities, adding that although traditional legal systems were made ineffective by 
the colonial legal structure, they were not in fact replaced by them. Instead, local 
groups could employ and adapt the colonial system according to need.45 Similarly, 
Marc Galanter has argued that the system allowed the local ‘underdogs’ an 
opportunity to challenge the decisions of indigenous forums such as the panchayat 
and take their grievance to the court instead.46 Oliver Mendelsohn, in his analysis of 
land disputes in present-day India, has argued that the complex issue of land disputes 
subjected to foreign laws during the British period, is the crucial  factor that explains 
the pathology of the Indian legal system, with courts placed with the responsibility of 
handling a ‘uniquely entrenched class of disputes.’47 In a similar vein, Robert Kidder 
has examined the internal workings of the modern Indian court and argues that courts 
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cannot provide quick, decisive outcomes because the judicial process is influenced 
by the process of negotiation rather than adjudication, ensuring that the court 
resembles not a legal institution but a complex social system.48 
The idea of a complex social system is certainly evident in the types of cases 
that were presented in the court which demonstrate that the relevance of the colonial 
court in the lives of the villagers was really dependent upon the needs of certain 
groups at certain times. Magistrates may have been urged to thoroughly investigate 
the matter and ensure that the ‘cause of such dispute no longer exists’ before striking 
off proceedings in such cases but the manner in which the resources of the court were 
employed made this a difficult task to perform.  According to one report submitted in 
1911, caste panchayats tended to pass cases on to courts where they could not 
enforce their decisions or in cases where it was felt that the aggrieved party would go 
to the official courts and prosecute the panchayat.  Another grievance of court 
officials was the improper use by complainants of both civil and criminal courts. The 
district superintendent of police for the Orissa division noted that, in the first 
instance, it was customary for the people to resort to the criminal courts, which were 
a less costly and equally a less time-consuming alternative to the arduous procedure 
of the civil courts. The consequence of this was the high volume of ‘false cases’ in 
the criminal courts, many of them of a petty nature. That is, what were essentially 
civil disputes were instead presented in front of the criminal courts. Dismissed as the 
proneness of the Indian to exaggerate any dispute, false cases would nonetheless act 
as a major factor in the collapse of cases that made their way to the sessions court.  
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Yet, although magistrates were accused of failing to sift evidence thoroughly, 
at the same time authorities were forced to admit that there was ‘an element of truth 
in every exaggerated claim.’49 Reasons could vary widely as to why civil disputes 
were so altered that they fell within the scope of the criminal court. The emphasis 
upon the control of crime and disorder within the colony, and the subsequent focus 
upon disputes of a criminal nature, meant that criminal cases were responded to more 
quickly by the authorities than those reported to the civil court. The impact of 
colonial policy upon the issue of land settlement in a colony in which property was 
tied to the rights of a collective unit rather than an individual was clearly felt in the 
British court. Many of the disputes in the criminal courts involved disagreements 
over land or rent enhancement, which, as many court officials would note were of a 
civil nature. The ways in which they were presented as criminal cases were 
numerous. During one Muharram festival, for instance, it was reported that what was 
essentially a dispute over rent enhancement between a Hindu landlord and his 
Muslim tenant was falsely claimed to have its origin in a dispute over a matter of 
faith.50 The magistrate of the division of Orissa stated that no mukhtear would omit to 
insert a cognisable section in any petition if he wanted a police investigation that 
preceded appearance in the criminal court.51 
That the two, both civil and criminal disputes, would become inextricably 
entwined was an issue that the British courts had to grapple with over the course of 
the colonial period. For the feuding parties, the colonial authorities would provide a 
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more ‘legitimate’ arena to continue long-running disputes. In the locality, use of 
force and violence could be a key feature of settling conflict. By taking the dispute to 
the court, both parties could combine the resources available to them. The civil order 
gained in the court would allow the ‘battle’ to continue in the legitimate arena of the 
court whilst the feud would continue in a not so peaceful manner back in the locality. 
In some instances, various legal pretexts were resorted to in order to continue the 
dispute in such a fashion.52 In other cases the order of the court would act as a 
justification for violence, at least for the parties concerned. In 1904, in a dispute over 
a plot of land, when an order was passed in favour of one cousin over another to 
‘build fences and plant trees’, an appeal was made by the defeated party to the High 
Court, which set aside the original order. On the strength of this court order, the now 
victorious clique made their way to the disputed site and forcibly ‘destroyed plants 
and tore down trees...their opponents came along with their lathials and further acts 
of violence ensued.’53  
 One of the most widely discussed disputes was that involving the European 
firm Watson and Company and their tenants, from whom they demanded enhanced 
rent. In response to the tenants’ refusal, employees of the firm, whose activities were 
‘shrouded in secrecy due to the silence of the police and the inability of district 
officers to tour the interior districts  employed a number of methods, ranging from 
‘illegally seizing cattle to instituting false cases against the tenants.’54 
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The court did not only, however, act as a disguise allowing the continuation 
of disputes through violence and force back in the locality. Marc Galanter and 
Catherine Meschievitz have suggested that the compromise made between rival 
groups in court, rather than being specious was actually a process of negotiation 
which allowed them ‘to vent their frustrations whilst maintaining their 
relationships.’55 The colonial authorities urged that the cause of dispute be recognised 
and resolved, but, as Galanter and Meschievitz have argued, long-term relationships 
produce all sorts of petty conflicts and quarrels. Single disputes, they have stated, can 
be ‘resolved but the underlying conflict endures.’56  Both parties recognised the rules 
that had to be followed in that particular dispute but these rules could change when 
other disputes arose.  
The search for the underlying cause of the dispute always proved futile as the 
‘dispute’ was reflective of the deeper, underlying conflicts that determined 
relationships within the village. These disputes were not restricted to the local 
community as George Graham demonstrated in his memoir. He recalled the dispute 
between a Hindu and European landholder, the former bringing a serious allegation 
against the latter. The matter was only resolved when they agreed to compromise the 
case and ‘try and settle matters amicably...the European would compromise the three 
small cases that he had against his opponent.’57 Similarly, the family quarrel between 
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Sukdeo and Pryag Naran Singh, a longstanding dispute over rights to a plot of land 
which resulted in two powerful factions and various disturbances of the peace despite 
both parties having gone to the civil court. The trying magistrate noted that disputes 
could only be settled in court ‘with regards to the matter then before me’ whilst 
another magistrate, presiding over yet another quarrel between the two parties, 
concluded that the ‘two parties will no doubt have a good fight locally once this case 
is decided.’58 
What is noticeable about these cases is their handling by the state. For all 
their emphasis upon the resolving of disputes that were produced before the court, 
colonial authorities seem to have provided a controlled environment in which 
disputes could be played out. In the case involving Sukhdeo Pryag and others of a 
similar nature the emphasis was on dealing with cases summarily.59 That is, the 
quartering of additional police forces in sensitive areas whilst placing the expenses 
upon the inhabitants. Indeed, within such reports there is detailed discussion of the 
nature and cause of the dispute, as well as its continuation despite the presence of the 
courts. There was also an implied resignation that the only option was to allow the 
continuation of disputes that could still be contained by the additional police 
provided by the state. Disputes which could not be controlled required a stronger 
response such as the handling of the so-called ‘Munda outbreak’, a cultivating class 
of the Chota Nagpur division, which had risen against intermediate tenure holders for 
over forty years. Having employed both real and false Calcutta pleaders and taking 
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their grievance to the colonial courts, leaders eventually declared that ‘we have 
appealed to the sarkar for redress and got nothing...now there is nothing left us but to 
look to one of our own men.’ What followed was the creation of a religious leader, 
who gathered a movement over certain areas of the region, leading to a panicked 
response from the colonial authorities to try and put down what was labelled as an 
’armed rebellion...led by the ambitions of a man who, under the garb of religion, has 
assumed a purely political role.’60 
The recognition that disputes within the native environment could never be 
successfully resolved is present in various reports. These reports discuss the 
difficulties of dealing with false cases which were presented in court. False cases 
presented the problem of trying to find out the truth from a mass of evidence, which 
was exaggerated but ‘not entirely false’, reflecting the ‘peculiarities’ of a people 
‘prone to exaggeration.’ Indeed, the placing of civil disputes within the criminal 
court was not the only difficulty faced by the authorities. In 1890, for instance, it was 
reported by the magistrate of Dacca that cases of adultery were reported by the police 
as theft in order to avoid the disgrace that the injured party would experience in such 
cases of infidelity. This demonstrates not only the important role of the policeman in 
adjusting the legal network so that it was more in line with rural sensibilities but also 
the crucial role of the local community in deciding the manner in which grievances 
were to be addressed within the legal arena. For the purposes of justice, simply 
appearing in court was equal to a conviction as the accused was put through as much 
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expense, trouble and inconvenience as possible. Thus, in a sense, and particularly in 
sensitive matters such as infidelity, the complainant could receive justice, albeit one 
that conflicted with the ideals of the colonial state, whilst at the same time managing 
to avoid the scandal and shame which such an act would potentially bring if it were 
officially recorded. 
 Not all cases of infidelity, however, were shrouded in secrecy due to 
concerns over honour. The low number of registered marriages amongst Muslim 
communities led to the British court facing ‘endless litigation’ and wronged parties 
failing to receive justice on account of being unable to provide evidence of infidelity. 
With no document to prove a couple were married, it was a ‘prevailing custom’ for 
fathers to get their daughters back after six months of marriage and find another 
suitor on ‘receipt of money.’ For the wronged husband, cries of infidelity would be 
useless in a court dependent on documentary evidence. The only way to receive any 
justice was to put forward a false case of assault, the dispute ending only when the 
‘wrong-doer’ had been inconvenienced and harassed through court and, finally, 
through the receipt of money. Justice in the court through the right channels may not 
have been possible but individuals could use the weaknesses of the system to ensure 
that the Indian could receive his own form of justice and adjust the court to meet his 
own requirements. 
The ability to successfully adapt the court in accordance with the local 
environment was made possible by the adherence of magistrates themselves to 
maintaining the moral economy of the vicinity within which they were posted. By 
adapting colonial procedure to the needs of the locality, officials often undermined 
the visibility of British power and authority in the interior districts, with some 
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officials directly and indirectly challenging the system of criminal administration 
itself. The manner in which colonial procedure was often contested by officials of the 
state, and why, will now be discussed in the following section. 
 
5.3 Imperial Agendas, Local Magistrates and the Law 
The cultural aspects of rural crime within which honour, status and complex familial 
relations were key features, often ensured, as one scholar has noted, that judges were 
placed in the dilemma of having to satisfy two conflicting demands. Whilst the state 
demanded adherence to the law, the local populace, with whom the judge was in 
direct contact with, may have demanded action that was more in line with the 
cultural norms and expectations of the people.61 In a similar vein, Hung-en Sen, in an 
analysis of the transition from authoritarian to more democratic states, has pointed to 
the difficulty of trying to ensure that excessive concerns over efficiency and low 
conviction rates do not undermine the most ‘basic mission of the court, that of doing 
justice.’62  
Within the context of the colonial environment in India, the magistrates in the 
interior districts were faced with similar dilemmas of trying to ‘do justice’ in a 
system, within which they faced considerable pressure from their superior authorities 
to convict. In 1891 the sessions judge of Pabna and Bogra complained that the 
Lieutenant Governor had inspected all the cases which the judge had acquitted. The 
judge emphasised that the examination had taken place in his absence and in a 
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‘purely executive atmosphere’, with only the inspector general of police present. He 
further claimed that he was being unfairly attacked by the Lieutenant Governor and 
that the continuous pressure upon magistrates resulted in them ‘keeping their rubbish 
to themselves.’63  The judge particularly emphasised that contrary to the opinion that 
the police were unfair targets within the criminal justice system, they, with the 
support of the executive authorities, could place undue pressure on the magistrate to 
gain higher levels of conviction. Pressure also led to a falsification of conviction 
rates. The sessions judge of Backergunge noted that the district magistrate of 
Patuakhali had been informed by the commissioner of the division that until he 
reported a higher percentage of conviction, he would not be promoted. The district 
magistrate subsequently raised his percentage from forty to seventy percent. 
Similarly, the excise deputy collector informed the sessions judge that he was aware 
that the majority of excise prosecutions in his local area were ‘pure fabrications but 
that his promotion depended on it...it is the fault of the Government and I must eat.’64 
Following the strict letter of the law would in any case produce ineffective 
results because the provisions of the law where incompatible with the requirements 
of the locality. The memorials of dismissed magistrates offer a valuable insight into 
the reasons behind the decision to adapt official procedure according to local 
methods that were more in keeping with the moral economy of the village. Failure to 
do so placed officials at a disadvantage as Govindji Desai of the Bombay presidency 
found out. His insistence on following the strict letter of the law and weakening the 
alliances formed between subordinate court officials and the corruption that would 
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result from such a union, placed Desai at the centre of various accusations and 
transferrals.65  
Other magistrates were sensitive to the conditions of the local environment 
such as Moulvi Hossein, who was dismissed for the preponderance of lengthy cases 
and low conviction rates within his court. In his defence, he argued that it was not 
possible for cases to be resolved quickly because ‘both parties must be satisfied’, 
arbitration and discussion being key features to any resolution.66 Dwarkanath 
Banarjea was another magistrate who was accused of ‘purposeful procrastination’ 
towards the prompt handling of cases.67 The sessions judge who took control over 
one case remarked that it was an extremely simple case with only one issue of 
contention, which was whether the ‘plaintiff went to the zamindar’s cutcherry of his 
own free will or was forced.’68  
Whilst the sessions judge chose to treat the incident as a single grievance, the 
decision of Banarjea to continuously postpone the case suggests that he was aware 
that he could not isolate one single incident from the broader context. Following the 
argument put forward by Marc Galanter, that long-standing relationships produced 
all sorts of petty quarrels, Banerjea, it can be argued, recognised the court as yet 
another forum in which the purpose was not to resolve the dispute indefinitely but 
simply to allow complainants to vent their frustrations in court. By continuously 
postponing the case in court, Banerjea may have ignored legal procedure but handled 
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the case in a way that was recognisable to the feuding parties, allowing them the 
legal space in which they could both quarrel and negotiate. 
Informality would also be a significant feature in the giving of justice at the 
local level. In 1906, the district magistrate of Backergunge was rumoured to have 
been in the habit of disposing criminal cases in his private room and ‘occasionally in 
his private residence’,  his confidential diaries containing only details of the efforts to 
suppress political crime within his region, thus indicating that certain crimes could be 
handled in a more informal manner.69 
 The case of C. J. O’Donnell, who will be referred to again further on in this 
section, is a particularly telling example of a magistrate who would ‘take an interest 
in the successful working of his sub-district but was not concerned with the details.’70 
In 1881, he was removed from his acting appointment as a Joint Magistrate, deprived 
of the power of trying criminal cases summarily and transferred from Jessore to 
Mymensingh. One of the accusations levelled against O’Donnell was his tendency to 
employ what was known as the kaifiyat procedure. This was a procedure which 
allowed O’Donnell to treat cases summarily, simply allowing both sides to come 
before him and offer their explanations.  Cases of a more serious nature, it was 
claimed, were ‘altered’ so that they no longer fell within a particular section of the 
penal code and could instead be tried summarily by O’Donnell himself.  
To the authorities, this was an indication of ‘laziness and inertia’. To 
O’Donnell the treatment of cases summarily was important in a countryside ‘where 
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nothing is as it seems’, citing the various cases of a civil nature which made their 
way to the criminal court and, crucially, the inability of the colonial courts to 
successfully resolve such disputes.
71
 The kaifiyat procedure, he continued, was 
necessary because it allowed people the opportunity to come before him and state 
their case in simple terms without the hassle of official procedure. Furthermore, a 
noticeable feature within his memorial to the authorities, aside from his disdain for 
the criminal justice system and its ineffectiveness in the interior districts, was his 
insistence that he simply acted in accordance with the views and conditions of the 
people of the locality.  
Surya Kumar Agasti was another dismissed official who offered an insight 
into the dilemmas that were faced by the local magistrate.72 He pointed to the fact 
that he was placed in a situation where he had to contend with the powerful 
zamindari court, without whose permission many tenants could not place any cases 
in the colonial court. Tenants who took their cases to the colonial court without the 
permission of their zamindar could face a heavy fine or a potentially more serious 
punishment. Agasti would cite a case in which a raiyat was carried off by the 
zamindar for ‘lodging a complaint without his permission and has since not been 
found.’73 That the zamindar alleged that the raiyat was hiding to make the case ‘more 
serious’ demonstrated the ways in which individuals could employ the resources of 
the court for their own gain whilst on the other hand indicating that the court would 
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never be able to ‘learn anything definite’ about the real state of affairs amongst the 
local community.74  
The memorial of Agasti is also telling in that it illustrates how litigation 
worked within the local community. In contrast to the image of the ‘litigious Indian’, 
in reality litigation was desirable because it seems to have been regarded as a process 
of negotiation which could provide opportunities for bargaining and mediation, a 
point that had been accepted by certain officials.75 Arbitration was key in the native 
form of justice and whilst petty cases could be quickly and easily resolved amongst 
groups themselves, passing more difficult cases on to the state courts was a way of 
‘buying time’, allowing themselves the opportunity to search for an agreeable 
solution and compromise. Crucially, Agasti pointed out that the high number of 
acquittals in his court were due to feuding parties finally reaching a compromise 
which, from their point of view, resolved the dispute. This was in stark contrast with 
legal procedure which regarded conviction as being a central aspect in any 
resolution. The sub-divisional officer working alongside Agasti tried to bridge the 
gap between the two views by stating that in the native context acquittal was the 
equivalent to a conviction. Thus, the court was treated by the Indian complainants as 
simply another resource within which they could ‘gain their point substantially at any 
rate.’76 That could be by negotiation, bargaining or simply causing their opponent 
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great inconvenience through the time and costs associated with a visit to the colonial 
court. 
The difficulties faced by the magistrate, thus, arose from the fact that he 
simply could not treat local grievances within the legal confines of the court because 
they involved considerations that went beyond adherence to strict law and procedure. 
Observance of official rules, furthermore, was an impossible task for some 
magistrates, who were themselves involved in the scandals and controversies within 
their districts. C. J. O’Donnell himself resided with the estate manager of his district 
which inevitably placed him at the centre of accusations of an ‘illegal alliance’ made 
against him by ryots of the district. Norman Warde-Jones, a district magistrate in 
charge of the Govindapur subdivision found himself in a similar position when he 
attempted to purchase land from the local zamindar of Jharia.77 Subsequent 
disagreements resulted in the ‘Raja’ accusing Warde-Jones of intimidation and 
harassment as well as theft and provided the necessary number of documents and 
witnesses to strengthen the case.  
The charges were eventually dropped leading the authorities to comment on 
the forgiving nature of the zamindar and the local community. By going to court, the 
zamindar, who had faced considerable pressure from Warde-Jones regarding the 
purchase, was making the district magistrate aware that he too could harass and 
threaten until more reasonable requests were made and a compromise reached by 
both sides. Indeed,  the zamindar was in a more favourable position as the colonial 
government did not take kindly to any pecuniary relations between officials and 
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members of the native community, a fact evident in the heavy censure that Warde -
Jones received from a government official for the ‘disgrace’ he had caused. 
The censure which local magistrates received for not following official 
procedure indicates the existence of a strained relationship between the upper 
echelons of the colonial administration and their subordinates in the interior districts. 
Yet, it was not the deviation from official procedure itself which caused concern 
amongst the superior authorities but the fact that the deviation had reached the public 
arena and made the flaws of the official system visible. Indeed, what the memorials 
of dismissed magistrates have in common is that their dismissal was a result of the 
difficult relationship they shared with their immediate superiors.  
The case of C. J. O’Donnell is particularly worthy of note in this respect. Had 
he had a better relationship with his district magistrate, it was noted, his faults would 
have been overlooked. What compounded the tensions which existed between him 
and other authorities was his downright refusal to admit any wrong doing on his part. 
Upon being criticised for residing with his estate manager, for instance, he replied 
that he, like many other magistrates, had no other option. As long as Government 
refused to ‘provide suitable dwellings in this foreign and unhealthy country for its 
civil and military servants’, he argued, the ‘former must make arrangements which 
they would gladly avoid.’78 
What is particularly interesting about the case O’Donnell is that he contested 
a number of agendas. He was dismissive of the cumbersome lengthy procedures in 
place, yet he was not a supporter of the locality of which he was in charge either, 
stating that it was often the landlord, and not the tenant, who was the oppressed. The 
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kaifiyat procedure he argued was a necessity in an environment where the local 
population would employ the courts for all sorts of mischievous purposes. But most 
glaring was his vehement opposition to the administration of which he was a part. 
The most striking example of this opposition came in 1876, when he authored a 
pamphlet by the name of The Black Pamphlet. In that document he accused both the 
viceroy of India and lieutenant governor of Bengal of  
prostituting charity, and of knowingly and wilfully misapplying eight and a half million 
pounds sterling of public money. He accused the Commissioners of winking at this 
misapplication; he accused the other officers of his own service of misrepresenting the real 
facts of the case; and he accused the European indigo planters of having “pocketed the  
loot.”
 79
   
 
In the aftermath of that publication, in which he ‘publicly insulted every class of 
European, official and non-official in Behar’, he was transferred to Eastern Bengal. 
By 1881, he was once again in trouble due to his clashes with superior officials and 
dismissed from his post in Jessore. O’Donnell did not let the matter of his dismissal 
rest easily and, in his customary manner, accused the highest of authorities, the 
lieutenant governor general of Bengal, for jeopardising his career. Furthermore, upon 
hearing that his appeal was to be rejected, he wrote to the secretary of state to India 
‘demanding’ that a copy of the papers regarding the decision, and the exact reason 
for his dismissal, be sent to him. 
  His demand was strongly criticised by the authorities who treated the action 
as further proof of O’Donnell’s insolence and inability to yield to his superiors. One 
official concluded that he was a ‘most inefficient and dangerous member of the 
Bengal Civil Service.’80 It was his deviant behaviour, rather than his deviation from 
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official procedure, that was the real source of anxiety amongst the superior 
authorities. His was the most visible example of an official publicly attacking the 
might of British authority. He criticised not only the mischievous nature of the local 
population but, most importantly, he openly contested imperial agendas of British 
rule itself. It was this challenge from within the colonial network that unsettled the 
authorities. His demand for the papers regarding his dismissal caused further alarm, 
for, if O’Donnell’s demand for the papers was complied with, noted the secretary to 
the Government of Bengal, then what was to stop other subordinate officials from 
making similar demands? 81 
What the memorial of CJ O’Donnell, and the other cases that have been 
discussed in this section, highlight, is the need for British authority to be made 
visible to the people. The impression had to be given that the institutions of the 
colonial state provided impartial justice to all which in turn would legitimise British 
presence in India. The appeals of dismissed subordinates were damaging because 
they publicly undermined the image of superiority of British justice and authority in 
India. They made visible to the Indian, not superiority, but the tensions and 
contradictions which existed within the colonial administration. The disclosure that 
the shortcomings of subordinate officials could be overlooked as long as they did not 
undermine the image of authority was an unwelcome reminder that colonial policy 
itself aided the adjustment of the legal system. Indeed, the adjustment of policy to 
meet the requirements of a colony was a central feature of colonial rule. Lack of 
finance and manpower were some of the reasons behind the reluctance of the British 
authorities to fully incorporate local forms of law and justice within the official legal 
structure. The objective of the colonial state was ultimately to preserve order in the 
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interior districts rather than give any serious consideration to the improvement of the 
ordinary machinery of law.  
Recommendations on how the system could be improved were simply a 
public exercise designed to give the impression to the public that the British ideal 
was still attainable. In reality, key features of the legal system were designed to 
ensure that local forms were disrupted as little as possible. The system of appeal, 
cited as one of the major flaws of the legal system, was preserved on the grounds that 
the concept of ‘finality’ was at odds with the views of a population accustomed to 
various sources of redress. Furthermore, the long-standing debate over whether 
executive and judicial functions should be placed in the hands of one official always 
focused around the issue of improving the ordinary machinery of law or the 
preservation of control. For those supporting a separation of functions, the question 
hinged on the fact that unification maintained the irregularities and loopholes by 
which an accused could escape punishment.  
The argument put forward by those in support of the status quo, on the other 
hand, was that the Indian was attached to the idea of despotic rule and one had to 
maintain a system which was in line with the habits of the people. Most importantly, 
it was argued, preservation of peace and the visibility of British rule were vital to the 
continuation of the empire. Separation would result in a further dispersal of authority 
in an environment in which British impact on local affairs was already so limited. 
Nothing, it was argued, should be done that weakened the position, influence and 
authority of the government. As one official concluded in 1868, the district 
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magistrate ‘need seldom use his judicial powers, but the knowledge that he could, if 
he so chose, would be everything.’82 
 The wider objectives of the colonial state, then, ensured that the legal 
structure was designed in a way that could be adapted to meet the needs of the people 
within the locality, in many cases allowing them to receive justice in their own way. 
Adapting the system allowed the colonial authorities at least to continue to 
‘despotically govern’, be visible to the people, and preserve the moral economy of 
the locality as well as the all-important peace of the district. Allowing justice to be 
gained in ways that differed from official procedure proved to be a necessity because 
the idea of difference between ruler and ruled was the foundation of colonial rule. To 
have tried to introduce democratic features designed to provide impartial justice to 
all would expose more sharply the racial inequality embedded within the legal 
system. Trial by jury was one such feature, which demonstrated why it was more 
conducive for the state to allow the continuation of a separate system for ruler and 
ruled respectively, which will be discussed in the following section. 
 
5.4 The Court, Law and Acceptable Distance 
 It has been truly said that in a country like India, 
 despotically governed, frequent tampering with 





This was the opinion expressed in an English monthly newspaper, the St. James’ 
Gazette, in London. The topic of discussion was a circular issued by the Lieutenant 
Governor of Bengal, Sir Charles Elliot, on 20 October 1892 by which Elliot further 
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restricted the powers of trial by jury in Bengal. The circular had followed two years 
of secret correspondence between the governments of India and Bengal relating to 
the jury system. The view of Elliot, that the system was a complete failure, and his 
circular that followed, caused a storm of protest from both nationalists and British 
officials in the colony and metropole alike. Nationalists would defend the system as a 
‘bulwark of liberty’, a boon and a privilege that was a central feature of any 
democratic legal system.  Officials referred to the system as a ‘useless exotic’ but 
also acknowledged the wider implications that any restrictions had, not least of 
which were the uncomfortable questions that such tampering raised about exactly 
what was acceptable in a colonial court of law, and crucially, for which group. Two 
months later in December 1892 the circular was withdrawn and another commission 
appointed in 1893 to investigate further the role of jury trial in India. As the above 
statement implies, interfering with law in a colony was a necessity but the manner in 
which it was to be done had to maintain a delicate balance between the two sides of 
colonial rule – the practicalities of empire on the one hand and a visibility intended to 
be synonymous with justice and progress on the other. The system of trial by jury in 
India was one problematic feature of the legal system which publicly undermined 
this balance and raised unsettling questions about the presence of native justice in a 
British court. As the author of the article in the St. James’s Gazette would conclude, 
what was required was a ‘more valid excuse than the statistics provided by Elliot...in 
order to justify the policy of tinkering.’84 
Tolerance of local customs and the preservation of the moral economy 
demonstrated that in India the legal system rested on the idea of difference, of the 
need to preserve a different system for the colonised and another for the coloniser. 





The problem with a system such as jury trial was that it brought the contradictions 
and dilemmas of colonial policy into sharper focus. The controversy following the 
circular of 1892 highlighted the uneasy relationship that existed between the judicial 
courts of justice and the executive government. Indeed, the article in the St James’s 
Gazzette had emphasised the need for a better reason to justify the policy of tinkering 
because the statistics used by Elliott were themselves a source of contention. Elliot 
cited the Shambazar riot case, which triggered the two-year enquiry and the 
subsequent circular, as one which demonstrated that the handling of evidence by a 
native jury was at odds with official procedure.  In that particular case, a clash 
between two religious groups over a plot of land, it was argued that the jury had 
passed a verdict of not guilty in spite of the ‘overwhelming evidence’ against the 
accused.85 The problem, the authorities stated, was that it was this reasoning by 
native jurors that was responsible for the low number of convictions and high 
acquittals which plagued the legal courts. Increased official control, therefore, over 
the workings of jury trial was considered a necessity.  
Yet what had also troubled Elliot and the executive authorities in the 
Shambazar case was the failure of Judge Rampini, who presided over that case, to 
pass the matter to the High Court even though he had disagreed with the verdict. The 
failure of magistrates to pass verdicts over to the High Court for revision was cited as 
a main reason why the circular was introduced. But Elliot’s eagerness to restrict jury 
trial had little to do with any faith in the High Court. Instead, the decision to restrict 
jury trial reflected a lack of confidence in the superior courts, which rarely acted in 
accordance with the wishes of the executive government. During the two-year 
enquiry which preceded the circular, the majority of district authorities had not 
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branded it a complete failure, despite pointing to the numerous shortcomings of the 
jury system. Most importantly, they noted that the High Court in the majority of 
cases actually upheld original jury verdicts, in direct opposition to the views of the 
executive authorities. It was in recognition of this fact that Judge Rampini had 
decided against passing his case to the High Court. 
 The commission that was appointed in 1893 to further investigate jury trial, 
whereby the opinions of various judicial authorities were sought regarding the 
working of the courts of justice, further revealed an extremely hostile relationship 
between the judicial and executive sector. Judges of the High Court pointed to the 
illegal nature of the executive government interfering with the judicial independence 
of the courts and the executive demand that the High Court act in accordance with 
the views and needs of the state.  The executive authorities responded to such claims 
by pointing out that judicial courts did not in fact have the same level of 
independence in India as in England, and that wherever the High Court failed to 
interfere, it was the duty of the local government to step in and preserve the peace of 
the district. 
The system of trial by jury, then, highlighted the broader practical problems 
inherent within the legal structure. The colonial authorities were also confronted by 
the dilemma of trying to justify restricting jury trial on an ideological level. Not only 
did it highlight racial distinctions but it raised difficult questions about the 
importance of jury trial in Britain. Tampering with Indian agencies such as the 
panchayat, as discussed elsewhere in this study, produced ineffective results but 
failure could be attributed to the indigenous nature of the panchayat and the 
peculiarities of the ‘native’ character. With the jury system, emphasis was placed on 
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the fact that jury trial was very much a western innovation; a foreign experiment 
considered to be too advanced for the people of the locality, the peculiarities of 
whom would severely limit the effectiveness of jury trial in India. At the same time, 
however, the critical gaze upon the peculiarities of the ‘native’ mind also rested upon 
the jury system in the metropole itself. Long regarded as a fundamental right of the 
British citizen and the backbone of the British legal system, jury trial in Britain was 
not without its critics, who questioned the suitability of allowing an ‘ordinary, little-
educated layman’ to decide matters of law. Furthermore, as one critic pointed out, 
with the development of a highly sophisticated legal system over the course of the 
nineteenth century with a skilled legal workforce, there was no longer the same need 
for the opinion of the selected few.86  
Restricting the jury system in Britain always attracted opposition primarily on 
the grounds that any attempt to limit a system referred to as the ‘palladium of justice’ 
was seen as an attack on the sentiments of the British people. The colonial 
government in India, on the other hand, did not face the same dilemma. Restrictions 
were a key feature of jury trial in India. Indeed, some officials considered the Indian 
jury system in a more favourable light than the system in the metropole.87 The 
differences between the jury system in the metropole and that of the colony were 
often startling. In England, jury verdict was unanimous; in India it was a majority 
vote. In England, the verdict of the jury was final; in India, by a ruling passed in 
1872, the verdict of the jury could be set aside by the presiding judge who could refer 
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the case to the High Court. In England, a jury could be used in both criminal and 
civil cases. In criminal cases, the jury possessed the right to pass a general verdict 
without explanation, whilst in civil cases, they were required to carefully assess the 
evidence before explaining their decision to the judge. In India, a jury could be used 
only in criminal cases but were required to use the civil procedure which was 
adopted in the courts of England. Although the jury system was extended to a select 
few districts in Bengal in the years following the withdrawn circular of 1892, the 
extension was still subject to a number of controls and was carried out in those 
districts where, as one official noted, certain agrarian disputes were few and where 
there were more competent judges, as opposed to jurors.88 
The restricted role of the jury in criminal administration coexisted uneasily 
with its role as a political tool. Trial by jury in Bengal was only introduced in seven 
out of forty-six districts, playing an insignificant role in the criminal administration 
system and treated with similar disdain by the majority of the population. Yet the 
importance of jury trial was always measured in political terms. For preserving the 
peace and well-being of the empire, trial by jury was useless to the government. But 
crucially, as one article noted, it was looked on with ‘pride by a class of people 
whose idea of progress rests on the imitation of English institutions...they view trial 
by jury as a trusted safeguard of their lives and property.’89 Jury trial was a ‘political 
advantage’ that would ensure that the legal system seemed less ‘foreign’ to the 
Indian people. It was intended to give the people the impression that they had a say 
in ‘their administration’ whilst at the same time extolling the virtues of British 
presence in India. Removal of jury trial in India would endanger the role it played as 
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a tool justifying British presence in the colony. Indeed, the authorities did succeed in 
promoting the idea of jury trial to educated members of the native community who 
went on to demand that jury trial be introduced in all districts. The circular of 1892 
was inevitably regarded as an attempt to deny the population ‘bulwark of liberty’ and 
at a congress meeting held in Allahabad in December 1892, members would describe 
the circular as a ‘retrograde, reactionary and injurious policy harmful to the best 
interests of the country.’90  
 Educated members of the native community had long been aware of how the 
jury system signified racial exclusivity, a point that the colonial government 
explained with much difficulty. In 1872, racial difference had become even more 
firmly entrenched in the law when James Fitzjames Stephen declared that the finality 
associated with jury decisions could never work in a country in which ‘control and 
supervision by one set of courts over another’91 was the foundation of colonial law. 
Finality, thus, was removed and native jury decisions were subject to revision by the 
High Court. At the same time, following the increasing numbers of Indian officials 
working within the judicial system, the government had come to the decision that the 
inequality embedded in the legal system had to become less visible. European 
members of the community, who up to that point could avoid being subjected to the 
local courts in the interior, were convinced to surrender their right to call for trial by 
jury and were as a result now subjected instead to the local courts. In return, 
however, they were provided the privilege of being tried only by a European 
magistrate in the interior. Inequality thus was still very much a part of the legal 
system and it would be an issue that would be keenly felt in 1883 following the 
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introduction of the controversial Ilbert Bill. Indeed, the significance of the uproar 
following the circular of 1892 becomes even more apparent when one considers it 
alongside the Ilbert Bill as both forcefully highlighted the legal distance between the 
European community and the native population in the interior districts.  
The circular issued by Charles Elliot was introduced only eight years after 
Courtenay Ilbert put forward a proposal which recommended that native district 
magistrates in the interior districts be given the right to try a European accused. Up 
until that point, any case involving a European accused which came before native 
magistrates would have to be transferred to a European magistrate. The trigger to this 
proposal was the administrative inconvenience involved in these transferrals. Added 
to this concern, were the reported violent excesses of British planters against their 
Indian employees, and the legal protection that the former could receive. It was in 
light of these issues and the need for justice to be seen, a crucial feature of colonial 
rule in India, that Ilbert had put forward the controversial proposal.  
The outcome was violent opposition in both India and the metropole, with 
members of the British community highlighting the need for legal protection in a 
colony in which they were outnumbered and vulnerable. Racial distinction in the 
law, whereby they were to be tried by members of their own race, was a necessity.  
The opposition only abated once the proposal was largely modified. One significant 
modification was the ‘compromise’ by which native magistrates were permitted to 
try Anglo-Indians but crucially, the latter could once again demand trial by jury, half 
of whose members had to be British or American. It was, as the Lieutenant Governor 
of Bengal would describe, a revolutionary enactment by which jury trial, formerly a 
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feature of both Sessions and High Courts, would be introduced into the magistrate 
court for the first time – but only for a select group. 
The Legislative Council meeting which preceded the modified bill of 1884 
included an in-depth discussion of racial distinction in the legal system.92 Ilbert 
himself stated that the objective had never been to introduce racial equality. The bill 
was only intended to include a very small number of Indian district magistrates, with 
the local government having complete control over the recruitment process. 
Crucially, he added, he had never proposed ‘the abolition of racial distinctions for 
judicial purposes...these would affect the privileges the European community 
enjoyed and which we would never take away.’93 The idea had been simply to 
remove race as a sole factor in disqualifying an Indian candidate. Trial by jury, as 
ineffectual and undesirable as it was, even in the metropole, was still a necessary 
institution for the European community in India, who by their very difference 
required their own law. Fellow council member Kristodas Pal stated that it was 
admirable that an English accused was given the option of seeking trial by jury 
instantly, a right not even available in many cases in the metropole, but he only 
wished ‘that it was a right that could also have extended to my fellow 
countrymen...with a jury full of Englishmen, will justice be received?’94  
What troubled Pal in particular was the fact that the modified bill of 1884 had 
not been issued to the local government for fuller consideration. What instead had 
occurred was private correspondence between the government of India and members 
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of the European community prior to the modification that would ensure immediate 
jury trial for a European accused when faced with an Indian magistrate. It excluded 
the involvement of Indian opinion. It was, as the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal 
noted, an extraordinary provision for extraordinary circumstances. The circular of 
1892 was formed in similar conditions. It involved a secret two-year enquiry between 
government officials and again excluded popular Indian opinion.  
The crucial difference between the two-year enquiry and modified bill, 
however, was that the enquiry was formed with the intention of restricting jury trial 
for the Indian accused. It was, in a sense, ordinary restrictions for ordinary times. 
When the rights of a minority ruling group were endangered, then the law was 
modified accordingly and jury trial safeguarded their rights. When the rights of the 
Indian majority were highlighted by nationalists, and the role of trial by jury in 
safeguarding these rights, the government pointed to the failings of the ordinary 
system of law as a whole and the unsuitability of jury trial in ordinary law courts. 
Trial by jury for the European was a much valued and necessary privilege in a 
foreign locale, a system that would protect vulnerable Europeans from the flawed 
ordinary machinery of law. To receive justice, it was argued in 1883, the European 
had to turn to people of their own race who would share the same level of 
understanding.  
Eight years later, the Europeans reversed this argument by stating that the 
Indian accused could not receive the same level of consideration from his own peers 
because caste, communal or other personal enmity would always surface and lead to 
a miscarriage of justice. Trial by jury for the Indian, it was argued, would always be 
ineffective as it was incompatible with native habits and customs and only 
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contributed to the numerous flaws in ordinary law courts. The complete removal of 
this ‘boon’ was out of the question due to political considerations. What was 
necessary instead was to introduce safeguards which would provide the executive 
with more control over native jury verdicts. It may have been acceptable for the 
Indian to provide justice according to his own views within his own local 
environment, but within the official arena of a court, which emphasised the 
importance of conviction as well as jury trial as the right of the privileged few, the 
opportunities to provide justice in the British court would always be limited. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
The colonial court of law was one arena which justified British presence in India. It 
was the arena that was intended to signify the supremacy of British law, order and 
justice. The colonial government was able to make British presence visible to the 
local population through the courts of law. But on a practical level, that same arena 
would also make visible the contradictions and dilemmas of colonial rule. The 
limitations of colonial policy, which placed emphasise upon preservation rather than 
radical change, meant that this was an arena within which judicial authorities were 
always unsure of how far to interfere in particularly sensitive matters. This was 
particularly a problem when marital disputes amongst the Muslim community made 
their way into the British court.  Without a registered document as proof of marriage, 
these disputes were difficult for the presiding magistrate to successfully resolve. The 
government had tried to alleviate the problem through the introduction of certain 
legislation, by which it had attempted to convince members of the Muslim 
community to voluntarily register their marriages. It was an attempt that met with 
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limited success.95 Marital legislation aside, when local magistrates personally 
handled local disputes of various kinds, they had to ensure that the resources of the 
court were adapted to meet the requirements of the locality. The instruction of their 
superiors was simply that any modifications be made quietly and without scandal, as 
the memorials of dismissed magistrates indicated. The personal strain of trying to 
maintain the public image of colonial authority whilst meeting the demands of the 
locality were also visible in the memorials that were presented to the court. 
Adapting official procedure would be beset by a number of problems. One 
officiating judge in 1891 ruefully noted that ‘evidence is recorded as if the deputy 
magistrate was a sort of typewriter worked by the witness.’96 Indeed, a magistrate had 
to act in such a manner because, in the Indian environment, justice involved more 
than a simple conviction of the accused.  Justice for the Indian could mean a number 
of things – negotiation, compromise or causing great inconvenience to an opponent. 
Governmental courts, Marc Galanter has maintained, can act as a weapon by which 
dominant groups in the locality can intimidate and harass their opponents. Yet at the 
same time they could be employed by the ‘local underdogs who could now carry the 
fight outside the local arena by enlisting powerful allies elsewhere.’97 Yet again, the 
court could act as an ‘additional option’ open to the villagers whereby bad cases, in 
which either side simply could not arrive at a compromise, were buried in the state 
courts. The court, as a result, had to be adapted to accommodate a wide of range of 
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behaviours, acting less as a site of dispute resolution, in which outright victory was 
key, and more as a forum in which people could quarrel, bargain and negotiate.  
As adaptive as the colonial court of law was to conditions of the locality, one 
can also recognise the points where the colonial government drew a line and refused 
to adapt any further. It was acceptable for the Indian to employ the resources of the 
court, particularly when the end result involved both parties eventually settling their 
dispute privately within the confines of their village. At least then the verdict took 
place outside the British court. Any variations were explained away by the 
authorities by an emphasis upon the ‘peculiarities’ of the people and their forms of 
local justice. The image that the authorities had wished to portray of the British court 
was at least protected. But to allow the Indian to provide justice within the British 
court was an entirely different matter, as the controversial subject of jury trial clearly 
demonstrated.  
For native forms of justice to coexist with the ‘superior’ justice of the 
colonial authorities, and that too within the official legitimate arena of the colonial 
court of justice, would create a number of difficulties. Firstly, as demonstrated in the 
initial section of this chapter, coexistence within the official arena involved 
recognition of different norms and values of Indian jurors which were at odds with 
the colonial model of justice. But above all, the placement of the native juror within 
the colonial court publicly undermined the image of supremacy. To have an Indian 
juror sitting in a colonial court setting aside official procedure was too visible a 
public reminder of how limited the supremacy and legitimacy of the British court 
actually was.    
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Equally important, trial by jury turned public attention to the distance 
between the Indian population and members of the European community. In other 
words, the jury system heightened awareness of racial distinctions ingrained within 
the colonial system, which served as a glaring example of the difference that was 
embedded in a legal structure which in theory was designed to promote equality. 
This in turn directed the public gaze, particularly the gaze of the nationalist, to the 
wider problems of the court system such as the uneasy relationship between the 
superior courts and the executive government.98 In particular, the jury issue once 
again highlighted the judicial-executive debate, a debate which raised uncomfortable 
issues such as the prevalence of despotic rule and the uneasy coexistence of both 
colonial and democratic law in British India. These were issues and uncomfortable 
questions that the jury system raised and the only way to respond to the jury issue 
was to ensure that it remained a limited feature in the colony. 
The British courts of justice, then, revealed a number of contradictions and 
dilemmas of colonial rule in India. The most important role of the colonial courts of 
law was to maintain an image of superiority in spite of the difficult questions they 
posed about the nature of British rule in the colony. The fractures and inconsistencies 
which existed within the system allowed those employing the courts to easily subvert 
the law of the court and assert themselves in various ways. Laxmi Telinee, 
mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, employed the court once the dispute arose. 
Once the dispute had been settled privately, she was content to discard that same 
                                                          
98
 Manmohan Ghose, a leading barrister and member of the Indian National Congress, was 
particularly vocal throughout the judicial-executive debate ‘If we are fit to have justice administered 
in Bengal according to that high ideal of impartiality and fairness which prevails in England’, he 
argued, ‘then do not give us the shadow and take away the substance...if the English model is unsuited 
to the country, better abolish all Courts of Justice and revert to the old Oriental and patriarchal 
system’. See Prithwis Chandra Ray, The Separation of Judicial and Executive Functions in British 
India: A Compilation of Authoritative Opinions and Statements on Both Sides of the Question, 1783-
1900 (Calcutta: City Book Society, 1902) p. 9 
227 
 
court. Jury members, when they were employed, would adapt the jury system of the 
court so that it resembled the decision making process to which they were 
accustomed. Furthermore, the challenges that the authorities would receive from 
within the colonial network, in the form of memorials from dismissed officials and 
similar cases, would further fracture the imperial agenda. As a result, for local 
agencies, the court would act as another flexible forum which they could employ in 





































Chapter Six: Conclusion 
The objective of this study has been to analyse the various forces and influences that 
shaped the working of the system of criminal administration in Bengal. This was a 
system designed to enable information to flow seamlessly from one agency to the 
next until a dispute was resolved and ‘justice delivered’. It was a network of control 
that did not simply settle for control over official agencies in the form of the police 
and the courts of law. It penetrated deeply into the rural interior and required the 
chowkidar as the key link which connected the distant rural population to the 
colonial state. The visibility of British rule was thus ensured in this process of 
connecting informal networks within village society with the formal legal network of 
control.  
British rule in India had a profound impact upon Indian society on a political, 
social and economic level, and it was the colonial law introduced by the British that 
played a crucial role in reshaping the social order of Indian society. As Rajeev 
Dhavan has argued, the ‘single achievement of the Raj was to bring the entire social 
and political economy within the shadow of its law and legal institutions.’1 Colonial 
law was at the core of several transformations: the empirical investigative 
techniques, which transformed communities into ‘criminal tribes’ thereby bringing 
them under the legal gaze; the economic policies which altered land relations and 
brought disputes within the legal arena; and the construction of legal and social 
identities. Equally important was the ideological significance of the law, central to 
the civilising mission in India which justified British presence in India. The colonial 
policeman, the court of law, the magistrate – these were all the markers of the 
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colonial state, markers that were designed to emphasise the authority of British 
power. 
 It was in the province of Bengal that these markers of the state were 
particularly influenced by systems of informal control at the village level. In the rural 
districts of other Indian provinces, the colonial state could rely on a number of 
indigenous agencies to provide information, particularly relating to criminal cases. 
Such agencies, it was felt by the authorities, were not available in Bengal. With lack 
of an efficient agency through which to maintain contact with village society below 
the district level, the government of Bengal sought to transform traditional 
institutions and clothe them in a language of what they considered ‘local self 
government.’ Thus, it was in Bengal that an institution like the chowkidari panchayat 
was created for the first time by the British government for purely executive 
purposes. The aim was really to ensure that by remunerating the chowkidar village 
society would feel that they had a voice, a type of self governance.  
The system in reality may have been designed to ensure the passing of 
criminal information from chowkidar to police but the promotion of the idea of local 
self-government, and the subsequent connection with colonial law, had a significant 
impact in Bengal. The concept of local governance was closely linked to the ideal of 
the responsible, moral Indian following the rule of law, which was crucial in the 
formation of identity in Bengal. Anindita Mukhopadhyay, for instance, has argued 
that the Bengali bhadralok constructed a distinct social identity through the selective 
use of western legal discourse, one in which the emphasis upon the bhadralok as ‘the 
good legal subject’ was key in maintaining the separation between them and the 
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chotolok.2  The use of colonial law in creating a distinct identity which centred 
around the idea of a law abiding population capable of self government meant that it 
was in Bengal that demands for constitutional reforms became particularly 
pronounced. This in turn was connected with a brand of provincial nationalism 
considered by the British to be particularly troublesome.3  
The might of British power was also effectively undermined on a subtler, yet 
equally significant, level by lesser known ordinary, mundane cases in Bengal which 
ensured that the institutions of the state functioned in ways that were more conducive 
to the needs of local society. They demonstrate the ways in which official institutions 
had to cooperate with more informal methods of control below the district level. 
Such a relationship would bring into sharper focus the often fragile nature of the 
relationship between state and local society, a fragile relationship more visible in 
Bengal than in other Indian provinces. The markers of the colonial state, thus, may 
have enhanced the visibility of British power to the local population, but they also 
emphasised how fractured this power was. The system of criminal administration in 
Bengal was the site where the fissures in colonial policy, the contests and the 
distortion of state institutions would be highlighted continuously throughout the 
colonial period. It was also the site which made visible the complexities of the 
interaction between state and local society.  
The network of control in Bengal transcended rigid binaries of power in 
which coloniser and colonised were pitted against each other, the latter subjected to 
the all-powerful Orientalist gaze of the former. Rather, the network acted as an arena 
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within which local agency could not only undermine imperial agendas but employ 
the system in ways that allowed them to, in a sense, establish their presence within 
the colonial network of control and set their own terms and conditions. And it was 
not only people of the locality that asserted themselves within the framework of the 
state. Officials employed by the colonial state- the policeman, the magistrate- would 
also publicly undermine the might of British power by operating legal institutions in 
ways that suited the conditions of the locality under their control. Thus, not only was 
the rhetoric of empire undermined from outside the network of control by local 
agencies, but also challenged from within. 
Subverting over-arching imperial agendas was made possible by the 
inconsistencies of colonial policy. The rhetoric of empire, and the civilising mission 
in India, was undermined by the practicalities of colonial rule, in which the cost of 
running the colonial administration and the desire to maintain a policy of non-
interference in matters not directly threatening to the colonial state were key 
components. These priorities were particularly visible in the working of various 
committees set up to address the failings of the system of criminal administration. 
For instance, the committee led by John Beames in 1890, which went on to publish 
its findings in 1891, was the first major investigation into the workings of the system 
of criminal administration since 1838. That it would be as limited in scope as 
previous reports is evident in the papers of the committee meeting held on 8 
December 1890, when committee member Raja Peary Mohun Mukherjee expressed a 
desire to examine ‘witnesses from all ranks of the community, including chowkidari 
panchayats, to find out what they have to say.’4 Beames’ response, in contrast, 
emphasised the practical difficulties of expense and of selecting those whose 
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opinions were of enough value to justify the time the government invested in 
examining these witnesses. As a result, it was the leading public associations and 
private individuals who would be consulted. The main aim was to try to ensure that 
criminal information was gained from local agencies and the affairs of the interior 
became known to the colonial authorities. Trying to actually address the needs of the 
locality, and aid the process of local self-governance, was not a priority. 
The practical concerns of empire ensured that colonial rule was defined by 
fears that the administration did not ‘know’ the people of the colony. This would 
further fuel stereotypes about the local population, carefully constructed images 
about the population which were designed to justify foreign rule in India. But, as 
chapter two of this study has tried to demonstrate, whilst colonial constructions could 
exaggerate racial stereotypes and subjugate Indian agency to the ‘colonial gaze’ they 
still could provide an insight into the everyday realities of that agency. The vast array 
of cases in the police administration reports focused upon the violence, immorality, 
adultery which ‘prevailed’ amongst the local populace, which in turn strengthened 
colonial constructions about the local populace. But upon a closer reading of these 
cases, and looking beneath the constructions, one can still view everyday ‘ground 
realities’ that simply cannot be dismissed as part of a hegemonic colonial discourse. 
Honour, reputation, economic survival in the form of the panha system, women 
striking a blow to patriarchal authority- these were just some of the concerns at the 
centre of all criminal cases that made their way into the police administration reports. 
Whilst they fuelled the colonial stereotype, they nonetheless provide an insight into 
real, non-political concerns of the people which were not directly concerned with any 
broader, imperial agendas. Neither can the construction of the Dhatura thug be easily 
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dismissed because, again, if the construction is peeled away then one can note the 
anxieties of the colonial rulers themselves. Having no control over the production of 
certain poisons, the only thing they could do was to, once again, fall back on 
stereotypes that would conceal their panic about the limitations of colonial rule. 
The handling of criminal groups, whose presence suggested the existence of 
an alternative to the sole authority of the colonial state, required more than the 
creation of stereotypes. The colonial state introduced special legal measures to 
repress these threats and employed both police and the law courts to enforce them. 
Yet, at the same time, when ‘ordinary’ crime and ‘everyday’ forms of conflict arose, 
one notices that the British system was flexible, allowing indigenous forms of 
authority to exist. 
The inconsistencies inherent within colonial policy effectively created a 
flexible system of criminal administration which would allow local society to adapt 
the system according to different circumstances. Indeed, the manner in which each 
agency worked highlights a number of rural responses ranging from outright 
rejection to accommodation. Rejection was apparent in the case of the chowkidar and 
the rural agencies, which were reorganised in a way that aided the information-
gathering process following the introduction of Act (VI) of 1870. It was a change 
that made visible the differences in perceptions concerning law, authority and power. 
For rural elites to serve on a panchayat only to ensure the regular payment of a 
chowkidar, without any real form of power formally given by the colonial state, ran 
counter to their expectations. The chowkidar was customarily part of a powerful rural 
network in which his sole responsibility was to serve the various needs and demands 
of the local elites. These rural elites were not opposed to British rule and indeed they 
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wished for some form of official recognition within the colonial network which 
would provide them with a role of responsibility and power. But to serve on an 
agency simply to ensure the smooth passing of criminal information and the 
remuneration of the local chowkidar in a sense created the impression that the 
powerful elite now simply existed to serve the needs of their chowkidars. For the 
landlord, this reversal in the traditional master-servant relationship, which existed 
between chowkidar and landlord, had the potential to impact negatively upon the 
way in which rural society perceived their rural masters.  
Local elites were willing to serve on the panchayat, and thereby work under 
the colonial state, but they wanted adequate recognition that would preserve their 
power and authority over their village. They wanted to be known as local 
magistrates, not merely collectors of the salary of the chowkidar. Similarly, those 
who acted as jury members within the British court did attempt to work according to 
the regulations of the court but, as was discussed in the fourth chapter of this study, 
the requirements of the jury system were, in comparison to local forums of decision-
making, far more restrictive and rigid in their scope. 
The tussle between local elites and the colonial administration over the 
information-gathering process and their conflicting visions of power and authority 
had a direct impact upon the official network of control. The chowkidar, as a direct 
result of the reluctance to bring him within the official machinery of colonial 
policing and control, remained firmly tied to the rural control network and attempts 
to make both panchayat and the chowkidar carry out the work of the state were 
limited. This had implications for both the police and the colonial courts of law, 
eliciting another form of response. Whilst local elites rejected legislation designed to 
235 
 
maintain them as ‘errand boys’ of the colonial state, they, and indeed the rural 
population, still made use of the agencies of the state, albeit in ways that suited their 
own needs and demands.  
Whilst it was true that the thana police were often an unpopular agency, the 
fact also remains that they were still a visible force within rural society and had to 
change the rules and regulations of the state to meet local circumstances. The 
colonial policeman could be a force of terror but even he knew the limits of his 
power, aware that his ability to gather information from local society depended upon 
preserving a certain relationship with that society. At the same time it can be argued 
that his decision to re-adapt legal procedure was his way of asserting himself within 
the network of control. In this network, he was poorly regarded and poorly paid, 
forever stereotyped as barbaric and corrupt. David Bayley has argued that corruption 
provides low placed officials with a level of power.5 One can apply this argument to 
acts that extend beyond traditional definitions of corruption. Thus, by adapting the 
official procedure to local requirements- dismissing certain cases, altering ‘facts’ so 
local agents could maintain their anonymity- the colonial policeman could, in a 
sense, display a form of power and authority. In a system in which he was excluded 
from power, adapting the system was his attempt at having a stake in the system and 
prevent being completely alienated from a system in which he was often frustrated. 
Of course he had to be careful not to completely alienate the local community in the 
process, but the knowledge that he had the power to subvert official procedure and 
use that power against the local community if required, was everything. 
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 The courts of law would find themselves in the similar position of having to 
adapt procedure to local requirements. As an examination of the memorials of 
dismissed officials has shown, officials of these courts, like the colonial policeman, 
were essentially caught between the demands of two systems. The realities of village 
life and local perceptions concerning justice meant that the courts had to adapt the 
official procedure of the state to meet the demands of local society. The local judge 
worked in an environment within which the British court, although the symbol of 
colonial supremacy on an ideological level, was, on a practical level, one forum 
amongst many in the eyes of the local system, one in which opponents could quarrel 
and negotiate in equal measure. That many officials would ignore official procedure 
and even publicly criticise the network of control was further evidence that the 
rhetoric of empire was contested by a number of groups.  
It was not the existence of a flexible network of control which troubled the 
colonial authorities but its visibility. The appeals of dismissed officials, the conflict 
between the police and the courts of law, between the courts of law and the executive 
government and the power struggles existing amongst officials, ensured conflicts 
which were played out in the public eye. This placed the colonial government in a 
position whereby they had to acknowledge publicly the limits of both their authority 
and the ideology upon which British rule rested.  
 The various forces which shaped the working of the system of criminal 
administration – the limitations of colonial policy, the conflict of interests between 
rural networks and the agencies of the state, the rejection of the system in some 
instances, the manipulation of it to meet personal agendas in others and the 
reworking of the system by both officials and members of rural society – 
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demonstrate the flexibility of the system. It was a flexibility which provided local 
society with a space within which their views could be aired and their identity 
asserted. Justice for the local community was far more than that envisioned within 
the law codes of the state, with their emphasis upon evidence, conviction of the 
‘accused’ and punishment.  
For local society, the agencies of the state, particularly the court of law, were 
sites where the grievances which defined personal relationships within everyday 
local society could be further played out. That the chowkidar aided this process was a 
given as he was closely entwined with rural society. The police and the magistrate 
also had to adjust their official conduct to meet local demands. This was a 
recognition on their part that the conflicts and grievances which defined relationships 
within village society required the agencies to work in ways which reflected local 
perceptions of justice and dispute resolution. 
Attempts to develop local self government in Bengal during the period under 
review in this thesis were ultimately shaped by imperial motives to create agencies 
that would simply aid police work. The establishment of local self governance was 
never the primary concern. Yet, as this thesis has demonstrated, the local populace 
could still in a sense establish their own form of local self governance, employing the 
agencies of the state in ways more conducive to the moral economy of the locality. It 
was local society who demanded that the magistrate and the policeman readapt the 
court and thana respectively so as to provide the community with their own forms of 
justice. It was only after 1914, a year which marks the point where this study ends, 
that the dynamics of local self governance, and indeed colonial rule, changed. The 
year 1914 marks an appropriate end point for this thesis because the administrative 
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changes introduced by the colonial state had the potential to impact the relationship 
between indigenous agencies and official institutions in ways which differed 
markedly from earlier periods. The colonial state devolved more powers to local 
agencies which had previously supplemented official legal institutions. The 
placement of such agencies on an official footing with a permanent stake in the 
official apparatus, at a time when both rural and urban sensibilities combined to form 
mass nationalism against colonial rule, inevitably affected how legal institutions 
responded to the changed circumstances in the later period of the British Raj. These 
themes can be more effectively addressed as part of a separate study. 
The impact of colonial rule is evident in postcolonial India, which has 
inherited the machinery of control, and the dilemmas that have shaped it, from the 
colonial era. Communities considered to be a threat to the authority of the state 
continue to be targeted by this machinery, in particular those now known as the 
denotified tribes. At the same time, communities also feel that the Indian constitution 
favours ‘the backward, poor and displaced at the expense of the majority 
community.’6 In this, the postcolonial state has inherited the dilemma of trying to 
balance the needs of the democratic state with the conflicting demands of individual 
communities. It is the problem of trying to create a secular state, of trying to keep the 
‘secular from the sacred’ as one scholar has described it, when religion, law and 
politics within Indian society are closely entwined.
7
 Like their colonial predecessors, 
scholars have argued, the transformation of a ‘religious’ concern into a secular one, 
thereby allowing the court to intervene involves a research process which redefines 
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religion and the rights of the religious community.
8
 Thus, the law has continued the 
process of redefining the ‘private sphere’ in a way that allows legal intervention. The 
law of the modern Indian state departs from traditional Indian thought. It is a 
departure, as scholar Robert Moog has suggested, which has a negative impact upon 
the Indian judge, who faces both isolation as a result of state attempts to weaken 
traditional kinship ties and also resistance from local level officials who resist change 
which affects their own interests.9 
 The manner in which the postcolonial Indian state operates, then, would 
suggest that there is the existence of a ‘democratic deficit’ within the country. Yet 
one can argue that when one speaks of a ‘democratic deficit’ one is subscribing to 
Western requirements of a modern nation state. In practice, as Akhil Gupta has 
noted, the ‘rigid categories of “state” and “civil society” are descriptively inadequate 
as terms for the lived realities that they purport to represent.’10 In a similar vein, 
anthropologist Anastasia Norton-Piliavsky has maintained that the ‘State’ and society 
cannot be considered in isolation from each other.11  
The Indian state, and the agencies which represent this state, is one within 
which officials can manipulate those who make use of state agencies. But, Gupta has 
added, the people can also attack and ‘use the hierarchical nature of state institutions 
for their own ends...seizing on the fissures and ruptures, the contradictions in the 
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policies, programs, institutions and discourses of the “State” allows people to create 
possibilities for political action and activism.’12 Of course just who this activism and 
these development programmes are intended to benefit is itself open to question.13 
The institutions of the state, thus, can be employed by powerful groups within 
society to oppress others but at the same time the hierarchical structure of the state is 
dynamic and flexible enough to provide an arena within which the aggrieved can still 
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